FOREIGN AFFAIRS

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America's "New Thinking"
Daniel Yankelovich* and *Richard Smoke

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Daniel Yankelovich
Richard Smoke

AMERICA'S "NEW THINKING"

The American public is willing to experiment with winding down the cold war. But this "new thinking" in America differs in at least one important respect from Mikhail Gorbachev's "new thinking" about Soviet-American relations. Gorbachev seems to want to make changes swiftly. Americans insist upon proceeding cautiously, testing Soviet good faith at each step. The average American wants to explore new possibilities but cannot easily brush aside forty years of hostility and mistrust. The attitudes of the American public have been tempered by disappointment with the détente of the 1970s. The public feels that the Soviets took advantage of the United States, and does not want to be "tricked" again.

Without sensitive management of the superpower relationship from both sides, a disjunction could open up between these differing tempos that could create difficulties for years to come. No new American administration, Republican or Democratic, will want to nor can afford to move more rapidly than the American public. But public attitudes are shifting too. Despite ambivalences, a striking pattern of change in public attitudes is radically altering the boundaries within which U.S.-Soviet policies can be shaped in the next few years.

II

The current attitude of Americans toward the Soviet Union is different from anything we have seen in forty years. It is not the troubled mood of recent years, of worry about nuclear war. It is not the mood of the beginning of this decade, when

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Daniel Yankelovich is President of The Public Agenda Foundation and Chairman of The Daniel Yankelovich Group, Inc. Richard Smoke is Research Director of the Center for Foreign Policy Development and Professor of Political Science, both at Brown University. The authors gratefully acknowledge the contributions of Cyrus Vance, Chairman of The Public Agenda Foundation, and Howard Swearer, President of Brown University and Chairman of the PAF/Brown joint project referred to in this article.

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Americans assertively endorsed a strong military buildup.[1] It is not the mood of the early 1970s, when Americans were overly optimistic about the possibilities of détente. Nor is it the cold war mood of the 1950s and early 1960s. The majority of Americans are now interested in neither a further military buildup nor instant friendship.

The current mood can be characterized as a wary readiness. It is readiness of a special kind: distinctly hopeful yet cautious. The public is hopeful that far-reaching change—perhaps even historic, fundamental change—in relations with the U.S.S.R. is in the offing. The nation is ready to embrace the prospect of fundamental change as time passes, if it meets America's needs. But the "if" is a big one, keenly felt. The country remains suspicious and mistrustful of the Soviets. If change proves a trap, Americans will be unsurprised; they are equally ready to embrace a new round of strenuous global competition.

This duality is easily misunderstood. But on close inspection it proves to be a rational, hard-headed stance upon which a new national consensus can be firmly built. Because the change is so far-reaching, it is desirable to document it as carefully as possible. Fortunately the evidence is exceptionally abundant this year. Not one but two projects of unusual scope and depth have explored American attitudes on this subject in the past year, in addition to a variety of regular polls.

One project is "Americans Talk Security" (ATS), an ongoing series of 12 bipartisan surveys of registered voters on national security issues conducted on a rotating basis by three firms—a Republican polling firm, a Democratic firm and a politically neutral firm. This project has explored a rich menu of questions on the single topic of national security; the ongoing nature of the project has also permitted ambiguous points to be probed by follow-up, elaborated questions.[2]

The other project is "The Public, the Soviets, and Nuclear

[1] Daniel Yankelovich and Larry Kaagan, "Assertive America," *Foreign Affairs*, America and the World 1980.

[2] The firm used by the Republicans is Market Opinion Research, by the Democrats, Marttila and Kiley, Inc.; the nonpartisan firm is The Daniel Yankelovich Group, Inc. Seven such surveys have been conducted to date. The first "Americans Talk Security" survey was conducted by Marttila & Kiley, Inc., on Oct. 15–18, 1987. ATS 2: Market Opinion Research, Jan. 7–14, 1988; ATS 3: The Daniel Yankelovich Group, Inc., Feb. 17–24, 1988; ATS 4: Marttila & Kiley, Inc., March 22–27, 1988; ATS 5: Market Opinion Research, April 25-May 1, 1988; ATS 6: Marttila & Kiley, Inc., May 24–27, 1988; and ATS 7: The Daniel Yankelovich Group, Inc., June 25–30 and July 5–7, 1988. All of the surveys used a sample size of approximately one thousand. "Americans Talk Security" is sponsored as a public service by Mr. Alan Kay.

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Arms," a joint effort by The Public Agenda Foundation (PAF) and the Center for Foreign Policy Development at Brown University.[3] The latter's research on policy options was interwoven with PAF's research on how the public uses information, to convey policy possibilities in a form accessible to the public.[4]

Both projects offer compelling evidence that Americans have changed their outlook on U.S.-Soviet relations. In the first two years of the Reagan Administration, numerous polls showed that the public endorsed a strong "get-tough" posture. Fewer than one out of five voters supported a conciliatory "negotiating" approach. In this final year of the Reagan era, the public has completely reversed its emphasis. Now, only one in five support the get-tough posture, with large majorities endorsing the view that America should seek to reduce tensions through negotiations and agreements (see Charts I and II).

Just two years ago, in October 1986, a Gallup poll revealed that only about one-third of the voters (37 percent) believed that relations between the United States and the Soviet Union were stable or getting better; 60 percent thought they were getting worse. By July 1988, an astonishing 94 percent thought they were stable or getting better, with a strong majority (68 percent) convinced they are now getting better (ATS 7).

In the summer of 1988, ATS 7 presented voters with a variety of options for U.S.-Soviet cooperation. Six were endorsed at a consensus level (more than seven out of ten voters): working together to combat (1) environmental pollution (85 percent), (2) the illicit drug trade (85 percent) and (3) terrorism (78 percent); (4) expanding cultural exchanges (84 percent); (5) working together to resolve conflicts in the Middle East and other regional trouble spots (72 percent); (6) eliminating most nuclear weapons by the year 2000 (71 percent).[5]

[3] *U.S.-Soviet Relations in the Year 2010: Americans Look to the Future,* A Report of The Public Agenda Foundation and The Center for Foreign Policy Development at Brown University, 1988.

[4] The two projects include unique and innovative features. In the bipartisan ATS project, the three organizations check each other's wordings of questions and interpretation of responses, thereby helping to ensure objectivity. In the PAF/Brown project, the challenge was to get beyond the public's superficial responses to well-considered judgments. This was accomplished by giving a cross-section of nearly one thousand eligible voters some three hours' exposure (including time for group discussion) to four broad directions for policy (to the year 2010), to the pros and cons of each, and to their short-term implications.

[5] The following options received the least support: (1) sharing SDI with the Soviets as it is being developed (28 percent); (2) agreeing to stop work on SDI as part of a nuclear arms agreement (34 percent); (3) agreeing on a 50-percent reduction in long-range nuclear weapons without any reduction in Soviet conventional weapons in Europe (36 percent); (4) or before

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CHART I

PUBLIC ATTITUDES IN THE EARLY REAGAN YEARS


"All the tough talk to the Russians will not be effective unless we back it up with a stronger military."
81%
March 1981 Harris
"By sending military aid to countries threatened by communism and being tough with the Russians, Reagan will rebuild respect for the U.S. in the Kremlin."
73%
March 1981 Harris
"We should take a tougher stand toward the Russians."
70%
November 1980 Los Angeles Times
"Western countries cannot live peacefully with Russia, sooner or later there is bound to be a major war."
68%
February 1980 Gallup
"The Soviet Union is like Hitler's Germany—an evil empire trying to rule the world."
56%
May 1984 Public Agenda Foundation
"We should do nothing that is likely to provoke a U.S.–Russian military conflict but instead try to negotiate and reason out our differences."
16%
February 1980 Roper

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CHART II

CHANGING PUBLIC ATTITUDES TOWARD A "GET–TOUGH" POSTURE



Perhaps even more persuasive is evidence from the PAF/Brown study, which queried citizens about the long-term future (to the year 2010). Here the public was asked not for predictions but for preferences. Before casting their ballots they discussed at length the arguments for and against each of four broad policy alternatives:

—The United States should seek to gain and maintain the upper hand over the U.S.S.R.

—The United States should cooperate with the Soviets in far-reaching steps to reduce the risk of nuclear war, but compete vigorously in all other ways.

—The United States and the Soviets should strive for as much "cooperative problem-solving" as possible, on a variety of problems facing them both.

—The United States should confine its defense commitments to the area around North America.

The participants were urged to consider not just their hopes but what would be feasible and realistic. Even after hearing a range of contrary arguments, people predominantly chose a future of cooperative problem-solving between the superpow-

seeing how the new INF treaty is working out (36 percent); and (5) selling "nonmilitary high technology, like advanced computer equipment and software" (36 percent).

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ers, giving it a decisive plurality of 46 percent. Fully three-quarters named it their first or second choice (see Chart III).

These clear-cut margins on complicated and troubling issues provide powerful evidence that the American people recognize that important changes are now under way in U.S.-Soviet relations, with still greater changes seen as likely and desirable.

A superficial reading of figures like these might suggest that the American public is as ready as it was in the early 1970s for détente. That reading would be a mistake; other questions posed in the "Americans Talk Security" series draw a very different kind of response. The first ATS survey, for instance, shows that two-thirds of the public (68 percent) continue to believe that "we cannot trust what Soviet leaders say, so we should proceed slowly and with caution in responding to Gorbachev." The most recent ATS survey reveals that majorities agree with the following statements: "If we are weak, the Soviet Union at the right moment will attack us or our allies" (56 percent); "The Soviets lie, cheat and steal—they'll do anything to further the cause of communism" (64 percent). Just one month after the Washington summit of December 1987, at which the Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty was signed with much fanfare, 55 percent said that "the Soviets

CHART III

ALTERNATIVE FUTURES FOR THE NEXT CENTURY



NOTE: Percentages add up to more than 100 due to rounding of figures. Figures here are for first choices only.
SOURCE: *U.S.-Soviet Relations in the Year 2010: Americans Look to the Future*, The Public Agenda Foundation and The Center for Foreign Policy Development.

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cannot be trusted to keep their part of the bargain on arms control issues" (ATS 2).

The evidence is unmistakable that Americans continue to harbor deep-seated feelings of mistrust of the U.S.S.R. Despite a strong favorable rating for General Secretary Gorbachev, the American people are definitely not prepared to drop their suspicion of Soviet leaders and their motives.

III

At least five major strands of perception and response combine to create today's singular mixture of hope and wariness. Each of the five is a response to developments over a span of years; none is merely a passing reaction to immediate events.

The first strand is satisfaction among many voters with the achievements of the Reagan Administration. In the assertive mood of 1980, Americans believed the Soviets were gaining ground in the superpower competition. Majorities supported not only a military buildup but also a demonstration of American will. At the start of the Reagan presidency, a substantial part of the public believed we had tried in good faith to make peace with the Soviets, yet the Soviets took advantage of our goodwill to make gains at our expense. The attitude was that the Soviet Union understands only strength and interprets goodwill as weakness. Therefore, the United States had to demonstrate strength.

In the eight years since, these feelings have evidently been satisfied. Significantly, the public today expresses approval of the U.S. military buildup. Sixty-six percent consider that the buildup was "necessary" and only 31 percent call it "unnecessary" (ATS 6). Equally significantly, however, the public now feels no need for any further buildup (84 percent, ATS 3).

The backlash of the 1980–82 period was in substantial measure a reaction to a specific situation—above all, the invasion of Afghanistan—and not a long-term norm. But public attitudes have not returned to the norm of earlier years either, for two reasons.

One is that, although the backlash is emotionally spent, "détente" has become a pejorative word in the American lexicon, one that all American political leaders avoid no matter what their policy preferences. The public attitude is: "once burnt, twice shy." Americans do not want to go through another cycle of superficial improvement in relations, excessive expectations, the exploitation and collapse of good relations,

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and yet another military buildup. They also are determined not to be seen again as naïve.

Despite their caution, Americans also anticipate real change. Not only does a strong majority think U.S.-Soviet relations are getting better, but 80 percent of that majority also expects improvement to be fundamental (ATS 6).

This brings us to the "new thinking" among Americans, and the other four strands of the current mood.

The second strand is economic. In this presidential election year, voters are more worried about American competitiveness in the world economy than about the Soviets. The third ATS survey showed that in choosing the next president, the public is more concerned, by a margin of nearly two to one (62 to 33 percent), that he be someone "who can strengthen our economy" than someone "who will protect our national security interests."

Americans worry that excessive attention to national security may be sapping the economy. Asked in 1983 and again in 1988 whether the American military buildup of this decade has "been good for the overall economy," the proportions responding yes and no have almost exactly reversed: 53 percent to 41 percent said yes in 1983; 53 percent to 39 percent said no in 1988. About three in five believe "the amount of money spent on defense is hurting our economic well-being" (ATS 3, 4). Eighty-six percent of ATS 3 respondents thought that we may "seriously damage our economy by spending too much to defend other countries."

The impact of Gorbachev and his reforms comprise the third strand in the public's attitude today. Americans' regard for Gorbachev has been rising steadily. A June 1986 Harris poll showed that about half (51 percent) reported they had "a favorable impression" of him. By the first ATS survey in October 1987, the figure had risen to two-thirds, and by July 1988 it had reached 83 percent (ATS 7). A favorable impression does not mean that Americans are ready to trust Gorbachev. But the public now believes that he is trying to accomplish a change in the very character of the Soviet Union, not just in the details of its policies. ATS 4 found that 66 percent of the American public thinks that "new Soviet policies will eventually create a more free and open society, versus remaining the closed society it has been in the past."

The fourth strand is a change under way in Americans' perception of the nuclear danger. In the past, the Soviet threat

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and the risk of nuclear war were closely linked, but 67 percent of Americans now say that "nuclear weapons are more likely to be used by terrorists or countries other than the U.S. or Soviet Union" (ATS 4). Seventy-five percent of the participants in the PAF/Brown study rejected the possibility of a direct nuclear attack by the U.S.S.R.; three out of five said that "a smaller country such as Pakistan, Israel or South Africa will eventually use nuclear weapons." Asked what they thought to be "the most likely scenario" by which a nuclear war between the superpowers might start, 52 percent said that "a war in the Third World (for example in the Middle East) will escalate and draw in the superpowers." Only 15 percent thought a deliberate Soviet attack was the most likely possibility.

A mutual reduction in nuclear weapons by the superpowers enjoys strong public support. In spite of suspicion that the Soviets may cheat, the ATS surveys indicate that Americans consistently supported the INF treaty, month after month, at levels above 70 percent. And 70 percent also told ATS 4 that "any mutual reductions in nuclear forces makes the world a safer place and improves our national security."

However, Americans think that a basic change in the overall superpower relationship is more important than arms agreements (ATS 4). The PAF/Brown study reached the same conclusion. An argument participants raised repeatedly in the discussions was that if the relationship was still competitive, the arms race might be relaunched; in the post-discussion questionnaire 73 percent said this was "a convincing argument."

The fifth strand in the public's perception might be seen as an extension of the fourth. Though the evidence here is less extensive, it appears that the public increasingly believes that important problems are no longer just East-West in nature, but global. New technologies and the spread of existing technologies are creating important new dangers. In the PAF/Brown study, one persuasive argument for the "cooperative problem-solving" option was that in the future a variety of global problems will confront the superpowers equally, including pollution, terrorism, overpopulation, medical crises like AIDS, the hazards of nuclear power plants, and nuclear weapons proliferation. This was the most popular argument for or against *any* of the alternative futures: a remarkable 83 percent found it convincing.

In sum, there seems little doubt that in the late 1980s Americans are adopting a more global perspective on potential

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threats. America's economic strength is challenged not by the Soviets but by new competitors from a different part of the world, who seem to be out-trading America on a global scale. To the American public the fearsome possibility of nuclear war derives not primarily from the Soviets but from new nuclear powers (actual and potential) elsewhere around the globe. Finally, new dangers are appearing that are global in their impact.

IV

We can refine Americans' new thinking by clarifying what it does *not* mean. It certainly does not mean that the United States no longer needs to be concerned about military strength. Even though large majorities dismiss the possibility of direct Soviet attack, they clearly do so on the premise that the United States remains strong. In the latest ATS survey, a majority (56 percent) expressed their concern that the Soviets might attack us or our allies "if we are weak."

The public also questions whether Soviet foreign policy has changed in any material respect. A 1984 Public Agenda poll found that Americans agreed, by 56 to 38 percent, that "whenever there is trouble around the world—in the Middle East, Central America or anywhere else—chances are the Soviets are behind it." In 1987 the first ATS survey found that a majority of Americans still believe this, by the nearly identical margins of 58 percent to 37 percent. The U.S.S.R. is still seen as playing for gains in the Third World. In the PAF/Brown project about two-thirds of the participants considered it likely not only that the Soviets would "increase their support of countries like Libya and of terrorist groups," but even that they might "attack other nations in the way they invaded Afghanistan."

More broadly, the public doubts that the two world powers will stop pursuing their interests, even though collisions could result. Because Americans do not think the U.S.S.R. has changed its basic foreign policy, only a third support any reduction in U.S. military spending (ATS 3).

These views are usefully distinguished from those that are indeed new. One is a marked diminution in the fear of nuclear war. Between October 1987 and March 1988 the number of ATS respondents who expect war within the next 25 years fell from 44 to 33 percent (ATS 1 and 4). This is a large reduction in only five months.

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The public believes that superpower nuclear arsenals are decreasing. This perception stands in notable contrast to actual fact, which is that the strategic arsenals are continuing to grow in number of delivery vehicles. The small reduction accomplished by the INF treaty will shortly be neutralized by "normal growth" in other forces. The public's view probably derives from policy declarations from both Washington and Moscow, which for several years now have stressed reductions, not arms "control" or ceilings, as the objective.

The American public has accepted the view (somewhat controversial among specialists) that the Warsaw Pact enjoys a large advantage over NATO in the balance of conventional forces in Europe. For example, the PAF/Brown study found that by a margin of 53 to 33 percent, Americans think that eliminating nuclear weapons would leave the West exposed to the Soviets' "large advantage in non-nuclear forces such as tanks and soldiers." And the public now believes that reductions in nuclear weapons must be linked to changes in conventional forces. The same study found that an impressive 70 percent said that either the U.S.S.R. must reduce, or NATO must increase, conventional forces "before another (nuclear) arms reduction." Only 22 percent favored going ahead with nuclear reductions without either one.

As marked as the contrast between a declining nuclear threat and a continuing global geopolitical threat is the contrast between Soviet foreign and domestic policies. The American public now recognizes clearly not only that enormous changes are under way in the U.S.S.R., but that the changes, if continued, could affect the Soviet system fundamentally. It has been a bedrock perception, endorsed for a long time by enormous majorities, that the Soviet system differs from the American one in the most basic ways. If that perception starts changing in the years to come, the implications could be profound. If Americans come to the conclusion that the U.S.S.R. differs only relatively, not absolutely, from the United States, the ideological core of the conflict could start to melt away.

V

Because some of the hopeful thinking about the future of U.S.-Soviet relations is so new, it has not yet firmly jelled. It is useful, therefore, to assess where the public's views are stable and where they are in flux. While it is not true, as specialists have sometimes believed, that American opinion on foreign

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policy issues is always volatile and hence can be dismissed, it certainly is true that some opinions are volatile.

From the policymaker's viewpoint, a quickly changing public opinion is more difficult to cope with than sustained opposition. Even stable and large opposition gives policymakers an unambiguous perception of where they stand. They can reach a rational decision about when to yield and when to cut losses. Stable majority opposition also has clear roots. Its sources and motives can be analyzed. Policymakers can better assess whether the opposition can be neutralized, or even converted to majority support, by acts of leadership.

Volatility does not offer these advantages, and it provides no firm basis for policy. Volatile opinion is often murky opinion. Uncertain itself, its sources and motives are even more uncertain. Volatility can sometimes mean that the public is in the process of making up its mind, and is thus especially receptive to strong leadership. But it can also mean that the public is only starting to perceive or grapple with the question, or that important values are in serious conflict. Those are treacherous grounds on which to tread.

Opinion is volatile about the future of the Soviet reforms and their meaning for the United States. A majority of Americans have made up their minds that Gorbachev himself is sincere in seeking reform. But, they ask, will he remain in power? Even if he does, can he succeed against great obstacles? And what will reform mean for future Soviet foreign policy—real and durable cooperation or, over the longer run, renewed political and military competition?

The American people are divided and unsure about the relative importance of the Soviet threat, as compared with other threats to American security. ATS 4 (March 1988) found that 48 percent of the public thinks the United States should focus more on other threats like terrorism and economic competition; yet 42 percent say that Soviet aggression is still the greatest threat and should remain the top security priority.

The complexity and ambiguity of the Soviet issue for the public was strikingly illustrated in the PAF/Brown study. Before the discussion, *all four* alternatives for future U.S.-Soviet relations received greater support than they did after. Thus the effect of hearing the arguments was to reduce peoples' initial enthusiasm for their preferences, whatever their preferences might be! Evidently, hearing the pros and cons lessened peoples' confidence in their off-the-top-of-the-head opinions. By the

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same token, a choice after the discussion represents a more considered judgment. (The figures shown on Chart III are the after-discussion choices.)

On certain matters, American views stand firm. One is the commanding importance of economic competitiveness. Worry about whether the United States can compete successfully in the world economy has reached the point where it is, perhaps for the first time, considered a vital issue of national security (ATS 3 and 4). The fourth ATS survey found that a solid majority (59 percent) believes that "economic competitors pose a greater threat to national security than military adversaries do, because they threaten our jobs and economic security."

The same survey offered options for what the United States should do. A decisive majority endorsed "improving the efficiency and productivity of U.S. industries" (61 percent) over "forcing other countries to adopt fairer trade practices" (24 percent). ATS 3 asked people where they would cut spending if they were forced to cut and had to choose just one area. Many more chose "military spending" (55 percent) than "social and domestic programs such as health care, social security and the like" (18 percent) or "economic programs to create jobs and economic growth" (22 percent).

Equally commanding is the need to reduce the risk of nuclear war. A global nuclear holocaust remains so colossal a threat that even a small possibility of it, even in the distant future, creates continuing anxiety. Any measure that can credibly reduce the chances of nuclear war without raising other insecurities will receive overwhelming public support. The public appears firmly convinced that Gorbachev means it when he says he too wants to reduce the nuclear threat (ATS 1 and 2). Americans believe that reducing the global nuclear threat is in the Soviet interest and that the Soviets know it. They feel that the Soviets may also seek nuclear security from the additional, selfish motive that it could make their conventional superiority more important (ATS 2). But that does not deny Soviet pragmatism in wanting to avoid global destruction.

Because of this perception and their own anxiety, Americans are firm that this is a time for negotiation, not confrontation. In three years Gorbachev has done nothing especially threatening, and he wants to talk. So, says the public, let's talk.

Finally, Americans are firm that the United States bears global responsibilities for peace and security which it cannot set down. The PAF/Brown study offered an essentially isola-

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tionist posture as one alternative future. Both before and after hearing the arguments for (as well as against) this option, it was rejected almost unanimously.[6]

VI

Today's public attitudes and values permit some inferences to be drawn for policies that will win widespread public support. Four of them merit attention.

The first and most direct is that the public wants to see U.S.-Soviet relations improve, but it wants American policy to proceed with caution. Americans have little desire for any quick change in East-West relations. Policies that create a public impression of great changes to be achieved rapidly might well call up the memory of "détente" and evoke a negative reaction.

The always useful distinction between short-term and long-term policy choices is unusually important at this juncture. The public itself is now making the distinction. There is hardly any doubt that over the next few years, Americans want the United States to proceed very carefully. ATS 7 asked people specifically whether "we should act now to seek agreements on arms reduction, trade and other issues as rapidly as possible" or whether we should proceed "cautiously, step by step." A decisive margin of 76 percent endorsed proceeding cautiously, against 16 percent in favor of seeking agreements as rapidly as possible. Only four percent endorsed a third possibility offered, that "even under Gorbachev the Soviet Union remains an 'evil empire' and we should not have anything to do with them."

A second general inference is that Americans' strongest support will be reserved for strategies that do not depend on trust. A good example is the INF treaty. That treaty does not enjoy its great public support for traditional "arms control" reasons. Americans understand that the treaty means only a small percentage reduction in either side's nuclear forces. ATS 1–3 and the PAF/Brown studies show that what the public finds interesting in the INF treaty is its novel provisions for on-site inspection in the U.S.S.R. That is the secret of its appeal, winning public approval by margins greater than 70 percent at the very moment that a majority also thinks the Soviets are likely to cheat on arms control. The on-site inspection feature means, to the public, that Americans do not need to rely on

[6] For more on elements of stability and potential consensus in public attitudes, see *Starting with the People*, by Daniel Yankelovich and Sidney Harman, Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1988.

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trust in this agreement. Even if the Soviets do cheat, the small percentage of the total forces involved means the cheating will not make much military difference.

A similar attitude would probably prevail regarding some kinds of limited agreements with the Soviets for mutual restraint in certain areas of the Third World. So long as the outcome meets the two conditions of being visible and low risk, such agreements would likely meet with public approval. Possible areas might include Cambodia and parts of Africa such as Ethiopia.

The principle of "verification," in fact, is moving to the center of the public's attitude about U.S.-Soviet agreements. Only to a small degree does this mean "verification" in the technical sense employed by arms controllers. The PAF/Brown research indicates that the public knows little about, and does not entirely trust, unilateral and technical methods of verification such as satellites, over-the-horizon radars and electronic listening devices. What the public seeks is direct and unambiguous verification, such as American inspectors on Soviet territory. The public wants the evidence to be so direct and clear that if the Soviets do cheat, the whole world will know it and believe it. The public definitely does not want verification to degenerate into an arcane debate among technical wizards, with Washington and Moscow trading charges and countercharges that few people can even understand, much less judge.

The desire of Americans not to rely on trust has sometimes been misunderstood. It is simply a "common sense" attitude much resembling attitudes in other spheres of life. For instance, many transactions in the world of commerce do not rely entirely on trust. Large corporations maintain internal auditors to follow the money trail, and also hire external auditors to check on them, and then superimpose a third level of checks and balances, typically in the form of an audit committee of the board of directors. Businesses sign contracts that are legally enforceable, reducing reliance on trust. Nor do businesses necessarily expect to develop blind trust over time, as some people apparently feel the United States and the Soviet Union should do.

Americans would be relieved to find new mechanisms that permit agreements with minimal dependence on trust. There can be no enforceable legal contracts because there is no authority to enforce them. But independent verification by each side of the other's behavior can play an important role. If

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one side cheats, future "contracts" will not be signed, and other current ones may be in jeopardy.

The word "verification" does not entirely capture what Americans are seeking, which is why they will sometimes express dissatisfaction with this term too. What they want is a low-risk, working relationship that improves only if and when the good faith of the other side has been clearly demonstrated.

ATS 7 gives some indication of what Americans mean when they speak of trust and good faith. The elements of good faith that majorities feel are "absolutely essential" in the other party are that "they abide by treaty commitments" (68 percent declare this absolutely essential) and "they tell the truth in dealing with us" (67 percent). Significantly, in judging good faith, the public draws a sharp distinction between a country whose "citizens enjoy basic human rights" (deemed absolutely essential by 53 percent) and a country that is "a democracy" (deemed absolutely essential by only 29 percent). Only 14 percent consider it absolutely essential to good faith that "their customs, culture and language are similar to ours."

The desire to verify is also part of our third general inference for U.S. policy: Americans will support strategies that test the Soviet Union's good faith while achieving something constructive. "Testing strategies" appeal to both the hopeful and wary halves of the two-sided readiness. The tests may yield more weighty proofs that the Soviets are indeed finally changing; that is the hope. But convincing proofs are demanded; that is the wariness.

For many years Americans have heard numerous charges from their leaders in Washington that the Soviets have cheated on past agreements. An Associated Press/Media General poll shows that 61 percent believes that the Soviets do not keep their side of arms control agreements. Americans also see a new Soviet leader who is trying to change, at least in some ways, the very character of the Soviet state. Perhaps under Gorbachev the U.S.S.R. will continue to cheat; perhaps not. Again the public's attitude is pragmatic: let's find out.

This is another part of the INF treaty's appeal. The on-site inspection provision gives the United States an opportunity to probe whether or not Soviet behavior is truly changing. Will inspection provide adequate and reliable information in actual practice? Only experience will tell. But the possibility is worth exploring. Success could lead toward the "verification" type of relationship not requiring blind trust. And since the INF treaty

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involves such a small fraction of U.S. nuclear power, it also satisfies the desire to proceed cautiously.

One of the creative challenges facing the next administration will be to devise additional "testing strategies" that can speak simultaneously to the hopeful and wary parts of the public's stance. Conventional reductions in Europe may be one area where the Soviets might be profitably tested at low risk.

Our last general inference is the simplest, and it applies to both superpowers: the temptation must be resisted to exploit short-term opportunities that could, in the public's mind, jeopardize the relationship. Today's constellation of American attitudes represents a balance that can be easily shaken. The implications could be tragic. There is a genuine readiness in America today to evolve an altogether new relationship with the U.S.S.R., if the Soviets will genuinely put their "new thinking" into practice. By almost four-to-one margins (59 percent to 16 percent) Americans would rather help than hurt the Soviet economy in the interests of promoting greater freedom and democracy (ATS 6). But the evolution will take time. Some major rupture in U.S.-Soviet relations could derail the evolution in ways that would make it very difficult to restore for a long time.

The on-again, off-again pattern (cold war-détente-cold war-détente) leaves a residue of skepticism in the public mind. At this point in the history of the U.S.-Soviet relationship, when the two superpowers are trying to build mutual confidence, it is essential that the fragile confidence not be dashed. The result could actually be worse than what existed before, were a "psychology of disappointment" to emerge. In our view, it would not just be equally hard to rebuild confidence once again in the future—it might be impossible.

The American public is ready to accept that fundamental change in the U.S.S.R. can truly come to pass; it is also ready to accept that change may prove a chimera. Americans are feeling hope and wariness in equal measure. It is too soon—much too soon—to make decisions or start acting on the assumption that the Soviets mean what they now say. It is not too soon to begin some new thinking about the possibility.

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Graham T. Allison, Jr.

TESTING GORBACHEV

Plato identified necessity as the mother of invention. General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev's recognition of the failures of the Soviet economy has inspired an inventiveness in Soviet policy, foreign and domestic, not seen since the death of Lenin. Gorbachev represents a rare combination of pragmatic realism on the one hand, and creative policymaking and public relations on the other. Just as economic determinants are finally imposing constraints that should make the Soviet Union a less formidable military adversary, Gorbachev has already made the Soviet Union a more daunting diplomatic competitor.

Across the East-West agenda, from nuclear and conventional arms control to Afghanistan and Cambodia, Gorbachev has seized the initiative. In the process he is winning too much of the credit for results achieved. Even when all he did was belatedly answer *da* to long-standing Western proposals on intermediate-range nuclear missiles, his skillful presentation of acquiescence persuaded most Europeans that the Soviet Union, not the West, deserved applause for both authorship and execution of this agreement. Today 63 percent of Americans give Gorbachev a "favorable" rating, ahead of any other foreign leader except Britain's Margaret Thatcher. In the Federal Republic of Germany, Gorbachev's approval rating tops President Reagan's by almost two to one.

The American response to Gorbachev's active diplomacy so far has been to hold fast, persisting in policies and proposals developed to address Leonid Brezhnev's Soviet Union, not Gorbachev's. Persistence can be a virtue, certainly preferable to reckless accommodation. Moreover, because Gorbachev is essentially dealing from internal weakness, his unilateral adjustments of Soviet policy are producing significant gains for the West. The Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan, the elimination of all land-based intermediate-range nuclear forces, acceptance of highly intrusive verification procedures (includ-

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ing mandatory on-site inspection), and encouragement of the projected Vietnamese withdrawal from Cambodia—these realize important U.S. objectives.

But by yielding the initiative to Gorbachev, the United States is defaulting on profound opportunities. The failure of American policymakers to develop any concept or strategy for dealing with the "new-thinking" Soviet leadership forfeits what may be a historic chance to push actively for specific and major steps by Moscow that advance Western interests. Equally important, the U.S. and other Western governments are failing an important test of public diplomacy: to fashion effective policies and present them in ways that will sustain public support.

I will argue that Washington should take the lead in formulating an aggressive Western diplomatic agenda aimed at testing Gorbachev at his word. His new thinking includes many intriguing concepts and suggestions. We should begin with a working hypothesis that Gorbachev really means what he says, and that, as an intelligent leader, he also understands the logical implications of his statements. The challenge is to formulate equally far-reaching proposals for Soviet actions that advance Western interests through propositions that Gorbachev cannot refuse—if he means what he says.

II

The primary causes of the emerging window of opportunity for the West are two: the harsh facts of life for the Soviet Union and Gorbachev's recognition of those facts. Gorbachev openly acknowledges that the current Soviet system is failing: "The economy is in a mess; we're behind in every area. . . . The closer you look, the worse it is." He also notes: "Society is ripe for a change. If we back off now, society will not agree to a return. We have to make this process irreversible. If we do not do it, who will? If not now, when?"[1]

A system that depends on command and control to direct the economy, the polity and society is not producing the economic products or the technology needed to compete successfully. Not only is the Soviet economy falling further behind the United States, Western Europe and Japan, it is losing ground even to the new industrial countries of Asia. As French

[1] Quoted in *The Boston Globe*, March 29, 1987.

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President François Mitterrand has observed, Gorbachev is the first Soviet leader to understand the failure of the socialist economic system.

That failure is evident in an economy that achieved five-percent growth in the 1960s, fell to two-percent growth in the first half of the 1970s, and stagnated at virtually zero growth by the early 1980s. Failure is evident in a military that now consumes at least 15–20 percent of the nation's product but cannot prevent a Cessna 172 from landing in Red Square, and allows Afghan rebels to defeat the mighty Red Army. Failure is evident in a health care system that alone among those of industrial nations has seen *reductions* in average life expectancy. It is evident in a technological base that still has not produced a personal computer for general consumption, when countries such as Taiwan and South Korea manage to market second- and third-generation personal computers around the world.

Gorbachev states the bottom line bluntly: unless the trend of the last decade is reversed, the Soviet Union will not enter the 21st century as a great power. The core of his response has two elements: common sense and pragmatism.

Nothing is more revolutionary in the Soviet system than common sense. Previously, ideology so distorted common sense and required so many epicycles of rationalization that most Soviet citizens knew more certainly what was not true (namely, the things that were said officially) than what might actually be so. In contrast to the Orwellian quality of official Soviet rhetoric of the past, Gorbachev is clearly committed to a great deal more of "calling things by their real names," as he says.

Gorbachev's pragmatism is also heretical. It means a willingness to experiment with alternative ways of achieving a goal. Past Soviet planning presumed a central monopoly of wisdom in the analysis of problems and design of a plan, and a monopoly of power in assigning players the roles they should perform according to script. In contrast, pragmatism requires that individuals be engaged and active enough to think for themselves and to adapt as they go.

At its core, Gorbachev's new thinking is essentially a radical rejection of the Stalinism that ruled the Soviet Union for more than half a century. As had Luther's denunciation of papal authority, Gorbachev's acknowledgment that the Communist Party of the Soviet Union has no "monopoly of truth" has earthshaking implications. Glasnost is predicated on the incandescently obvious idea that truth emerges from discussion and

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debate among many people, each of whom lays claim to a piece of reality. Perestroika revises the notion of an economy centrally planned by all-knowing authorities, in favor of greater local autonomy, incentives and, over time, market forces. As the Gorbachev revolution continues, we should expect to see additional repressive features of the Stalinist society subjected to scrutiny, and buried.

The primary implications of these fundamental changes for Soviet national security policies are increased subordination of foreign policy to domestic priorities and the necessity to reduce investments in the defense sector. If the Soviet Union is to address long-term internal problems successfully, an enabling precondition is substantial relaxation of competition with the United States in the international arena. Moreover, substantial restructuring of the Soviet economy will require resources now consumed by the Soviet military. Both Defense Minister Dimitri Yazov and Chief of the General Staff Sergei Akhromeyev acknowledge that even they do not know how much the Soviet Union now spends on its military establishment.

From what Gorbachev and his advisers say with increasing openness, a new Soviet strategy is emerging that calls for arms control agreements to reduce the Western threat and thereby allow Gorbachev to cut Soviet defense expenditures with minimal adverse effect on Soviet military advantages. Gorbachev needs substantial reductions in conventional forces because, as Willie Sutton observed, "that's where the money is." Gorbachev's concepts of "reasonable sufficiency" and "defensive defense" are in part military doctrines, but more importantly they are justifications for constraining resource demands—not unlike some previous American military doctrines. Other indications of Gorbachev's intent to control defense expenditures include his careful decisions regarding key military appointments, his reassertion of the party's role in formulating broad military doctrine, and the increasingly visible role of civilian experts in discussing a domain previously the exclusive preserve of the Soviet General Staff.

III

Gorbachev's new thinking holds the promise of fundamental improvement in U.S.-Soviet relations. But it is evolving. To be fully developed in the Soviet Union and appreciated in the West, it must be put to the test. American diplomacy must be imaginative and aggressive in proposing bold actions that con-

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stitute operational tests of the logical consequences of Gorbachev statements. Tests can be devised in at least three dimensions of the U.S.-Soviet relationship: arms control, regional conflicts and human rights.

In arms control, start with what Gorbachev has said. Leaving aside his rhetoric about eliminating all nuclear weapons, his more realistic statements essentially reject Clausewitz's proposition that war is an extension of political struggle by other means. Instead Gorbachev says:

> The fundamental principle of the new political outlook is very simple: nuclear war cannot be a means of achieving political, economic, ideological or any other goals. . . . Security can no longer be assured by military means. . . . Attempts to achieve military superiority are preposterous. . . . The only way to security is through political decisions and disarmament.[2]

This language embodies a significantly different conception of the role of military power than the philosophy that has motivated the relentless buildup of Soviet military forces since the early 1960s. If Gorbachev really believes this, what might the Soviet Union be prepared to do?

In the first instance, it might begin to restrain the continuing growth and modernization of the Soviet military establishment. Over time, in concert with reductions in Western forces, a government in Moscow that believes Gorbachev's words should be prepared to reduce sharply and restructure Soviet military forces. But note the gap between word and deed. If one judges by observable changes in Soviet military forces to date—increases in defense spending, modernization of both nuclear and conventional forces, deliveries of new equipment to front-line forces and the character of field exercises—Gorbachev's fine phrases have yet to be translated operationally in the military realm.

Gorbachev, however, has already passed one test that seemed improbable to almost everyone before he came to power. He accepted the U.S. proposal for the elimination of intermediate-range nuclear forces. When that proposition was first put forward by the Reagan Administration in 1981, it was declared a "non-acceptable demand" by the Soviet leadership, and most American experts concurred. (In fact it had been designed within the U.S. government as an offer the Soviets could never accept.)

[2] Mikhail Gorbachev, *Perestroika: New Thinking for Our Country and the World,* New York: Harper & Row, 1987, pp. 140–141.

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The concessions that Gorbachev made to achieve this treaty are not insignificant. These include the exclusion from negotiations of equivalent British and French forces, inclusion among the weapons to be destroyed of the shorter-range Soviet SS-23s, and acceptance of Western verification proposals. The most startling of these concessions was the agreement to highly intrusive verification procedures on Soviet territory, a demand that Moscow for decades had maintained was unacceptable. Indeed, many American arms controllers had given up on this demand and had agreed with the Soviet claim that it was "unreasonable" since it violated natural Soviet conservatism and the character of Soviet society. Note the formula for NATO's success in this case: a reasonable though radical proposal combined with persistence and hard bargaining. This formula should be emulated on other fronts, including strategic arms control.

What do Gorbachev's words imply for the Soviet Union's strategic arsenal? In a recent *Pravda* article, Vadim Zagladin, a deputy head of the International Department of the Central Committee, admitted that "we proceeded for a long time, for too long, from the possibility of winning a nuclear war."[3] If Gorbachev no longer believes in the winnability of a nuclear war or in the utility of the threat of nuclear war, then he should be prepared not just to reduce but to eliminate strategic nuclear forces acquired for that purpose.

In short, Gorbachev should now be prepared to restructure the Soviet nuclear arsenal in ways that reduce the possibility, or threat, of surprise attack, and thus eliminate the first-strike weapons Americans fear most, namely the Soviet heavy land-based missiles (SS-18s). U.S. proposals in the Strategic Arms Reductions Talks, which call for a 50-percent cut in numbers of warheads, are a step in the right direction, though not bold enough. A serious test of Gorbachev's provocative views would be to propose eliminating all weapons that are best suited for use in a first strike, and thus all heavy land-based MIRVs (multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles) that have hard-target kill capability.[4]

[3] "We Discuss the CPSU Central Committee Theses Following a Course of Reason and Humanitarianism," *Pravda,* June 18, 1988.

[4] The nub of this problem is MIRVed ICBMs, especially the ones that permit the attacker to destroy more of the opponent's missiles than it expends in the attack. Such weapons provide an incentive, under certain conditions, both to strike first and to launch on warning. Serious interest in eliminating the crisis instability and risk of accident inherent in such a theoretical first-strike capability would lead to low throw-weight ICBMs carrying single warheads.

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Nowhere does the U.S.S.R. pose as great a military threat to American vital interests as in Europe. Thirty forward-deployed divisions of the Soviet army in Eastern Europe, along with dozens more divisions in the Soviet Union's western military districts, stand equipped, trained and regularly exercised to conduct a surprise attack that moves rapidly west to defeat and occupy Western Europe. To meet this challenge NATO maintains combined conventional and nuclear forces and a doctrine of "flexible response" that includes the possible use of nuclear weapons to meet even a conventional attack. Nowhere would Gorbachev's rhetoric offer more promise for the West—if words led to equivalent action.

Among Gorbachev's most beguiling and publicly attractive statements is his reference to Europe as a "common security house" in which tenants can legitimately provide for their own security—but not by filling their apartments with explosives that could destroy the building. In 1986 Gorbachev confounded the experts by accepting the Western concept of an "Atlantic-to-the-Urals" arms reduction zone. In 1987 he began making these ideas more operational by calling for the elimination of the capacity for surprise attack or offensive operations.

That would require, he recognizes, asymmetric reductions where there are "imbalances and asymmetries in some kinds of armaments and armed forces on both sides in Europe, caused by historical, geographical and other factors." He continues: "We stand for eliminating the inequality existing in some areas, but not through a buildup by those who lag behind but through a reduction by those who are ahead."[5] To that end, at the Moscow summit in June, Gorbachev proposed to President Reagan an ambitious scheme to transform the conventional force balance in the Atlantic-to-the-Urals area consisting of four steps: an exchange of data on the conventional forces in the zone, to be verified by on-site inspections; the identification of asymmetries in the forces of the two sides and elimination of those asymmetries; reductions in each alliance's manpower in the zone by 500,000 men; and the restructuring of conventional forces in Europe to give them a solely "defensive" orientation.

It is an indictment of U.S. leadership in NATO that such a politically promising series of suggestions has been spelled out

[5] Gorbachev, *op. cit.*, p. 203.

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over the past three years by Gorbachev alone, essentially talking to himself. Listening to proposals that could significantly reduce the threat Western Europe confronts, is it any wonder that allied publics should conclude that Gorbachev seems more interested in peace than President Reagan? NATO should immediately take up Gorbachev's offer to exchange and verify data about the military forces on both sides.[6] Our positive response should set the terms of reference for an exchange that would include a detailed order of battle, broken down to the level of regiments or battalions and including the location, designation and subordination of units, as well as manning levels and equipment by type and model. This information about NATO forces is publicly available; in the Soviet Union such data has been a top military secret, not only through the 15 years of talks on Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions, but since 1917. NATO's acceptance of Gorbachev's proposal would offer a low-cost, high-benefit trial of his readiness to do business here.

NATO's goal should be to craft arms control agreements that reduce the Warsaw Pact's capabilities for surprise attack and large-scale offensive operations. We must recognize that "nothing is as much anathema to traditional Soviet military thinking as is a defense-dominant theater strategy and force posture."[7] Here Western proposals attack Soviet offensive concepts and practices that have motivated the largest buildup of military power in history. Thus, in designing agreements for reductions in Warsaw Pact operational capabilities, we should be sensitive to Soviet bureaucratic interests: the Soviet Union's military system, like the West's, probably would be more ready to sacrifice levels of readiness, ammunition, logistics, some weapons systems and even force modernization programs than force structure or command slots. Among the elements of Soviet forces most essential to a surprise attack, and thus most important to reduce, are tens of thousands of Soviet tanks and artillery in Eastern Europe and the western Soviet Union.

Beyond reductions, another area that invites Western probes of Gorbachev's intentions are confidence-building measures to increase transparency and constrain military activities. Initially

[6] For a further discussion of this issue, see Robert D. Blackwill, "Specific Approaches to Conventional Arms Control in Europe," *Survival,* Sept.-Oct. 1988 (forthcoming).

[7] Stephen Meyer, "The Sources and Prospects of Gorbachev's New Political Thinking on Security," *International Security,* Fall 1988 (forthcoming), p. 151.

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in word, but now in the deed of the INF treaty, Gorbachev has transformed Moscow's policy of secrecy about Soviet territory, military forces and perhaps even military doctrine. If Gorbachev means what he says, he should permit levels of Western access to Soviet territory, military bases and exercises that were previously unthinkable.

NATO should seize the opportunity to propose measures that create tripwires the Soviet Union would have to trigger in preparing to go to war. These should include positioning permanent international inspectors at militarily important arms depots, airfields, fuel dumps, rail heads and perhaps even command and control centers; specific constraints on forward deployment of tanks, artillery, bridging and mine-clearing equipment; and year-in-advance schedules for force mobilizations.

IV

Few in the West believed Gorbachev's early indications, at the 27th Party Congress in early 1986, that support for "wars of national liberation" would no longer be a Soviet priority. His rationale had a certain plausibility: the era of decolonization having come to a close, the issue was no longer of prime concern. But according to many Western Sovietologists, external expansion served an essential ideological role in justifying the Soviet regime at home. Thus even less credence was given Gorbachev's assertions that the use of armed force to promote social revolution had declined in value, that the superpowers should not introduce their troops into Third World conflicts, and that regional conflicts and crises must be resolved by political means.

In 1985 anyone in the West who suggested that these words signaled impending Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan—even after Gorbachev described that land as a "bleeding wound"—would have been rejected summarily by most Western experts. A Soviet withdrawal without victory would blatantly refute the predominant Western geopolitical explanation of Moscow's intentions in Afghanistan—an explanation that shaped the U.S. government's view of the ambitions of the Soviet Union in the 1980s. Afghanistan shares a border with the Soviet Union. Afghanistan represented the only major use of Soviet military power outside Europe since World War II. Afghanistan was a war that a committed Soviet Union was determined to win and could not afford to lose. Afghanistan

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was a calculated step in Russia's centuries-old quest for warm-water ports. Domination of the world's strategic oil reserves was the unspoken prize. All this quickly became conventional wisdom after 1980.

Yet Gorbachev has accepted defeat, with only the fig leaf of calling it stalemate and without even demanding a decent interval. This realism is the strongest evidence so far that he may genuinely believe some of the more unlikely things he says. The consequences of the withdrawal from Afghanistan are difficult to exaggerate. The effects on the Soviet army and society should prove more profound than the impact of the American defeat in Vietnam on the United States. Perhaps even more significant will be the reverberations in Soviet satellite and client states, since defeat in Afghanistan rolls back for the first time the Brezhnev Doctrine of the irreversibility of communist gains.

Gorbachev's propositions about declining Soviet stakes, influence and interest in the Third World deserve to be more vigorously tested in other regions. In Angola, movement toward a settlement has begun, and the United States is finally pressing its case with Moscow. But the big disappointment has been American diplomacy in Central America—or more precisely, the lack thereof.

In his book, *Perestroika,* Gorbachev explicitly supports "the peace-making efforts of the Contadora Group, initiatives by the Central American heads of state, and the Guatemala City accord." He goes on: "We are not going to exploit anti-U.S. attitudes, let alone fuel them, nor do we intend to erode the traditional links between Latin America and the United States."[8] At the 1987 Washington summit, according to a Soviet spokesman, Gorbachev proposed to Reagan "to review possibilities for promoting the process of peaceful settlement in Central America. First, our idea is related to the entire Central American region. . . . Second, it provides for reciprocal Soviet and American pledges to refrain from deliveries of weapons."[9] Though Reagan inexplicably failed to pick up the offer, when Gorbachev was asked at the 1988 Moscow summit about the Soviet position, he said: "We [Reagan and Gorbachev] looked back at the history . . . [and] we have different

[8] Gorbachev, *op. cit.,* p. 188.

[9] Soviet Foreign Ministry spokesman Boris Pyadyshev, *Tass,* Dec. 16, 1987, cited in *The New York Times,* Dec. 17, 1987, p. A11.

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explanations and different views. But I suggested we take as a starting point today's reality. The Contadora process is with us, the Guatemalan accords. . . . There is some movement towards a political settlement, and we must base ourselves on that process and lend our support."[10]

Soviet actions fly in the face of every implication of Gorbachev's words. Specifically, Moscow's shipment of arms and other military equipment to the Sandinista government of Nicaragua and to guerrillas in El Salvador and Guatemala has continued without pause, and indeed increased in the first quarter of 1988. Soviet-bloc economic and military aid to the Sandinistas is estimated at almost $1 billion annually. Last December, Sandinista Defense Minister Humberto Ortega confirmed a report by a high-level Nicaraguan defector that the Sandinistas plan to double their armed forces to 600,000 troops, with additional supplies coming from the Soviet Union including, Ortega claimed, MiG-21s.

The United States should move immediately with the Central American presidents to propose cessation of all military aid (Soviet, Soviet bloc, Cuban and American) to the Sandinistas and the contras, together with effective guarantees that the Nicaraguan government will cease all material support for insurgency movements. The Central American presidents should also take the Soviet Union to task for the discrepancy between its verbal support for the Arias plan and its continued supply of arms to guerrillas in El Salvador and Guatemala, and demand that such assistance stop immediately.

V

Gorbachev's trenchant indictment of the Stalinist totalitarian system and its incompatibility with a successful economy, society and culture exceeds all expectations. Who could have imagined an unstructured debate among participants in a solemn party conference, including denunciations of individuals to their face, on multiple sides of issues—*and on television* for all to see? Western Sovietologists who in the past offered indictments half as biting as Gorbachev makes today were then regarded, not only by Russians but by Americans interested in better U.S.-Soviet relations, as dogmatically anti-Soviet. The Soviet government's declaration about increased freedom of

[10] *The Washington Post,* June 2, 1988, p. A27.

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conscience for religious believers and its commemoration of the Russian Orthodox Church's millennium have been impressive.

Progress on emigration for refuseniks, release of political prisoners and the elimination of psychiatric prisons for enemies of the state has been slower than we would like (and should insist upon), but more rapid and deeper than in any equivalent period of Soviet history. While Gorbachev bridles at the West's persistent demands regarding human rights for Soviet citizens, President Reagan's firm pursuit of this issue at the Moscow summit did nothing to dampen progress in other areas. The United States should keep pushing Moscow on human rights across the board. Both publicly and privately we should explain why a society that becomes less repressive at home becomes more trustworthy abroad.

Along the economic dimension, if the Soviet Union hopes to engage in international trade and produce goods that are globally competitive, it must reorganize its internal pricing system so that it can join the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, as China has been working to do. It only makes good sense to treat the Soviet Union as we do China and some East European countries, including providing incentives to adopt a price system that would make it possible for the Soviets to have observer status in, and eventually even become a member of, international financial institutions. The benefits to the West of Soviet economic decentralization down to heads of industries, firms, farms and collectives should not be underestimated. The decentralization of economic power weakens the monopoly of political authority. A totalitarian political system is not compatible in the longer run with a decentralized market economic system, because people who have economic power have power per se.

The list of possible Western tests of Gorbachev goes on and on. A realistic U.S. strategy would look at many other issues, including terrorism, where Gorbachev has also offered a number of attractive ideas: rejecting terrorism in all its guises; agreeing on the 99 percent on which we can agree; establishing an international tribunal under the auspices of the United Nations that would be a definitive court of justice on these issues; and imposing sanctions on any nations that violate the dictates of this court. Regarding the United Nations, Gorbachev's decision to pay Soviet arrears and make greater use of the U.N. system—even suggesting the reactivation of the mil-

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itary committee of the Security Council—in resolving regional issues and peacekeeping remains to be addressed in a serious way by Western policy.

VI

Do we want Gorbachev to succeed? Where he is taking actions that advance our interests and move toward a more secure, peaceful world, the answer must be yes. Consider the alternatives. Another Soviet leader might pursue similar internal reforms, just more slowly and with a less active foreign policy dimension. An equally plausible historical analogy, however, would be the Austro-Hungarian government of 1914, which sought to exploit its military advantages of the moment in the hope of reversing what otherwise promised to be decades of relative decline.

In fashioning its own policies, the United States cannot assume that Gorbachev will remain in power, or that the Soviet Union's long-term objectives have changed. Gorbachev's main purpose is to guarantee and enhance the Soviet Union's position as a great power. To that end, he seeks breathing space, *peredyshka*. His words and deeds attempt to cope with competing challenges: to secure his position in the struggle for power at home; to provide a framework that will allow him to shift resources from defense to more productive investments; and to maintain a posture plausible enough to allow him to constrain Western arms through arms control. At the same time, he is sorting out what he really thinks about a confusing, changing international environment. It would be a mistake to assume that Gorbachev has a long-term plan that maps the future. Rather, as he and his associates say, they see the world as being "in flux" as they venture into uncharted territory.

To the extent that Gorbachev's analysis is leading him to take steps that serve our interest, good. Restructuring the Soviet economy and society will require a crusade not of years but of decades or even generations. To the extent that the Soviet Union turns inward for a decade or two, and concentrates on rebuilding Soviet economic strength, we should cheer. To the extent that Gorbachev judges a period of international stability, and specifically a reduction of conflict with the United States, to be an essential precondition for Soviet focus on internal affairs (and this leads him to pull back from Afghanistan, Africa and Central America and to moderate Soviet policies in the Middle East), we should wish him Godspeed. To

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the extent that his reforms provide greater freedom for Soviet citizens, less totalitarian control of the society, and a reduction of ideologically motivated expansionism, this will erode the moral features of the Soviet regime that most offend American values. Where the price of reductions in Soviet threats to us are cuts in Western forces and defense expenditures that threaten them, we should act with a clear view of our net advantage.

A strategy of testing Gorbachev is not without risks, however. As the U.S.S.R. passes such tests, some in the West will proclaim prematurely that peace has broken out. Others may be lulled. We could be tricked. The web of interdependence we spin could entangle the West more deeply than the Soviet Union.

Nonetheless, consider the dangers inherent in simply standing firm with policies designed to meet previous challenges. The attempt to deny that real changes are occurring in the Soviet Union is a losing cause. Moreover, it will miss opportunities to nudge Moscow toward choices that advance our priorities. For example, as the Soviet Union struggled to extricate itself from Afghanistan with minimum embarrassment, an American willingness to be helpful for the price of progress in Central America might have produced a diplomatic settlement there as well.

Thus without illusion about the Soviet Union being or becoming benign, or exaggerated views of the West's ability to influence internal Soviet developments, the United States and its allies should encourage progress in the West's direction. Gorbachev's reforms could conceivably produce a more competitive Soviet economy some decades hence that would make the U.S.S.R. a potentially more formidable adversary. Perhaps, but if so the character of that Soviet Union is likely to be unrecognizable.

A Western strategy of probing Gorbachev's words for opportunities, pressing for movement in desirable directions, and even consciously seeking to help Gorbachev would stretch well beyond past or current American policy. For four decades the cardinal rule in our policy of containment has been to oppose virtually whatever the Soviet Union was for. But in a period of significant change, such a rule falls into the trap Nietzsche noted when observing that the most common form of human stupidity is forgetting what one is trying to do.

America's basic national security objective has remained unchanged for four decades: to preserve the United States as

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a free nation with its fundamental institutions and values intact. As George Kennan observed in his original 1947 formulation of the policy of containment, our primary objectives in dealing with the Soviet Union were to contain the U.S.S.R. both ideologically and militarily by building up the strength and self-confidence of the nations threatened by Soviet expansion, exploiting natural tensions between Moscow and the international communist movement, giving internal contradictions within the Soviet Union time to emerge, and thus moderating the Soviet Union's conception of international relations so that we could settle outstanding differences. Kennan specified no timetable, although some of his associates anticipated that changes should have occurred sooner.

Nonetheless, the similarities between current events in the Soviet Union and the consequences Kennan foresaw are not coincidental. The combination of time, NATO's determination not to yield to the Soviet Union any exploitable military advantage, the performance of Western market-oriented economies, and the Reagan Administration's active opposition to Soviet external adventures has fostered what appears to be an increasingly realistic assessment in Moscow of the fact, and even the causes, of Soviet failure.

The United States and its allies must now reach beyond containment to aggressive engagement of the Soviet Union in ways that encourage Gorbachev's reformist instincts to restructure Soviet external relations and internal institutions. This will mean paying strict attention to how far Gorbachev's Soviet Union has come, and how much further it has to travel.

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Robert C. McFarlane

EFFECTIVE STRATEGIC POLICY

The past eight years have been a time of enormous flux in those strategic factors that affect stability among the great powers in Europe, Asia and North America. Some of the changes offer the possibility of reduced tensions in East-West relations; others, involving differences among allies or within the U.S. government, are deeply worrisome. This period of change is not over. Within the next year, decisions must be made regarding virtually every important area of American defense policy, from nuclear doctrine to the conventional balance in Europe.

Moreover, the Soviet Union is in the throes of generational change in its leadership. Self-interest alone would have led General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev to attempt reforms that are essential to any hope of the Soviet Union's achieving sustainable increases in productivity and output. We cannot know whether he will succeed in carrying out fundamental reform of the party's control over the economy. But whether or not he succeeds, for the West the question is: What changes, if any, are in store in Soviet foreign policy?

In the short term (five to ten years), we can probably look forward to a period of gradual improvement in U.S.-Soviet relations. Gorbachev needs to focus on the resolution of internal problems, and he wants access to Western help. He can best achieve this through "good behavior"; hence his self-interested desire for a period of calm.

I am skeptical about the probability of any fundamental reorientation in Soviet global purposes before the turn of the century, if then. But because we cannot divine the future, U.S. strategic policy ought to be guided by a realistic evaluation of Soviet military capabilities—which remain formidable in every area: strategic offensive, defensive and conventional.

Some analysts believe that we can expect a cutback in the level of resources the Soviets will direct to their defense estab-

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lishment. This may be small cause for comfort, however, because the motive for any cutback in military investment—if there is a cutback—seems likely to be to assure future military competitiveness, not a retrenchment in expansionist goals or a diminution of the power of the military in the state. How, then, should we proceed?

II

The goal of our nuclear strategy has been to convince the Soviet leaders that it would never make sense for them to initiate a strategic nuclear conflict, because of the survivability and retaliatory capacity of U.S. forces. In designing this capacity for our forces we have had to keep in mind that the Soviet Union might well discover an effective means to neutralize a particular system or technology, e.g., our land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs). Consequently, the United States has been careful not to put all its eggs into a single basket; instead it has followed a policy of maintaining a triad of forces comprised of ballistic missiles deployed both on land and at sea, and bomber aircraft, some armed with cruise missiles.

Our reliance through the years on the ability to threaten a credible, devastating offensive counterattack—the concept of deterrence, as opposed to defending against an incoming missile attack—has been the subject of periodic debate. The 1972 agreements of the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) capped this debate for a time. In those agreements, the two sides decided to limit strategic offensive missile launchers and, in the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty, to forgo the significant defense of those forces or of populations. At the time, America's readiness to accept this decision reflected our hope that the Soviet Union would adopt as doctrine the principle that an approximate balance of forces and mutual vulnerability could provide for stable mutual deterrence. It also reflected the practical reality that the state of the art in defensive technologies made effective defense infeasible.

There were important but unstated American qualifications concerning what constituted "balance." Specifically, our postwar military strategy rested not only on nuclear deterrence, but on collective security as well, through the maintenance of strong alliances. In Europe our strategy—called flexible response—sought to compensate for a conventional military imbalance favoring the Soviet Union by committing, in advance,

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American nuclear forces to be used to check and then reverse any potentially decisive Soviet conventional breakthrough in Western Europe.

For as long as the United States held an indisputable superiority in nuclear arms vis-à-vis the Soviet Union, the credibility of our stated willingness to use it was largely moot: we were unlikely to be challenged. But starting in the mid-1970s, with the advent of rough nuclear parity between the two sides, inevitable doubts began to emerge on both sides of the Atlantic as to the credibility of America's willingness to risk its own nuclear devastation over a conflict in Europe.

These doubts led to U.S. efforts to lend credibility to our pledges of nuclear intervention. One such measure was to move away from reliance, in our targeting doctrine, on the threat to destroy Soviet cities, and instead to make clear our capability and intention to maintain survivable, highly accurate systems that could attack Soviet military targets in Europe and elsewhere. We also modified our strategy to include plans for the possible execution of "limited nuclear options"—for attacking Warsaw Pact and other military targets discretely—while maintaining better control over the pace and character of escalation.

In addition, faced in the late 1970s with the Soviet deployment in the western U.S.S.R. of SS-20 intermediate-range missiles armed with multiple independently targeted reentry vehicles (MIRVs) that could target all of Western Europe, NATO decided in December 1979 to deploy its own corresponding capability, although in much smaller measure. It was to consist of 108 U.S.-built Pershing 2 ballistic missiles and 464 ground-launched cruise missiles (GLCMs) stationed in Western Europe.

These missiles, which were to be targeted on the Soviet Union, were ostensibly meant to deter the Soviet SS-20 force. But the more plausible NATO motive was to link any European conflict more concretely to U.S. strategic nuclear weapons. It was assumed that if we had already crossed the nuclear threshold by using Pershings and/or GLCMs in Europe—an act that Europeans assumed would be easier for us than launching ICBMs from North Dakota were the Soviets to cross the East-West frontier—then the decision to launch central strategic systems against targets deep inside the Soviet Union would be less anguishing. If the Soviets appreciated such calculation, deterrence would be enhanced.

These several actions—the revision of our nuclear doctrine, the development of limited nuclear options and the deployment

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of intermediate-range nuclear forces in Europe—were designed to strengthen American credibility at both the nuclear and conventional levels.

The doctrine was fine. But it was dogged by our inability to maintain survivable, responsive and effective nuclear forces to back it up. In a nutshell, our 550 Minuteman III ICBMs, each armed with three warheads, were our only responsive missiles with sufficient accuracy and high enough nuclear yield to threaten hardened Soviet missile silos and most other military targets. But the Minuteman III force was too small to hold at risk a significant percentage of the Soviet target base. And it was deployed in fixed silos that were becoming ever more vulnerable to a Soviet attack.

In the mid-1970s, the Soviets took two actions that made matters worse. First, they built a very large force of new ICBMs (the SS-18 and SS-19 missiles, carrying ten and six warheads respectively) that were capable of destroying our silos and hardened military targets. Second, the Soviets hardened their own missile silos so as to reduce their vulnerability to attack. By the end of the decade, the Soviet Union had raised an alarm in the United States: Would the U.S.S.R.'s advantage tempt it, during a crisis, to destroy most of our counterforce systems in a preemptive strike, leaving us with no options other than surrender or a suicidal attack on Soviet cities? There was also concern that the Soviet Union was carrying out active research and development in defensive technologies.

In sum, within ten years after the SALT I agreements were signed, questions arose regarding the two axioms on which they were based—our hope that the Soviets would come to accept our concept of balance and mutual vulnerability, and our assumption that cost-effective strategic defenses were infeasible.

The United States responded in the mid-1970s by proposing to modernize its ICBM force. We sought to deal with the problems of imbalance and vulnerability by designing a new, highly accurate missile with up to ten warheads, the MX, which we planned to deploy in a basing arrangement that would ensure its survivability. The latter effort focused upon several variations of deceptive or mobile basing. (It should be noted that the Russians have since moved to mobile missiles, the multiple-warhead SS-24 and the single-warhead SS-25, which are currently being deployed.) But in the United States, a considerable popular backlash emerged, as antinuclear senti-

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ment combined with partisan political opportunism and legitimate military criticism to roll back President Carter's plan for a multiple protective shelter deployment mode. This same combination of sentiments subsequently killed a series of basing schemes proposed by President Reagan.

At that juncture in late 1982, with the charged political climate promising continued paralysis, President Reagan appointed the Bipartisan Commission on Strategic Forces (known as the Scowcroft Commission) in an effort to establish a political consensus on the modernization of our strategic nuclear arsenal, especially our ICBM forces. In its report, submitted in April 1983, the commission reconfirmed the conceptual soundness, military effectiveness and technical feasibility of deterrence. It stated clearly that, considering all military, political and economic factors, our best course from now until some time in the early 21st century was to seek to deter a Soviet attack by maintaining a balanced triad of modern, survivable, *offensive* forces. Its program recommendations emphasized the importance of assuring the survivability of all our forces, and especially of moving away from high-value (MIRVed), vulnerable (silo-based) systems in the land-based leg of the triad. The commission proposed instead the development of a small single-warhead missile to be deployed in a mobile configuration (the Midgetman).

III

Two weeks before this report appeared, a major new factor was introduced by President Reagan's Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI). It is now clear that, even before he was elected, the president held the conviction that it was irresponsible to leave Americans exposed to the risk of nuclear devastation, and that scientific discovery could provide the means for effective protection against such a threat. As a corollary, he believed that such a discovery, by devaluing the threat of nuclear attack, could render nuclear weapons "impotent and obsolete." He believed that, ultimately, nuclear weapons could be eliminated from the face of the earth. And at a time when he saw nuclear weapons threatening to proliferate into dozens of countries, he thought an attempt should be made to stem the tide.

The president's SDI proposal of March 23, 1983, raised two threshold questions and a host of subsidiary ones. First, had the state of the art in defensive technologies advanced to the point where it would be feasible in the foreseeable future to

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defend the entire population, and at tolerable cost? If so, how should that prospect affect our strategy and force planning? Second, could effective defenses make the elimination of offensive nuclear weapons feasible and likely?

The president's speech provoked a firestorm of debate, and the five years since then have been marked by bitter, passionate advocacy and criticism. Concurrently, however, the scientific community has been evaluating the potential of several remarkable discoveries that might be applied to the problem of defeating tens of thousands of incoming objects (warheads and decoys). Initially, these efforts were polarized by, on the one hand, the romantic and manipulative hyperbole of the Administration and, on the other, by the flatly dismissive rhetoric of scientists who should have known better. Since this initial conflict, however, a more sober climate has emerged that makes possible a more objective evaluation of the proper role that defensive technologies might play in the years ahead.

It is useful to enumerate the basic criticisms of defensive concepts: 1) they would only provoke offsetting countermeasures, including expanded and more modern offenses; 2) they would present the appearance to Soviet leaders that we might be aspiring to a first-strike capability—a destabilizing impression that could provoke Soviet preemption; and 3) to the extent that development and testing—not to mention deployment—could involve violation of the ABM treaty, the utility of arms control would be undermined.

Truly impressive gains have been made in the technologies associated with ballistic missile defense since the late 1960s. The most dramatic has been in the technology of battle management—specifically in the speed and problem-solving capacity of computers. With regard to weapons applications, substantial improvements have been made in efficient missile propellants and in guidance systems that make possible high-speed, non-nuclear, ground-based interceptors of greater reliability. Separately, the technology of kinetic-kill systems has advanced considerably and holds a high probability of being adaptable to ground- or space-based platforms within ten years. As for the more exotic technologies—directed-energy and particle-beam systems—much of the information about U.S. programs is classified. But it is fair to say that truly remarkable strides are being made, particularly in the free-electron laser.

Yet there is no basis for saying that any of these systems will be adaptable as effective weapons systems before the turn of

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the century, except for two traditional ground-based interceptors (called the exoatmospheric reentry vehicle interceptor system, or ERIS, and the high endoatmospheric defense interceptor, or HEDI) and a relatively primitive space-based kinetic-kill system. In short, the answer to the first threshold question—can defensive technologies provide the means to defend us against ballistic missile attack?—is that we do not know and cannot know for the next ten to 15 years.

A critical military weakness of space-based systems is vulnerability to Soviet countermeasures. Ground-based systems such as ERIS and HEDI are susceptible to being easily overwhelmed by Soviet missile warheads, which can be produced relatively cheaply. Systems operating from low earth orbit in space, moreover, are vulnerable to a family of countermeasures, both ground- and space-based, at costs that also favor the Soviet Union. Pentagon planners believe that the vulnerability of space-based systems can be overcome by building into each platform a maneuvering capability and other protective measures, but it is not clear that these measures could be adopted at a cost approaching that of the Soviet countermeasures. As a separate matter, there remains the difficult problem of how to enable a U.S. interceptor to distinguish between a real nuclear warhead and thousands of decoys.

The central reason for opposing exclusive reliance upon defensive systems for protection against nuclear attack is that to do so is to misrepresent the character of the threat, and, more cynically, to mislead our own people concerning feasible and sensible options for dealing with it.

It is irresponsible to assert either that, once developed, an instrument of mass destruction can be eradicated or that it portends inevitable catastrophe. To suggest that the Soviet Union, or any other nuclear power facing a nuclear threat, would voluntarily do away with all its own nuclear weapons is to assert that the differences that divide great powers are unimportant matters, of no consequence; that Soviet leaders are not serious about their international ambitions or the defense of their homeland and therefore will not see it as imperative to maintain the most modern weaponry for promoting and defending their national interests. Nuclear weapons cannot be disinvented. The technology essential to the construction of these weapons has spread throughout the world.

The Soviet Union has been deterred from the use of nuclear

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weapons, and a strong basis exists for believing it will remain deterred if faced with the enduring impossibility of any rational concept of gain. Because there is no current basis for confidence that a survivable defensive shield is within reach, and in view of the very substantial problems of political, economic and military stability attendant to making a commitment to such a shield, the adoption of a defensive doctrine, even as a goal, would be imprudent.

At the same time, a vigorous strategic defense program is very sound policy. A properly structured program is essential to our national security. In the event that an arms control agreement providing for deep reductions in strategic weapons is reached with the Soviet Union, the diminution of the threat measured in terms of Soviet ballistic missile warheads will affect the scale of any strategic defense program designed to deal with it. If we are no longer dealing with many tens of thousands of incoming warheads, but, say, only 5,000 to 10,000, the program requirements for strategic defense should be much more modest.

In this context, it is clear that a review of the SDI program is appropriate. As such a review is undertaken, the concept of strategic defense should be broadened to encompass how to preserve the survivability of each leg of the triad—not just ICBMs—against the putative threat before us.

While there is much to criticize in the misleading simplicity of the Administration's announcement of the SDI program and the way in which it exploited popular antinuclear aspirations, one cannot ignore the positive practical consequences. In truth, the analysis behind the original concept was oriented toward dealing with an intractable military problem—a worsening counterforce imbalance which we appeared unable to check.

While we can argue whether SDI could conceivably deal with this problem and whether, even if it could, other solutions would not be preferable, it must be said that, in retrospect, SDI—as evaluated by the Soviets—seems to have played an important role in leading the U.S.S.R. to engage seriously in an effort to meet our concerns over the counterforce imbalance. In addition, the prospect of SDI may have been an important influence in encouraging Kremlin leaders to reassess their economic system's fundamental ability to compete, in leading them to the ultimate conclusion that it could not, and in bringing about their acceptance of the need for perestroika.

For those of us involved in shaping the original SDI proposal,

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two conclusions stood out regarding the ability of the United States to restore and preserve a stable balance of offensive systems.

First, the United States had been reduced to competing on terms according to which the Soviet Union enjoyed a comparative advantage—that is, in building and deploying ICBMs. The problem was not that we could not build as good a missile, but that we could not fashion a political consensus behind a deployment plan, so divisive were the effects of partisanship, environmentalist opposition, legitimate military misgivings and antinuclear sentiment.

Second, those of us in the White House who proposed the Strategic Defense Initiative believed that a reorientation of our investment strategy to emphasize an area of our comparative advantage—excellence in high technology—could persuade the Soviets that we could outstrip an entire generation of Soviet military investment. If we could do so, we would remove their only claim to superpower status and perhaps lead them to deal more constructively with our concerns about their forces. The Soviets' commitment to a 50-percent reduction in their heavy missile launchers and warheads—a possibility they would not discuss seriously until after SDI was proposed—represents a vindication of that strategy.

IV

If a reorientation of our strategic doctrine is infeasible and imprudent at this time, then we must return to the basic task—how otherwise to address the offensive imbalance in a way that enhances overall stability. The goal for U.S. strategic offensive forces is to deter the Soviet Union from committing aggression. This is best assured by our having strategic forces that are survivable, have a short time of flight, are highly accurate and within easy, reliable reach of communications.

Submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) fulfill the first two qualifications very well; they are survivable and can reach their targets quickly. The design criteria for the new generation of such missiles, the D-5, include sufficient accuracy and yield to enable SLBMs to attack hardened Soviet military targets successfully. Unfortunately, however, the difficulties in discrete, dispersed targeting inherent in any multiple-warhead missile, when combined with the problematic communications characteristic of submarines, make this a poor weapon of choice. If the goal is high confidence of assuring rapid initial

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response as well as measured responsiveness through the course of the battle, SLBMs do not fill the bill.

That leaves land-based forces, ICBMs, as the only alternative. They possess the requisite accuracy and short flight time, and communications with them are reliable. Survivability is the problem with ICBMs.

Our goal should be to move both sides in the direction of more survivable forces. This objective is promoted by reducing the ratio of each side's warheads to the number of aim points on the other side that would have to be attacked in a preemptive strike. By definition, the objective of reducing the warhead/aim point ratio can be approached by reducing the numerator—the size of the Soviet counterforce arsenal—through arms control negotiations, by increasing the denominator by adding American aim points, or by a combination of the two.

It is to President Reagan's credit that he has succeeded in getting Soviet commitment to reductions in its ballistic missile forces, and especially in its heavy, silo-based MIRVed ICBMs (SS-18s). If the current Soviet agreement to reduce this force by 50 percent can be translated into a final agreement while the current warhead/aim point ratio is maintained or lowered, this would represent a very substantial gain for the stability of the East-West nuclear balance. If the Soviets do in fact cut their SS-18 force by 50 percent to 1,540 warheads, stability will improve or remain the same, but only as long as we keep 500 or more aim points on our side. The important issue to keep in mind, however, is the ratio, *with or without arms control.*

But reducing the number of nuclear weapons—decreasing the size of the numerator—is not without its own set of problems. After reductions, we may have no more than 20 ballistic missile submarines in our force and perhaps no more than 12 at sea, instead of as many as 41 boats, with 22 at sea, as in years past. This smaller submarine force would be inherently more vulnerable, simply because the Soviets could concentrate their entire submarine attack force—the size of which is unaffected by the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START)—on finding fewer U.S. boats.

Regardless of the outcome of arms control negotiations, the toughest issue remains whether we will make the hard decision today that we have avoided in the past—to make our new ICBMs survivable by adopting a deceptive-basing or mobile-deployment scheme (whereby the number of aim points becomes substantially larger).

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The choice is complex. We seek to maximize the number of our aim points, and thus survivability, with the least disruption of the civil/environmental setting and the least financial cost. We should proceed from the assumption that within the lifetime of the system we are designing, any START agreement reached may expire. Since, therefore, our missile force could face attack from huge numbers of Soviet ICBMs and/or SLBMs, ideally it should be able to survive an attack without warning. It should be a system that, first and foremost, meets our military requirements; if possible, it should also be compatible with the verification desiderata of sensible arms control agreements.

There are several approaches that, to varying degrees, would fulfill these criteria. Those considered have included horizontal multiple protective shelters (MPS) and closely spaced basing (CSB), both of which were turned aside earlier because of different disadvantages.

Horizontal MPS, proposed in the late 1970s, provided for 200 MX missiles to be moved randomly within a matrix of 2,300 horizontal shelters, each separated from the others by a mile and hardened against 200 pounds per square inch of overpressure. It would have taken at least 4,600 Soviet warheads to barrage such a deployment successfully, and the shelters would have cost between $40 billion and $50 billion to construct. Horizontal MPS would have occupied an enclosed land area of approximately 4,000 square miles.

CSB was based on a different principle; it called for deploying a given number of MX missiles in a corresponding number of silos spaced near to each other. This system relied upon the probability that, if an attack were launched against it, the first incoming warheads would, upon detonation, create conditions in which successive waves of the attacking force would be destroyed or would be rendered inoperable for a period of several minutes (a phenomenon called fratricide). It would have required a substantial hardening of the silos to avoid damage to more than one from each single blast and was undermined by uncertainty over largely undemonstrated theories of fratricide effects.

The newer approaches are rail garrison, the so-called carry-hard approach and road-mobile basing.

Under rail garrison, up to 100 MX missiles would be deployed on trains based on military reservations. Current Pentagon thinking calls for the trains to operate outside the bases periodically, without nuclear warheads. In time of tension the trains

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would operate constantly, moving to prearranged assembly sites for warhead mating once an alert condition was directed. The chief drawback to this system is that it would require a matter of two to three hours to move to full alert. Such warning time may well be available, but to rely on it would be to subvert our historical resistance to a policy of "launch on warning." Throughout the nuclear age the United States has operated its strategic forces in the expectation that we will not have, and should not plan for, more than a few minutes warning. This is why we have kept ballistic missile submarines on patrol and bombers on alert. There is no reason to alter this planning assumption now, and to do so would be imprudent.

The "carry-hard" MPS plan was designed to deal with a number of criticisms of the horizontal MPS system, notably: the high costs of each shelter due to the need to harden each one; the large land area required; the relative softness of the shelters, even with hardening, due to modifications required to meet verification needs; and persistent doubts over the system's penetrability by Soviet intelligence. The carry-hard version's improvements are achieved by putting each missile in a hardened canister, thus requiring only 100, not 2,300, hardened housings. These hardened canisters (resistant to 10,000 pounds per square inch), with missiles inside, would be moved randomly among over 2,200 shelters, as with the original MPS system, although the shelters would be vertical. As a consequence of the additional hardening, much greater Soviet accuracies would be required, and each shelter could be separated from its nearest neighbor by as little as 1,500 feet (as opposed to a mile between the shelters in the original MPS plan), thus requiring much less land area—250 square miles as opposed to 4,000 square miles. And unlike the original MPS system, civilian observation would be prohibited to a distance of three miles. This system demonstrates an impressive ability to meet the criterion of assuring high survivability, particularly in a strategic climate where warheads are constrained by an arms control agreement. It also withstands higher overpressures and is relatively cheaper.

The road-mobile concept calls for single-warhead Midgetman missiles to be mounted on specially designed trucks and operated from military bases, preferably in the southwestern United States. It provides better survivability than any other system, since its operating area is larger (and therefore the number of Soviet warheads needed to barrage the area would

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be far greater). The 15-year cost would be about $29 billion for a 500-missile force. Its greatest advantage over the alternative systems is that it would assure survivability against even the most extravagant Soviet threat. If we consider the worst-case threat imaginable—no arms control limitations and a Soviet decision to build to the limit of their capability—only the road-mobile deployment concept would fulfill the survivability criteria.

If, however, a START agreement were to be concluded along the lines of the current U.S. position (but with mobile missiles allowed on both sides), we could improve system survivability under any of these alternative concepts, with the exception of the rail-garrison proposal. The lengthy alert time required by rail garrison would still make it less desirable than the others.

Turning to the modernization of missiles themselves: the basic wisdom of the Scowcroft Commission's proposal, that a new small single-warhead missile be developed, remains sound. It is also clear, however, that new techniques for updating current systems, and the fiscal realities before us, warrant consideration of alternatives. These include modification of the Minuteman II and/or Minuteman III systems. The Air Force has analyzed the military effectiveness and cost of refurbishing each of these systems. The Minuteman II, which is currently a single-warhead missile, could be modernized by refitting it with new propellant grains and a new third stage, as well as the single warhead and guidance system from the Minuteman III, at a cost of approximately $8.1 billion for 500 missiles. The Minuteman III missile could be modified by downloading two of its warheads at an even smaller cost.

If either alternative were selected, however, we would have a new problem: we would have to declare a system with the demonstrated capacity to deliver three warheads—the Minuteman III system or the upgraded former Minuteman II—to be considered henceforth a single-warhead system; this would lead to inevitable Soviet insistence on reciprocal treatment for their MIRVed systems. Unfortunately, even if agreed, the larger throw-weight of Soviet missiles would give them an enormous breakout advantage, were they to cheat by reverting to multiple warheads. For this reason there is a strong argument for choosing the Midgetman, which is designed at the outset to carry only one warhead. In addition, considerable research and development work has already been done on the Midgetman toward meeting the demanding conditions of road mobility; a

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converted Minuteman system would likely prove less reliable in this area.

The foregoing analysis might best be summarized by presenting the most desirable approach to meeting the most demanding requirements, and then proceeding by regression to less demanding levels.

—If there is no arms control regime and we must deal with an unconstrained Soviet threat, leaving aside fiscal limitations, our best course would be 1) to proceed with the MX, to be deployed in a carry-hard configuration at a force level of at least 100 missiles, and 2) to plan for the deployment of a large Midgetman force—at least 600 missiles—in a road-mobile configuration. Such a deterrent would present an extremely demanding challenge to any Soviet attack, because of the enormous proliferation of aim points to be attacked.

—If, however, an arms agreement is concluded at or about the currently proposed warhead levels, and we continue to assume no fiscal constraints, then the 50-missile MX program in silos, augmented by at least a 500-missile Midgetman program in a road-mobile configuration would fulfill our needs.

—Proceeding further, however, if fiscal realities and our political process foreclose the expense of proceeding to a $29-billion Midgetman deployment at this time, then the same 50-missile MX program (in silos), paired with a program calling for 500 Midgetman missiles in a carry-hard configuration, is the next best choice.

In my judgment, the overall economics argue for going directly to a mobile deployment mode for the Midgetman system. I believe that such a course is affordable without undue damage to other major procurement programs. At the same time, there is certainly room for argument. Putting a Midgetman or upgraded Minuteman force of 500–600 missiles in existing silos on an interim basis (assuming a START agreement along currently agreed numerical lines) would represent an improvement upon the current situation in terms of stability. Consideration should be given to this course.

V

To sum up: deterrence, through maintenance within a triad of forces of survivable retaliatory capability to inflict prompt, intolerable damage on Soviet military and related targets, remains the most cost-effective, stable and militarily sensible

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way to avoid nuclear war and lower-order aggression in Europe.

In the future it may be necessary for the United States to adopt some form of strategic defense to maintain the credibility of its nuclear strategy. There are foreseeable circumstances in which an accidental or unauthorized launch might endanger military and/or civilian targets. And there are other reasons for a serious program of research and technological development applicable to defense against ballistic missiles and air-breathing systems (aircraft and cruise missiles). These include:

—assessment of the cost-exchange ratios for defending various targets to various levels of survival in the face of responsive threats, including countermeasures, to determine the vulnerability of the defenses to direct attack and to analyze the stability of configurations of defensive and offensive deployments.

—deterrence of, and if necessary response to, a Soviet ABM breakout.

—preservation of possible options for the active defense of selected retaliatory forces and strategic command, control, communication and intelligence against certain small attacks, such as accidental, unauthorized or third-country launches.

Among the political decisions the United States should make are: to abide by the restrictive interpretation of the ABM treaty; to protect fully, in any negotiations, the ability of the United States to do research under the treaty; and to continue to evaluate SDI by the criteria of cost-exchange ratios at the margin, degree of vulnerability to direct attack, effect on stability, and impact on the strategic balance. The cost and value of SDI must also be weighed against other critical military programs for both strategic and general-purpose forces.

The SDI research program should avoid "spectaculars" carried out for their own sake. It should explore ground-based terminal defense of mobile or fixed hard points, ground-based and space-based sensors and advanced directed-energy weapons (such as ground-based free-electron lasers and space-based chemical lasers). Insofar as space-based kinetic-energy weapons appear to be vulnerable to straightforward countermeasures, that approach should be de-emphasized.

This general program should also proceed at a measured technological pace, with annual funding increasing from the fiscal year 1988 level ($3.7 billion over the next two or three years) at a rate consistent with efficient progress—on the order of ten percent per year.

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Some of the funds thus made available should be diverted to high-technology conventional force initiatives, in order to reduce the risk that the rapid increase in SDI research and development funding may starve U.S. conventional forces of the technological edge they need to offset the Soviet numerical advantage in conventional forces. Any decision on full-scale engineering development of a multi-tier SDI system should be delayed at least until the early 1990s.

With regard to arms control, our purpose should be to seek agreements which contribute to the establishment of balance and stability, as described in this article. In that context, I believe that the current U.S. proposal in the START negotiations is generally sound, but only if our strategic modernization program is guided by the need to reduce or at least preserve warhead/target ratios. It is particularly noteworthy that the Soviets have agreed to reduce their SS-18 force by 50 percent. Presumably, the United States will drop its demand that mobile missiles be banned, although as a stratagem to underscore the importance of assuring adequate verification, this demand has not yet served its purpose.

The past five years have been a time of enormous change. We entered those years with public support for a more assertive U.S. international role. Much of that enthusiasm has been usefully channeled into sensible national security programs, but some of it has been wasted, in part as a consequence of our ambivalence in regard to strategic concepts.

The next five years promise to be equally tumultuous as a result of fiscal pressures, technological progress and the normal, disarming swing of the political pendulum in the West back toward the romantic side of the arc. This latter trend is most unsettling. For unlike times past when, as these swings occurred, our superior strength afforded us a margin of error to experiment with various concepts for securing our interests, we no longer have that luxury. It has become much more important that we be guided by a concrete understanding of the threat before us and the path that, historically, has been the best way to deal with it.

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Strobe Talbott

WHY START STOPPED

In the presidential campaign of 1980, Ronald Reagan helped make SALT a four-letter word, all but unmentionable in polite but hard-headed company. Such was his distaste for the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks that had been under way for more than a decade. Yet during his Administration, the quest for an agreement between the United States and the Soviet Union on the size and composition of their intercontinental nuclear arsenals has continued under the new acronym of START, for Strategic Arms Reduction Talks.

As Mr. Reagan nears the end of his presidency, an important part of his legacy is a work-in-progress: a START treaty already in the form of what diplomats call a joint draft text. But that document still contains numerous brackets that indicate points of disagreement. Soviet and American negotiators in Geneva labored hard to remove some of those brackets during this past summer. In late September, Secretary of State George Shultz and Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze are scheduled to meet in New York and Washington, and START will be high on their agenda. While last-minute breakthroughs are still possible, neither side expects a completed treaty to emerge from that meeting.

Time may have run out for the Reagan Administration in arms control, though not for the enterprise itself. Both of President Reagan's would-be successors, George Bush and Michael Dukakis, have indicated that they would build on the considerable progress that President Reagan, in partnership with General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev, has made in START during the past few years.

However, in addition to inheriting an unfinished treaty, the next administration will also inherit some unanswered questions about the future of American defense programs. Further

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progress toward finishing the treaty will almost certainly require progress toward answering those questions.

II

When they met in Washington in December 1987, Ronald Reagan and Mikhail Gorbachev signed a pact eliminating intermediate-range nuclear missiles. The "zero solution" was stunning in its simplicity and boldness, yet it accounted for only about five percent of the firepower in the Soviet and American arsenals. Therefore, while the signing of that agreement was the pretext for the Washington summit, the main business transacted during those three days was an intensive effort to achieve progress in START, which had been proceeding in parallel with the intermediate-range nuclear forces (INF) talks in Geneva.

Both leaders had strong incentives to follow up on their success in INF with a START treaty in 1988. President Reagan wanted to achieve his long-sought goal of "radical," 50-percent cuts in the most dangerous weapons on earth. He wanted to claim that the American buildup in offensive weaponry, along with his cherished Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), had served to bring the Soviets not only to the START negotiating table but to the treaty-signing table as well.

A strategic arms pact in 1988 would also have helped offset the tribulations afflicting the Administration elsewhere in its foreign policy, particularly in Central America and the Middle East. The more bad news coming out of Nicaragua, Panama, the occupied territories of the West Bank and Gaza, and the Persian Gulf during the winter of 1987–88, the more attractive to the president and his advisers was the prospect of springtime in Moscow.

For Gorbachev, too, a clear-cut diplomatic triumph would be welcome in a year of troubles. He had to cope with an outbreak of ethnic unrest in the Caucasus and a recurrence of labor strife in Poland. In Afghanistan, the Soviet Union was cutting its losses and withdrawing the forces that for nine years had waged a quagmire war against the local, U.S.-backed anti-communist resistance. Gorbachev's internal reforms were a major preoccupation for him and the rest of the leadership, arousing resistance if not outright opposition at virtually all levels of Soviet society. Perestroika (restructuring) at home required a *peredyshka* (breathing space) abroad. Summitry would help to that end. Furthermore, reductions in strategic

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arms of the kind envisioned for START seemed to be consistent with Gorbachev's political, military and economic priorities.

So at the beginning of the new year—Reagan's last in office—political will appeared to exist at the highest levels in the White House and in the Kremlin for concluding an agreement. Also present were the main contents of the strategic arms reduction treaty itself.

The basic structure of the prospective START agreement is similar to that of its unratified predecessor, the SALT II treaty of 1979. An interlocking set of ceilings and subceilings was intended in the case of SALT to limit—and is intended in the case of START to reduce—those weapons that the superpowers might use to strike each other's territory in an all-out war: intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) and long-range bombers. Of particular concern have been those weapons that have the capability of carrying out a preemptive and disarming first strike. The object of arms control is to achieve not just a subtraction in the overall numbers of strategic arms, but preferential cuts in those systems that are most likely to be used to start a war. If those components of the two arsenals are reduced, so will be the danger of war itself.

From the American standpoint in both SALT and START, the principal purpose of strategic arms control has been to constrain Soviet ICBMs, especially the U.S.S.R.'s so-called heavy ICBMs. These are larger than any missiles on the American side, and each is armed with as many as ten warheads or multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles (MIRVs). Its preponderance of highly accurate land-based MIRVs gives the Soviet Union its most threatening advantage over the United States, since those warheads are the putative instrument of a bolt-from-the-blue attack against America's own ICBMs.

Thus, an important American criterion for judging progress in arms control has been the extent to which the process blunts the cutting edge of the Soviet Strategic Rocket Forces. By that standard, START had already produced the makings of a promising agreement by the beginning of 1988. Twin ceilings of 1,600 launchers (intercontinental bombers, ICBMs and SLBMs) and 6,000 warheads had been agreed upon over a year before, at the Reagan-Gorbachev meeting at Reykjavik in October 1986. The Washington summit of December 1987 yielded a subceiling of 4,900 on all ballistic missile warheads (i.e., both land- and submarine-based). Two additional features were es-

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pecially welcome to the American side. These were mandated 50-percent cuts in heavy missile warheads, where the Soviets had a monopoly, as well as in Soviet ballistic-missile throw-weight (the cumulative capacity to hurl warheads at the enemy), where they had an advantage.

Another salutary feature of the prospective agreement was a formula whereby bombs and short-range missiles on intercontinental bombers would be "discounted"—that is, treated less stringently than ballistic missile warheads. The discount on bomber weapons constituted an incentive for the two sides to retain forces that were better suited for retaliatory missions rather than ballistic missiles, which pose the threat of a first strike.

To be sure, some crucial matters remained in dispute, such as "counting rules" (how many weapons to attribute to various kinds of launchers) and verification (how one side could assure itself that the other was not cheating). But the broad outlines and the key provisions of the treaty were already established, and even in its unfinished form, START already represented a potential landmark in the 20-year search for "stabilizing reductions."

START appeared to be at least as close to completion in January 1988 as SALT II had been in January 1976, when the secretary of state at the time, Henry Kissinger, traveled to Moscow hoping for a breakthrough that would permit Gerald Ford to sign a treaty before that year's presidential election. Ford faced a conservative challenge from Ronald Reagan, and some presidential advisers feared that the American concessions necessary to deliver a treaty would hurt Ford's chances of nomination. Therefore they undercut Kissinger's effort to advance the negotiations that January. SALT II entered a state of suspended animation until Jimmy Carter became president, and it was not until three years later that a treaty was finally signed.

At the beginning of 1988, START seemed to suffer from no such election-year liability. Public opinion polls showed strategic arms control to be a popular goal, especially given the new atmosphere of optimism in Soviet-American relations and the need for fiscal restraint to cope with the huge federal deficit. It was widely believed that a completed START treaty would only help the Republicans against the Democrats in the fall. Thus there was all the more reason to expect an agreement, perhaps even by early summer.

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Moreover, the Washington summit provided the glimmer of a solution to what had become a major conundrum: how to reconcile strategic arms control—and particularly strategic arms reductions—with the Reagan Administration's determination to develop, eventually test and in due course deploy a large-scale, space-based system of high-technology defenses against ballistic missiles.

III

For 20 years superpower deterrence and diplomacy alike had been based on the morally troublesome, politically controversial but curiously durable proposition that each side had an interest in its adversary's capability to retaliate against an attack. To be secure, each side must be assured of the ability to survive a first strike. At the same time, however, to be deterred from launching such an attack, each side must remain vulnerable to a second, or retaliatory, blow. The SALT agreements of 1972 and 1979 depended on a tradeoff between strategic offense and defense: under the SALT I Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty of 1972, the United States and the Soviet Union agreed to an open-ended prohibition against nationwide antimissile defenses while they set about first to limit, then to reduce offensive forces.

By the time the Reagan Administration was in office, the assumptions underlying SALT were officially in doubt if not in disgrace. What many experts believed to be the looming vulnerability of the United States to a Soviet first strike undercut American confidence in deterrence and stimulated fresh interest in strategic defense. Conversely, an American quest for near-perfect defense and near-absolute invulnerability under the banner of SDI (announced by President Reagan in March 1983) constituted a powerful incentive for the Soviet Union to increase its offenses rather than reduce them.

Hence there has been in the dynamic of arms control since 1983 a perplexing contradiction between START and SDI. By the time Reagan and Gorbachev met in Washington in December 1987, their governments had been trying for some time if not to resolve that contradiction, then at least to postpone its consequences long enough to achieve progress in START.

Compromise proved difficult. At the center of the negotiation was a Gordian knot of seemingly irreconcilable differences over the future of deterrence. Reagan wanted to make sure that the research, development and testing of SDI would lead

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to eventual deployment of a system that would revolutionize how global peace was assured. From his standpoint, the sooner R&D gave way to deployment the better. He was determined to prevent what he saw as any Soviet effort to "kill" SDI, such as Gorbachev's proposal at Reykjavik to limit all SDI research and development to the laboratory.

As for Gorbachev, he was sufficiently eager for a START deal that he adjusted the Soviet position on SDI considerably during 1987. But he never accepted the desirability, much less the inevitability, of a large-scale, fully deployed SDI. He would not insist on killing the program outright, but he clearly wanted to hamper it as much as possible.

Meanwhile many members of the Reagan Administration had their own doubts about the technical feasibility and strategic wisdom of comprehensive, space-based strategic defense in its most grandiose, presidentially sanctioned form. Therefore they found it possible, when Gorbachev came to Washington in December 1987, to make common cause with their Soviet counterparts on compromise language that begged the question of what SDI would turn out to be and how it would be governed by the ABM treaty.

In the communiqué released at the end of the Washington summit, the two leaders agreed on a de facto if not de jure way of updating the long-standing tradeoff between offense and defense while setting aside the hard issues of SDI. The most important, and most contorted, passage in the communiqué was the statement that the two sides would "observe the ABM treaty, as signed in 1972, while conducting their research, development, and testing as required, which are permitted by the ABM treaty, and not to withdraw from the ABM treaty, for a specified period of time." The commas and subordinate clauses left deliberately vague what level of testing would be permissible during the period of nonwithdrawal.

The American officials responsible for what became known as "the Washington finesse" were trying to make a virtue of a necessity. Five years after Reagan's so-called Star Wars speech, the prospects for the SDI program bore little resemblance to Reagan's original dream of an impregnable shield that would transform the nature of deterrence by rendering offensive weapons, in the president's famous phrase, "impotent and obsolete."

A majority in Congress had resisted the Administration's requests for large funding increases and ruled out SDI tests that

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would violate the ABM treaty. Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger, who resigned shortly before the Washington summit, had failed in his drive for early demonstrations of SDI technology and early deployment of an actual system. No more successful had been the presidential campaign of Jack Kemp, the one candidate who had made all-out advocacy of Star Wars a major theme in his bid to succeed Reagan.

The new secretary of defense, Frank Carlucci, called in General James Abrahamson, the director of the SDI Organization, and told him that from now on he would be a program manager, no longer a salesman. In testimony on Capitol Hill, Carlucci offered assurances that tests scheduled through 1991 would "probably not raise the [ABM] treaty compliance issue."

Suddenly everyone seemed to be looking for ways to scale back the goals and cost of SDI without killing the program entirely. The uniformed military had already closed ranks behind advocacy of a system that might stop about half of the Soviets' heavy ICBM warheads and only 30 percent of the entire missile force in a massive first strike. Such a defense would, according to its advocates, complicate the Kremlin's calculations and thereby bolster deterrence, but it was a far cry from what the president had originally wanted and still seemed to want in early 1988.

Senator Sam Nunn of Georgia, the influential Democratic chairman of the Armed Services Committee, proposed something much more modest—what he called an accidental launch protection system, a land-based defense against stray missiles.

Almost no one wanted to be an apologist for the idea of leaving the United States forever entirely naked to nuclear attack. The new fashion in strategic defense, however, was minimalism. One of the oldest, most legitimate, most difficult, and still unanswered questions of the nuclear age was now back in focus: Was there a role for strategic defense in keeping the peace? Would it be possible for one side to deploy defenses in a way that would increase its ability to withstand a first strike without decreasing the other side's confidence in its own ability to carry out a second strike in retaliation against an attack? Could limited defense be put to work in the service of offense-dominant deterrence in a way that would bolster mutual deterrence and mutual security?

These were genuine questions, quite different from the declaration of faith in the deus ex machina of pure defense that had driven SDI. Even with President Reagan, the ultimate

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SDI enthusiast, still in office, all eyes were turning to the post-Reagan era. And in the eyes of almost everyone except Reagan, SDI had reached the point that the ABM program had reached 20 years earlier: the order of the day was a "thin" defense, whether against a fraction of the Soviet missile force or against a lone missile fired by mistake, by a rogue colonel or by a Third World madman. Just as the adoption of the "thin ABM" in the late 1960s had laid the ground for the offense-defense tradeoff in SALT in 1972, so the emergence of a loose consensus in favor of a thin SDI in 1987–88 seemed to make possible a similar breakthrough in START.

IV

But it was not to be, at least not by the spring, as Reagan and Gorbachev had hoped. They kept to their timetable for a fourth summit by mid-1988. The meeting was held in Moscow May 29 to June 2. But the president and the general secretary were unable to use the meeting to sign a final agreement in START. Instead, they had to settle for another joint statement. This time it was one that indicated progress only on minor matters while acknowledging that "serious differences remain on important issues."

A number of factors combined to dash the hopes of the two leaders. One problem was that the INF treaty had run into unexpected trouble in the Senate. Some of the opposition came from the predictable quarter of ultraconservative senators like Jesse Helms (R-N.C.). He and other diehards on the right used the INF treaty as a kind of voodoo doll in which they could stick pins in order to inflict pain on the body of arms control generally and START in particular. Seizing on discrepancies among estimates of how many undeployed, uncounted INF missiles the Soviets had, Senator Helms accused the State Department of "cooking the books" to conform with Soviet lies about their missile inventory.

Moderates, too, had their reservations. Senator David Boren, the Democratic chairman of the Select Committee on Intelligence, contended that the government would have to improve its coverage of the Soviet Union with spy satellites to monitor compliance with the treaty.

The Administration's resulting defensiveness over a treaty that it had already signed and the long delay in its ratification was a drag on progress in START. Not until Reagan had already

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departed for Moscow in late May did the Senate finally (though overwhelmingly) approve the INF treaty.

The major cause of the long stall in START in 1988 was what amounted to a revolt by the military leaders against their civilian colleagues over the conduct of arms control.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff and their chairman, Admiral William Crowe, had never seen themselves—or been seen by others—as in any sense against arms control. In that respect there was a marked contrast between Crowe and the Joint Chiefs on the one hand and their former boss, Caspar Weinberger, on the other. Weinberger had spent much of his nearly seven years as secretary of defense thwarting, or trying to thwart, the pursuit of negotiable agreements.

In an interview on June 3, 1988, Crowe summed up his differences with Weinberger: "I was never sure he was for an agreement, and I knew I was." Crowe recalled that earlier in the year he had assured Secretary of State Shultz that the Joint Chiefs wanted to do everything they could to "advance the endgame" in START. Officials at the State Department confirmed that they regarded Crowe as essentially friendly to the objective of arms control even when there were differences over tactics and details.

But as the Moscow summit approached during the spring of 1988, those differences, concerning the pace as well as the substance of negotiations, became very sharp indeed. The Joint Chiefs still saw arms control as a useful auxiliary to national security policy. But in their view, national security policy suffered from too much confusion, uncertainty and dissension for arms control to go forward at anything like the forced-march pace that the State Department and White House wanted. The Joint Chiefs were in a position to slow the process in part because the Reagan Administration, wounded by the Iran-contra affair and other setbacks, was limping into its last year in office. They saw an opportunity, and a need, to assert themselves—to insist on a pause in arms control and a reassessment of the nation's strategy and weapons programs.

The diplomatic process had been under way for most of the last six years, but only recently had the Joint Chiefs of Staff faced up to its ramifications. They could perhaps be forgiven for their delayed reaction. For much of the Reagan presidency—from 1981 through most of 1986—the U.S. military leaders, like many others, had not taken very seriously the possibility that the Geneva arms negotiations would actually

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produce a strategic arms treaty that would concretely affect American forces. For years START had seemed doomed to stalemate, perhaps even deliberately so in the minds of some hard-liners on the American side. The largely sterile exchange of what were widely considered nonnegotiable proposals between Moscow and Washington appeared to have little consequence for the real world of procurements and deployments on which the military chiefs concentrated their attentions and energies. There had even been a total collapse of the negotiations that lasted for more than a year—from the Soviet walkout at the Geneva arms control talks in late 1983, after the U.S. INF deployment in Europe, until the resumption of negotiations in early 1985.

Not until late 1986 and early 1987 did the Joint Chiefs begin to pay close attention to what was going on in arms control and its near- and middle-term implications for American defense programs. They did not like much of what they saw, particularly in the confused record of the hectic, largely improvisational, and highly ill-considered bargaining that went on between Reagan and Gorbachev at Reykjavik in October 1986. In the dizzying last hours of that encounter, President Reagan embraced the idea not only that strategic ballistic missiles, like the intermediate-range missiles of INF, should be reduced to zero but that this giant step toward nuclear disarmament might be accomplished within ten years.

True, the so-called zero-ballistic-missiles ingredient of the Reykjavik package was contingent on American concessions in SDI that the president was not willing to make (Gorbachev's "killer" insistence that the research-and-development program be confined to the laboratory). Nonetheless, the willingness of the president to agree, however conditionally, to the elimination of the most powerful of all weapons and the backbone of the American deterrent came as a rude shock to the Joint Chiefs of Staff. They were profoundly doubtful that the United States could assure its security and that of its allies without ballistic missiles.

What was more, they were already fighting an uphill battle in Congress on behalf of a number of new ballistic missile systems (the MX ICBM and the Trident II SLBM). They feared that their selling job would be all the harder now that the commander in chief had endorsed the idea of eliminating all such systems in ten years.

The Joint Chiefs were instrumental in making sure that the

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zero-ballistic-missiles idea ended up on the cutting room floor during the aftermath of the Reykjavik meeting. They also had qualified reservations about the plan for 50-percent reductions. The Joint Chiefs saw the emerging START treaty as featuring ceilings and subceilings that could indeed be conducive to strategic stability. But whether START in fact turned out to be stabilizing would depend on how the United States chose to fill its allotment under ceilings of 1,600 launchers, 6,000 nuclear charges, 4,900 ballistic missile warheads, and so forth. More specifically, it would depend on what steps the United States took to assure that its reduced number of strategic ballistic missiles was less vulnerable than before to the threat of a Soviet attack.

The military leaders believed that invulnerability meant some sort of mobility for land-based missiles. Stationary missiles in underground silos were simply too easy for highly accurate Soviet warheads to destroy. This was one reason why only 28 of the nation's newest missiles, the ten-warhead MX, had been deployed in silos. The Air Force was moving ahead with a plan to deploy the MX on railroad cars, but it ran into resistance. Key members of Congress, opposed to MIRVed missiles in general, were pushing the idea of developing a small, mobile, un-MIRVed missile called Midgetman. Its single warhead would permit the deployment of a large number even under the agreed START ceilings. The Joint Chiefs, however, believed that Midgetman, precisely because it would be designed to carry only one warhead per launcher, would turn out to be too expensive. They were concerned that funds for developing it would have to come out of other corners of the defense budget. This in fact happened in the current budget, when Congress took funds for Midgetman out of the MX account.

The worst outcome, Crowe feared, was that enthusiasts for Midgetman in Congress would block any further deployment of the MX, particularly as a mobile missile, while the cost-cutters on Capitol Hill would block the Midgetman, and the United States would end up with no mobile intercontinental missiles at all. Meanwhile, the Soviets would continue their deployment of two mobile systems: the SS-24, roughly comparable to the MX, and the SS-25, similar to the Midgetman.

Partly because that fear was shared elsewhere in the government, since 1985 the Administration had been formally proposing to ban all mobile ICBMs in the START treaty. That ban remained part of the official American position in 1988.

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Thus, there were multiple contradictions on the American side over what the United States felt it could and should do in its mobile ICBM program; there were contradictions within the executive branch and between the executive and legislative branches, as well as between U.S. military programs and the American negotiating position in Geneva.

For this reason Admiral Crowe repeatedly warned the president in early 1988 that it would be a mistake even to try to complete a START treaty until the United States had a much clearer idea of what sort of ICBM program made military, economic and political sense.

Various influential voices outside the Administration, notably including Senator Nunn's, echoed that caution. These concerns seemed to carry the day with the Reagan Administration, dampening hopes for a START treaty in 1988 and providing a rationale for a period of reassessment in U.S. military policy before diplomacy could resume in earnest.

V

While the Reagan Administration was unable to reconcile differences at home over its ballistic missile program, the negotiations with the Soviets were encountering another difficulty. The reduction of strategic ballistic missiles, mobile or otherwise, was not the principal bilateral problem contributing to the slowdown in START. Instead, the weapon that represented what seemed to be an almost insurmountable obstacle to a final agreement by the time of the Moscow summit was a small, low-flying, slow-flying drone. This was the nuclear-armed, sea-launched cruise missile, known as the SLCM (pronounced "slickum"), which could be deployed on both surface ships and submarines.

SLCMs had been around for a long time as a weapon system and also as a challenge to arms control. The Ford and Carter Administrations had haggled over SLCMs, both within the corridors of the U.S. government and with the Soviets. In SALT II an agreement was reached to defer SLCM deployments for three years; after this special protocol lapsed, the United States began some deployments. The United States enjoyed a significant lead in the miniaturized guidance and propulsion systems for all cruise missiles, and partly for this reason the Soviets wanted to limit them severely. Ground-launched cruise missiles were banned by the INF treaty, and START yielded a formula that

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would permit air-launched cruise missiles. SLCMs, however, seemed to defy compromise and agreement.

Marshal Sergei Akhromeyev, the chief of the Soviet General Staff, was particularly adamant that a START treaty must include stringent limits on SLCMs. At the Reagan-Gorbachev meeting at Reykjavik in October 1986, Akhromeyev, who served as the chairman of the Soviet "working group" on arms control, said that reductions in ballistic missiles would be meaningless and indeed unacceptable if the United States retained the right to surround the U.S.S.R. with nuclear-armed SLCMs. It took more than an hour at Reykjavik to agree on a joint statement saying no more than that the two sides would work toward a mutually agreeable solution.

But not until 1988 did it become apparent that what for years had been a worrisome detail in strategic arms control might, at the eleventh hour, become a treaty-blocker if not a treaty-buster. That occurred in part because, since Reykjavik, START itself had evolved from a largely abstract, propagandistic exercise into a negotiation that finally—and, to many, surprisingly—seemed about to produce an agreement. The more movement there was on other matters, the more serious the issue of SLCMs became.

Max Kampelman, the chief American arms control negotiator in Geneva and the counselor of the State Department, is a distinguished Washington attorney. In an interview on May 12, 1988, he compared what was happening in START to his own earlier experience with last-minute, drawn-out snags in contract law: "After you've got the major issues in your pocket, the minor issues become major issues."

SLCMs were a particularly nettlesome example of this phenomenon because the U.S. Navy had already begun deploying nuclear-armed long-range SLCMs. Thus many in the military had acquired a vested interest in the continuation of the program.

Nonetheless, other American military experts argued that the United States should accept stringent restrictions on SLCMs while the Soviets were still interested. The American technological edge would almost inevitably prove temporary, while geographical asymmetries between the superpowers were permanent—and permanently favorable to the Soviet Union. Key American cities and military installations were near the coasts, and therefore easy marks for Soviet SLCMs, while many comparable Soviet targets were deep inland and protected by the

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most extensive air defenses in the world. A number of NATO officials, particularly from Norway and Canada, made the same point, and Senator Nunn said in an interview on May 24 that he found this view "most persuasive."

Another consideration militated against nuclear-armed SLCMs. By any standard, the United States' navy was superior to the Soviet Union's. America could out-fight the Soviet Union on the high seas—as long as the war was confined to conventional forces. However, if the Soviets "went nuclear" in battles at sea, American aircraft carriers and battleships might disappear in mushroom clouds. In that event, the Soviets would have used their naval nuclear weapons as equalizers to compensate for America's maritime superiority, much as the United States counted on its own nuclear weapons to make up for NATO's numerical inferiority in conventional land-based forces in Europe. Therefore, from the American standpoint, it was better to raise the so-called nuclear threshold as high as possible in the naval arena; that meant no nuclear-armed SLCMs.

Paul Nitze, the senior adviser to the president and Secretary Shultz on arms control, was the principal proponent within the Administration of the view that possession of nuclear-armed SLCMs by both sides made those weapons "inherent losers" for the United States. As secretary of the navy in the Johnson Administration, he had been responsible for removing nuclear-armed carrier-based aircraft from the so-called Single Integrated Operational Plan—the Pentagon's top-secret, highly detailed master plan for waging nuclear war against the Soviet Union. Nitze had concluded that carrier-based planes were unlikely to survive long enough to be of any use in a nuclear war. Recalling that decision of a quarter-century earlier, he asked a number of admirals in 1988 whether the U.S. Navy would not be better off with a simple, radical measure—a ban on nuclear-armed SLCMs, as well as on nuclear-armed torpedoes, depth charges, surface-to-air missiles and other such weapons. Each side had roughly 2,000 such "nonstrategic" naval nuclear weapons that would be eliminated by a ban. The only nuclear weapons remaining in the superpowers' navies would be submarine-launched ballistic missiles.

Nitze hoped that American willingness to do away with nuclear-armed SLCMs would be a central part of what he called a "more forward-leaning" package of new American START proposals that Secretary Shultz could take to Moscow for a

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ministerial meeting with Shevardnadze at the end of February 1988.

But Secretary of Defense Carlucci and the Joint Chiefs of Staff vetoed the idea. Carlucci regretted that the Pentagon had ever agreed even in principle to put SLCMs on the agenda for START. He and the Joint Chiefs believed that the United States had to preserve the option of deploying ship-to-shore (or "land-attack") nuclear-armed SLCMs as a means of bolstering nuclear deterrence in Europe, especially now that American intermediate-range missiles were going to be removed as a result of the INF treaty. Therefore, they concluded, START should permit each side more than 700 nuclear-armed SLCMs as well as more than 3,000 conventionally armed ones.

That should have meant coming up with a verifiable way of differentiating between the two. SLCMs are small and easy to hide—it is almost impossible to distinguish the nuclear-armed version from the conventionally armed one at a distance—and, despite some vague Soviet offers, neither side would probably be willing to permit the other to conduct on-board inspection of its ships.

At the conclusion of the Washington summit in December, Gorbachev had touched off a minor stir by claiming at a press conference that it was technically feasible for one side to determine from a distance whether the other side's ships had nuclear-armed SLCMs on board. Some of his scientific advisers had encouraged him in the belief that such remote monitoring was possible. American experts were extremely doubtful. They were sure that it would be possible to shield nuclear warheads so that the rays they emitted could not be detected by the other side's remote sensors. A number of Soviet military experts shared their skepticism.

The Pentagon's solution was for each side simply to declare how many SLCMs it planned to deploy. This made a mockery of the long-standing American insistence that each side must be able independently to monitor the other's compliance with all provisions of an agreement. In his meetings with Gorbachev, President Reagan was given to repeating a Russian proverb, *Doverai no proverai* ("Trust but verify"), as the watchword for arms control. Yet where SLCMs were concerned, the American position was: Trust, period.

Secretary Carlucci's way of dealing with this awkwardness was to assert, in a television interview with the Cable News

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Network on May 30, during the Moscow summit, that SLCMs were not really strategic weapons anyway.

If there was to be a breakthrough in START in time for Reagan to sign a treaty before he left office, there would have to be a capitulation by one side or the other. The United States would have to decide that it could live without nuclear-armed SLCMs after all, or the Soviet Union would have to decide it could live with large, probably uncountable numbers of those weapons aboard American ships after all. Neither outcome seemed likely.

Another option—favored by some arms control advocates on both sides—would be to finesse the SLCM issue in somewhat the way the SDI problem had been finessed at the Washington summit. One possibility would be to set SLCMs aside for the time being, putting them on the agenda of a new, separate negotiation, much as intermediate-range nuclear forces (including various kinds of cruise missiles) had been split off from SALT in the 1970s.

However, through the Moscow summit and into the summer, the Soviet military was not willing to exempt SLCMs from START. Unlike SDI, SLCMs represented a technology that was already available—indeed, a weapon system that was already being deployed. Therefore the Kremlin continued to insist that SLCMs be subject to low, verifiable limits as part of a START treaty.

VI

The impasse over SLCMs might have been resolved had there been more ability and determination on the part of the Administration to forge a consensus about the future of U.S. military programs. As 1988 unfolded, it became increasingly clear that the division within the American government was not so much over how START should deal with a particular issue, such as mobile ICBMs or SLCMs, as it was over how realistic it was to expect, or how prudent to attempt, to have any treaty at all before the Administration left office. Admiral Crowe's conviction was growing that the difficulty in what he called "getting our own act together" was too deep-rooted for there to be a treaty by June. Meanwhile, on visits to Capitol Hill, Secretary of Defense Carlucci was hearing warnings to the effect that START would encounter even more trouble than the beleaguered INF treaty.

These congressional misgivings about the prospective treaty seemed mild and diffuse compared to the drumbeat of criticism

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already coming from a number of distinguished private citizens who, as government officials in the 1970s, had been closely associated with SALT but who were now engaged in something close to a preemptive strike against START.

In a newspaper column in mid-January Henry Kissinger warned: "The current nuclear arms control negotiations are too one-sided." He argued that unless the United States restructured its own forces considerably by "going mobile" with its land-based missile force and dispersing its submarine-launched missiles among a larger number of smaller boats than navy programs then envisioned, the American deterrent would end up no less vulnerable to a Soviet first strike than before—and perhaps more so.

Kissinger was, in effect, blaming START for a state of affairs that had come about as a result of unilateral American decisions—or, in the case of mobile ICBMs, indecision. This had also been a habit of critics of arms control back in the days of SALT, when Kissinger was a negotiator and defender of the agreements in question.

For months, the Reagan Administration seemed to be biting its tongue. It concentrated its forensic powers on defending the INF treaty until after that document was safely ratified. Not until June 21, in an article in *The Washington Post*, did Paul Nitze reply, on behalf of the Administration, to Kissinger and other critics. Nitze contended that they were placing an unfair burden on arms control. It was up to the United States to decide how most sensibly—i.e., least vulnerably—to base its ballistic missiles on land and at sea. "No foreseeable arms control agreement can alone solve" the problem of vulnerability, he wrote. Besides, he continued, because of the drawdown in Soviet warheads and throw-weight, "START would reduce the threat to whatever system we chose" for the basing of American missiles.

There was still, however, a necessity for choice. In their own deliberations on START, the Joint Chiefs of Staff were stressing that the treaty would be stabilizing only if the United States took steps to assure that the 4,900 ballistic missile warheads allowed by the treaty would be deployed in a fashion that assured their ability to survive a first strike.

Reagan's military advisers came to believe, early in the year, that too many important military choices were left hanging, or were being rushed, for the diplomats to proceed. In late January, just as Secretary Shultz was about to undertake the

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first in a series of visits to Moscow to prepare the way for the midyear summit, Carlucci warned, during a White House meeting, against going into a "two-minute drill." Shultz replied that the United States would never know what could be accomplished without trying, and Howard Baker, the White House chief of staff, sided with Shultz. The president agreed. Borrowing a phrase from the Winter Olympics then under way in Calgary, he said that the United States should "go for the gold."

But the negotiators needed more than a presidential blessing. A breakthrough required fresh initiatives—on mobile ICBMs, SLCMs and other sticking points—and there were none. When a group of influential senators, including Sam Nunn and Robert Byrd, the Democratic majority leader, visited Geneva in early February, they found the American and Soviet diplomats there discouraged by the treadmill-like quality of the negotiating process. On their return to Washington, the senators called at the White House and conveyed to Reagan and Baker their pessimism about the chances for an agreement in time for the summit. Nunn used the occasion to reiterate his reservations about whether it was wise to proceed toward a START agreement when there was still so much division, uncertainty and confusion on the American side over the future of American strategic offensive programs, including both mobile and cruise missiles.

The president decided that the time had come to lower expectations for the summit and stress that he was more interested in a good deal than an early deal. In an interview with Lou Cannon of *The Washington Post* on February 25, Reagan said:

> I have to tell you that common sense indicates that the time is too limited for us to really think that we could bring a treaty ready for signature to [the summit]. . . . This one [START] is so much more complicated with regard to verification and everything else than the INF treaty, which we were able to bring together. But even that took a few months to do. So we're not going to be disappointed . . . we're not at this moment anticipating that it would be ready for signature then.

This statement was read with relief at the Pentagon and dismay at the State Department. Advocates of an all-out push, under the pressure of a deadline, had publicly lost their main sponsor. The prospect for a START treaty in 1988—seemingly

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so bright after the Washington summit—now seemed bleak indeed as the Moscow summit drew closer.

Presidential impetus is crucial in arms control, even in the best of times. An election year and the final months of a lame-duck administration are not the best of times, especially if the chief executive has never been deeply engaged in arms-control policymaking and, with his eye on the exit, has recently been disengaging more than ever. Such has been the case with Ronald Reagan. He seemed to conclude that while a START agreement would have been welcome, it was not indispensable, as his crowning achievement. Throughout much of 1988, his involvement in START was largely a matter of saying "good point" to those, like Crowe and Carlucci, who wanted to go slow in the negotiations and "good luck" to those, like Shultz and Baker, who wanted to press ahead. In the delicate and complicated machinery of arms control, the brakes tend to work better than the accelerator.

VII

For three months—March, April and May—there was some progress toward measures to verify limits on mobile ICBMs as well as toward a compromise on how to count air-launched cruise missiles. But largely because of its own ambivalence about mobile ICBMs, the United States was still formally holding out for a ban on such systems, and negotiations over SLCMs remained at an impasse. Shultz came to feel that the best the two leaders could do at the summit would be to "take a photograph of where we are" by consecrating the work that had already been done on the joint draft text of a START treaty, leaving it to their subordinates, if not their successors, to remove the remaining brackets indicating points of disagreement.

En route to Moscow, Air Force One stopped in Helsinki for three days to give the president a chance to catch up on jet lag. During the layover, on May 28, the president's national security adviser, General Colin Powell, gave a briefing for the traveling White House press corps. He spelled out his own hope for the summit, acknowledging what had become the number-one sticking point: "If we make some progress on sea-launched cruise missiles—if not a breakthrough, we might make sufficient progress that we can return to work in Geneva, finish it over the summer, and in the fall at a ministerial meeting or higher, should that come about, we could go to closure on it."

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Powell acknowledged that in addition to the remaining points of contention between the United States and the Soviet Union, there was also "a level of negotiations that takes place in Washington within the Administration as we debate out positions and make sure that the positions we come down on to present to the Soviets are acceptable to all of the interested parties in Washington. . . . There are outstanding issues within the Administration."

Both sets of negotiations—between the two governments and within the American government—were grinding to a halt, well short of the finish line that Reagan had hoped for as recently as February.

There was no breakthrough—in fact, no progress at all—on SLCMs at the summit, and only the most modest, inconclusive progress on other, lesser issues. For all the important political symbolism of Ronald Reagan strolling through Red Square arm-in-arm with Mikhail Gorbachev, the theme of nuclear diplomacy at the meeting was in a distinctly minor key.

There was a sense of fatigue on the American side and of impatience on the Soviet side—not just restlessness with the same old disagreements, but eagerness to deal with a new American leadership. After the summit, in July, a number of Soviet spokesmen and officials, including two personal advisers to Gorbachev, remarked privately in Moscow that their side had come to a political judgment: the Kremlin had done nearly all the arms-control business it could usefully accomplish with the Reagan Administration.

VIII

The Soviets may be right in betting that George Bush or Michael Dukakis will move relatively quickly to finish what he inherits in START. They may be right that there will be no return to square one in strategic arms control of the sort that occurred early in both the Carter and Reagan Administrations, infuriating the Kremlin and delaying agreement for years.

In many of their campaign statements about arms control, both Bush and Dukakis have had kind words for the broad outlines of the prospective START deal. The candidates and their advisers have cited strategic arms control as one area of foreign and defense policy where there is likely to be a high degree of continuity once a new administration takes office.

The Soviets may also be right that either Bush or Dukakis will have a relatively easy time shepherding a START treaty to

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ratification, past the ideologically motivated opposition of the ultraconservatives and the more technical concerns of critics like Kissinger. A new president, after all, will presumably have the benefit of a honeymoon with Congress and public opinion. He would also have a higher level of energy and more willingness to crack heads among his advisers, including his military advisers, than has been the case in the waning months of Reagan's presidency.

But even if the next president decides that he wants a START treaty along the lines of what has already been negotiated, he will still have to decide what the small print in that treaty should say about mobile ICBMs and SLCMs, and what an accompanying document should say about SDI. Those weapon (and antiweapon) systems are not—or at least should not be—bargaining chips. Their future should not be decided on the basis of arms control tactics. They are matters of defense policy and military strategy, and they should be treated as such.

Nor will the conflict over those issues go away with the inauguration. Admiral Crowe will still be chairman of the Joint Chiefs when Bush or Dukakis takes office in January. If the Democrats maintain control of the Senate, Sam Nunn will still be chairman of the Armed Services Committee.

Implicit in the cautionary advice that Crowe and Nunn have been giving Ronald Reagan for much of this year is a message for the next president as well: before a new administration can pick up where the old one leaves off in START, it should impose some order on the chaos of U.S. official thinking (including that in Congress) about mobile ICBMs; it should decide whether there is a militarily sound mission for nuclear-armed SLCMs; and it should develop a plan for further research and development of strategic defenses that realistically reflects available funding and scientific promise (neither of which is unbounded).

This year has been as instructive as it has been suspenseful. In addition to running the gamut from high hopes after the Washington summit to muted disappointment after the Moscow summit, 1988 has offered an object lesson in the need for the nation's political leaders to have clearly in mind a coherent, sustainable military program before they can conclude comprehensive and prudent agreements with the other superpower.

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Bruce M. Bagley

COLOMBIA AND THE WAR ON DRUGS

Aside from traffickers in the United States, Colombians earn more from the drug trade than do any other nationality of the western hemisphere. During the 1980s 70 to 80 percent of the refined cocaine and 50 to 60 percent of the marijuana available in the U.S. market have come from Colombia. Colombia also ranks as the world's largest supplier of quaaludes, and there are indications that in the mid-1980s Colombian drug traffickers began experiments with opium cultivation as well. Moreover, Colombian criminal organizations have become involved in virtually every aspect of the narcotics trade, from financing drug plantations and laboratories in Colombia and other South American countries, through smuggling operations, to distribution networks at both the wholesale and street levels in the United States, Canada and Europe.

The infamous Medellín cartel alone is reputed to earn some US$2 billion to $4 billion a year and to rival many Fortune 500 companies in terms of its global reach. Including the entire spectrum of drug exports, probably $2.5–3 billion a year in profits are repatriated to Colombia; drugs now rank above coffee ($2–2.5 billion) as the country's principal foreign exchange earner.

Colombia's emergence as a key source and trafficking country has understandably attracted a great deal of attention from U.S. policymakers, law enforcement officials and journalists over the last decade. Indeed, in the minds of most Americans, Colombia is now essentially synonymous with drug trafficking. In view of the country's sullied reputation, the Colombian government's obvious failure to rein in the Colombian *narcotraficantes* and the growing concern in the United States about the drug problem reflected in the Reagan Administration's "war on drugs," Colombia has inevitably come under increas-

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ing pressure from Washington to act more forcefully against drug production and trafficking within its borders.

Washington's approach to the drug problem has focused on eliminating drugs at the source of production and refinement or seizing them before they reach American shores. The specific international policies it has promoted in Colombia, as in the rest of Latin America and the Third World, include programs of eradication, crop substitution, interdiction and enhanced law enforcement.

Given the current intensity of anti-drug sentiments in the United States and the growing political pressure to "do something" about the drug plague, Washington's emphasis on "supply-side" solutions in Colombia and elsewhere seems logical from a U.S. perspective. But often lacking in U.S. discussions is an awareness that Colombia and other Latin American countries confront equally dire drug-related problems themselves. These countries see the need to balance supply-side efforts with greater emphasis on the demand side in the United States if they are ever to make headway against drug traffic. This article focuses on the domestic implications of the drug problem in Colombia in an effort to clarify why many Colombians and Latin Americans have come to this conclusion and what it implies for the war on drugs.

II

Colombia is a country of contradictions. On the one hand, it ranks as the most economically prosperous nation in Latin America during the 1980s. Its economy grew by 5.5 percent in 1987, and is expected to grow by 4.5 percent in 1988. It has achieved real economic growth every year since 1980, and unlike virtually all its regional neighbors, not once in the 1980s has Colombia fallen behind on debt service payments or sought to renegotiate its $15.7-billion debt.

On the other hand, despite its relative economic success Colombia is one of the most violent countries in the hemisphere, perhaps in the world. In 1987 there were some 16,200 homicides in Colombia, a 15-percent rise over 1986. In fact, the current murder rate has been estimated by the Colombian government to be higher than it was during the peak years of *la violencia*—the undeclared civil war of 1948–58 between the dominant Liberal and Conservative parties in which 200,000 people died. Murder is the principal cause of death of Colom-

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bian males aged 15 to 44 and the second leading cause of death among all age groups.

Colombia's rising tide of violence is in part politically motivated. Since its return to civilian rule in 1958 after four years under the military regime of General Gustavo Rojas Pinilla, Colombia's political system has been formally democratic. Nonetheless, the highly restrictive political procedures adopted under the bipartisan National Front agreement effectively limited participation in the system to the dominant Liberal and Conservative party elites, while denying access to other social forces created by rapid economic modernization. Colombia, with one of the most skewed patterns of income distribution in Latin America, has been plagued for decades by increasingly violent guerrilla warfare. It harbors the oldest Marxist guerrilla organization in the hemisphere, the Colombian Revolutionary Armed Forces (FARC). Colombia is also home to at least eight other guerrilla organizations, including the non-Marxist 19th of April Movement (M-19). In all, there are some 12,000 to 15,000 guerrilla combatants currently active in Colombia.

Left-wing violence has in turn spawned a wave of violence from the right. During the 1980s paramilitary groups and right-wing death squads have proliferated in Colombia; the government recently identified 138 such organizations. Their targets have been most frequently peasant and labor union leaders, intellectuals, journalists and leftists suspected of collaboration with the guerrillas. At least some of these death squads have included active or retired military and police personnel in their ranks, conjuring up visions of the "Salvadorization" or "Argentinization" of Colombia.

Despite record levels of political murders in recent years, however, less than ten percent of Colombia's homicides are politically motivated. Out of its history of bitter civil wars in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries and the inherited hatreds that developed between the Liberal and Conservative parties, Colombia evolved a deeply ingrained culture of partisan violence that sets it apart from other Latin American republics. This tradition of violence has been compounded by rapid social change, extensive poverty and high unemployment, all of which have fostered high rates of crime. Efforts to combat crime are hampered by the corruption and inefficiency of the national police and judiciary, and by the limited presence (or total absence) of government institutions in large areas of the national territory.

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While Colombia has long been accustomed to extraordinarily high levels of violence, the rise of organized drug mafias in the country in the late 1970s provoked a qualitative change in the violence. Relying on paid assassins, locally known as *sicarios*, Colombia's drug lords have not only fought among themselves but also waged a systematic campaign of murder and intimidation against government authorities seeking their extradition to the United States. In the last three years alone, Colombia's drug bosses have been responsible for the assassination of one minister of justice (and an attempt on the life of a former justice minister serving as Colombia's ambassador to Hungary), one attorney general, more than 50 judges, at least a dozen journalists, and more than 400 police and military personnel. They have effectively paralyzed the country's system of justice, driven scores of prominent Colombians out of the country and degraded the lives of those who stay. Murder has become a regular source of income for many.

The most recent kidnapping to dominate Colombian headlines was that of Alvaro Gómez Hurtado, the Conservative Party's presidential candidate in 1986 and a prominent newspaper editor. In the wake of his abduction on May 29, 1988, former President Misael Pastrana Borrero declared that "this country is in flames." He added, "Last year I said we were on the verge of the abyss. Today, I think we are in the abyss."[1]

III

While Colombia's emergence as a preeminent drug-trafficking country in the last 15 years has been nothing short of meteoric, the roots of its involvement with drugs lie much further back in history. Colombia's indigenous people have grown and chewed coca for thousands of years. Marijuana cultivation is a more recent phenomenon; it arrived in Colombia via Panama during the first decade of the twentieth century.

Colombian marijuana production mushroomed in the middle and late 1960s as a result of growing U.S. demand. By the early 1970s Colombians had emerged as major U.S. suppliers, earning at least $1 billion annually, although Mexican traffickers remained dominant. The epicenter of marijuana production in the hemisphere shifted to Colombia in the 1970s when

[1] Andres Oppenheimer, "Rising Violence Rips Colombia," *The Miami Herald*, June 12, 1988, p. 1A.

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the United States tightened up drug enforcement along the U.S.-Mexican border and when Mexico launched a major drive against its domestic producers in 1975. Colombia is ideally located for smuggling large amounts across the Caribbean into the United States. The Colombian state was relatively weak and corruptible, while Colombian terrain afforded optimal conditions for cultivation.

By the end of the 1970s Colombia accounted for some 70 percent of the marijuana reaching the United States from abroad. Between 30,000 and 50,000 small farmers along Colombia's Atlantic coast came to depend directly on marijuana cultivation for their livelihood, while at least another 50,000 (seasonal pickers, transporters, guards, bankers, and such) made some part of their living from it.

The trade proved to be an important source of new wealth for the Atlantic coast, as the newly rich *narcotraficantes* went on building sprees, imported Mercedes cars, bought protection from local judges, politicians and customs agents, and married their children into Colombia's oligarchical families. But the boom was by no means an unmixed blessing. The coast's Guajira Peninsula, a center of contraband smuggling since colonial times, experienced a dramatic upsurge in drug-related violence and a disintegration of police and judicial institutions through corruption and bribery. Many legitimate businesses were bought up by mafiosos looking for ways to launder their illicit profits.

IV

The Colombian cocaine trade followed in the footsteps of the marijuana traffickers. In the late 1960s a relatively small cocaine-smuggling network had developed largely under the control of exile Cuban criminal organizations based in Miami. Coca was cultivated in small plots by Paez Indians in southwestern Colombia and the Western Cordillera. Smuggling was primarily carried out by individual carriers or "mules" who transported a few kilograms at a time using commercial airlines. In 1970 U.S. Customs seized a mere 100 kilos of cocaine from Colombia. As the U.S. demand for cocaine expanded rapidly in the early 1970s, the limited coca supply grown in Colombia was augmented with coca paste imported from Bolivia and Peru and refined in Colombia's "kitchen laboratories."

In 1974 Carlos Lehder Rivas—who would subsequently emerge as a drug kingpin—was a 25-year-old small-time crim-

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inal serving time in a U.S. prison for marijuana smuggling and car theft. While in prison he dreamed of replacing the "mules" with private airplanes capable of carrying hundreds of kilos of cocaine in a single load. After he got out of jail in 1976 he began to work with cocaine-smuggling networks in the Colombian city of Medellín to put his revolutionary ideas into practice. By 1977 he, along with Jorge Luis Ochoa—another future cocaine baron, had effectively transformed the transportation system into huge airlift operations.

By late 1977 the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) was already referring to a "Medellín Trafficking Syndicate" in testimony before Congress:

> Cocaine traffic is dominated by disciplined syndicates whose overall structure is superior to any other organizations in South America. Some groups operate as underworld multinational corporations, vertically integrated from the clandestine laboratories in Colombia to the stateside distributors. As a result, Colombia has developed a large and aggressive criminal underworld which dominates the entire South American trafficking organization.[2]

After establishing their dominance on the South American side of the market, in 1978–79 the Medellín drug bosses turned their attention to gaining control of wholesale distribution in the United States. Thus began a period of violence in South Florida known as "the cocaine wars." It peaked in 1981 with a reported 101 drug-related murders. Because the biggest profits were made in the United States, not South America, the various Colombian gangs involved in the trade fought bitterly among themselves for control of the Miami-based wholesale market. In the process, they systematically exterminated the Cuban-Americans and others who were involved in the trade on the U.S. side. By eliminating these middlemen and installing their own, the Colombians not only improved their profit margins, but also disposed of many Cuban informants who had ties with the CIA and other U.S. law enforcement agencies, thereby lowering their risks.

By reinvesting their profits, the Colombians expanded and streamlined production in Colombia and farther south in the Andes. They also purchased bigger and better airplanes and

[2] Select Committee on Narcotics Abuse and Control, "South American Study Mission, August 9–23, 1977." Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, SNAC-95-1-13, 1977, p. 9.

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boats for transporting drugs, more sophisticated electronic communications devices and radar to escape detection, and paid huge bribes to law enforcement officials in both Colombia and the United States for protection.

The DEA estimated that from 14 to 19 metric tons of cocaine were smuggled into the United States in 1976. By 1982 the DEA estimated that upwards of 45 metric tons of cocaine a year were being imported into the U.S. market. The Medellín bosses became fabulously wealthy, leading *Forbes* magazine to begin listing Medellín drug barons like Jorge Ochoa and Pablo Escobar among the richest men in the world. Although impossible to determine precisely, revenues derived by Colombia from marijuana and cocaine were about $1.5 billion in 1980. By 1985 the figure had risen to between $2.5 billion and $3 billion annually, where it remains today.

By the early 1980s the cocaine trade was eclipsing the marijuana traffic in terms of wealth and power. The distinction between the two enterprises, largely controlled by different groups, lies in the difference between farming and industry. Marijuana is essentially a labor-intensive process; the employment and income multiplier effects are therefore more widely distributed. Cocaine requires fewer people, more capital and at least an incipient industrial process relying on imported chemicals. It demands financial skills to handle the much larger profits, which are heavily concentrated in a few hands.[3] Cocaine syndicates tend to be more vertically integrated, more hierarchical and more violent.

The Colombian cocaine industry does not have the same well-defined hierarchical structure that characterizes organized crime in countries like the United States. In a sense, the cartel has made the transition from infancy to adolescence, but has not yet reached full maturity as a criminal organization.

A key date in the evolution of the cartel was November 12, 1981, when, after M-19 guerrillas kidnapped his daughter and demanded $1 million in ransom, Jorge Luis Ochoa called a meeting of the leading drug traffickers at his family's restaurant, La Margarita, on the outskirts of Medellín. The traffickers, recognizing that their wealth made them vulnerable to extortion, each reportedly contributed $7.5 million to form an organization called "Death to the Kidnappers" (MAS), dedi-

[3] Alan Riding, "Shaken Colombia Acts at Last on Drugs," *The New York Times*, Sept. 11, 1984, p. A16.

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cated to ending kidnappings in Colombia. Their decision to cooperate to protect themselves from guerrilla kidnappings represented the definitive end to the cocaine wars and the effective beginning of what today is known as the Medellín cartel.

In addition to forming MAS, the traffickers at La Margarita agreed to build and operate collectively a giant cocaine laboratory complex on the Yarí River in the department of Caquetá. An informal division of labor among the drug kingpins began to take shape. Pablo Escobar specialized in security for the organization; he is reputed to have employed some 200 gunmen and created two schools for training assassins. Jorge Luis Ochoa, and his brothers Juan David and Fabio, took responsibility for the distribution networks in Florida and California. Other trafficking groups based in the city of Cali, run by Gilberto Rodríguez Orejuela and José Santacruz Londoño, apparently controlled distribution in New York and Houston. Carlos Lehder assumed responsibility for air transport into the United States, often using the Bahamas' Norman Cay as a stopover.

Although the term has stuck, a number of experts argue that the Medellín group does not technically qualify as a cartel. They point to the relatively loose internal structure of the Medellín group and the presence of other independent organizations. Moreover, the group has not been able to control the supply effectively or fix prices at inflated levels; the wholesale price for cocaine dropped from $60,000 per kilo in 1980 to less than $10,000 in 1987.

Already wielding enormous economic power, the Medellín traffickers reached out for a larger share of political power. Several, such as Lehder, bought interests in local radio stations and newspapers. Others, such as Pablo Escobar, sought to create a following in the cities by handing out cash to the poor, building low-income housing in the slums, or purchasing sports teams and constructing sports stadiums. A number contributed to local political campaigns. Indeed, there are persistent rumors that congressional and even presidential campaigns in the 1980s, especially in 1982, received financial backing from the drug lords. Lehder went so far as to create a political party and to publicize his political ideology (a hybrid of Colombian and Latin American nationalism, leavened with elements of fascism) through his newspaper, *Quindio Libre*. In 1982 Escobar was elected as an alternate congressman on a Liberal Party

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slate in his home department of Antioquia. In 1982–83 the Medellín group also financed a nationwide publicity campaign to arouse nationalist sentiment against the 1979 U.S.-Colombian Extradition Treaty.

Despite these political activities, most observers do not believe that the Colombian traffickers have political goals beyond protecting their profits and themselves from prosecution in Colombia or extradition to the United States. Their campaign contributions were designed to buy them political protection and compliant judges, police and customs officials. The MAS assassinations were intended to protect them and their families from leftist rebel kidnappings. Their systematic attacks on the judicial system since 1983 have been geared toward preventing the Colombian government from carrying out the extradition treaty with the United States.

V

Throughout the 1960s and early 1970s successive Colombian governments did little to stop drug trafficking. As one U.S. official put it: "You get lip service support from the government on narcotics matters but nothing else."[4] Before 1973 the U.S. government provided Misael Pastrana's Administration (1970–74) with only token assistance for narcotics control: six spare vehicles and some handcuffs, with a total value of approximately $45,000. In 1973 the U.S. government did respond positively to a Colombian request for training, spending some $6 million over four years to train 600 Colombian law enforcement officials.

Despite this training and some modest Colombian expenditures on enforcement, responsibilities among Colombian agencies remained unclear and overlapping, leading to constant friction, bureaucratic turf battles and general inefficiency. Moreover, every agency was understaffed, poorly trained and underpaid, leaving them vulnerable to systematic bribery and corruption from the traffickers. Although Pastrana's rhetoric was cooperative, it did not yield practical results.

When President Alfonso López Michelsen (1974–78) took office, he found Colombia's anti-drug efforts in complete disarray, with high-level corruption pervading enforcement agen-

[4] U.S. House of Representatives, Foreign Affairs Committee, "The World Narcotics Problem: The Latin American Perspective." Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 91-5710, 1973, p. 24.

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cies, especially the security police, the Departamento Administrativo de Seguridad (DAS). He quietly fired the head of DAS, General Luis Ordónez Valderrama, and replaced him with General José Matallana, a highly respected army officer. Matallana purged over half of the top DAS officials and even arrested some. Despite these efforts, the linkages between the Colombian security forces and the drug traffickers remained essentially intact throughout the López presidency. In 1975 the DAS even became involved in shoot-outs against other Colombian anti-narcotics units.

In 1977, yielding to insistent U.S. pressure, President López announced an expanded campaign against cocaine traffic, assigning anti-narcotics units of the national police to seaports and international airports. He also proposed reorganizing the judicial police into an elite, highly paid and centralized narcotics force with an annual budget of $15 million. The Carter Administration promised increased resources, including three helicopters and other equipment worth $3.7 million. Then a U.S. congressional fact-finding mission to Colombia learned that the helicopters were too small to be used effectively in the crop eradication program for which they were earmarked. The mission also expressed concern that so few aircraft would not provide sufficient mobility for law enforcement personnel and questioned the value of employing outmoded conventional aircraft to combat the highly sophisticated equipment used by the traffickers.[5]

President Julio César Turbay Ayala took office in 1978. In his inaugural address he declared war on the traffickers and promised that his administration would restore law and order in Colombia. Three months after taking office, he used his state-of-siege powers to crack down on drug traffickers and sent the military into the Guajira Peninsula. Supported by the navy and air force, the army imposed a blockade on the Guajira for almost two years, seizing over 6,000 tons of marijuana and nearly 300 aircraft and boats.

The U.S. government enthusiastically embraced President Turbay's war on drugs in Colombia. When President Turbay agreed in 1979 to a U.S.-Colombian extradition treaty that would permit Colombian traffickers accused of crimes in the United States to be extradited and tried in the U.S. courts, the U.S. ambassador, Diego C. Asencio, successfully petitioned

[5] *Ibid.*

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Washington for $16 million in additional assistance for Colombia, out of the total $42 million earmarked for worldwide narcotics interdiction. This figure represented a tripling of the anti-narcotics aid that the United States had provided to Colombia from 1970 through 1977.

The U.S. government also provided substantial support for Colombia's military interdiction campaign, for the reorganization and strengthening of the Colombian Customs Service and for the National Police. Much to the dismay of the U.S. State Department and Colombian officials, however, Congress subsequently amended the law, effectively barring the use of U.S. funds for such items as airborne radar, planes and communications equipment because it feared that they would be used for military rather than drug enforcement purposes. The Colombians argued that such restrictions would severely hamper their anti-drug operations.

U.S. anti-drug policy suffered another important setback when the Colombian army announced in March 1980 that it was abandoning its U.S.-assisted efforts to curb marijuana shipments from the Guajira region. Many Colombians felt that the campaign had failed to meet its goals and had hurt Colombia's economic interests. The army commanders had become increasingly leery that the army would be corrupted, as the police had been, by the estimated $110 million in protection monies disbursed annually by the traffickers. Also, the Colombian military needed the manpower elsewhere to check an upsurge in guerrilla activity that occurred in 1978–80.

The Colombian experience with militarization of the Guajira provides important insights into the Colombian trafficking problem. First, the army's campaign did put a serious dent in the marijuana trade in the region, even though it did not halt it altogether. Second, the costs to the local population were high and deeply resented. Third, to the extent that enforcement efforts in the Guajira were successful, they tended merely to displace drug cultivation and transport activities to other parts of the country, such as the Eastern Plains and the Amazonian jungle, rather than eliminating them. Fourth, the Colombian military was susceptible to drug corruption. Fifth, once the military withdrew, the traffickers proved quickly able to reestablish activities. Sixth, because supply-side eradication and interdiction campaigns were not coupled with parallel demand reduction programs, there was little (if any) hope of achieving a permanent cessation of drug trafficking.

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Recognizing this last point as elemental, President Turbay himself noted: "Colombians are not corrupting Americans. You are corrupting us. If you abandon illegal drugs, the traffic will disappear."[6]

VI

President Belisario Betancur Cuartas came to office in 1982 with considerable reservations about conducting the type of war on drugs favored by Washington. He refused on nationalist grounds to honor the extradition treaty signed by Turbay, preferring to try Colombian traffickers in Colombian courts.

While his uncooperative attitude, especially with regard to extradition, outraged Washington, Betancur did take measures against the increasingly powerful Colombian drug lords. To head the Justice Ministry, he appointed Rodrigo Lara Bonilla, who actively went after the traffickers in cooperation with U.S. narcotics agents. On March 10, 1984, Colombian police and DEA officials jointly raided and destroyed the Medellín cartel's huge cocaine-refining complex on the Yarí River. In this raid they seized 27,500 pounds of cocaine with an estimated street value of $1.2 billion, the largest cocaine bust on record. U.S. officials were jubilant, viewing it as a major blow against the cartel.

In retaliation, the Medellín kingpins put out a contract on Minister Lara. Despite his own increased security measures and a bulletproof vest given to him in appreciation of his efforts by U.S. Ambassador Lewis Tambs, he was assassinated in Bogotá on April 30, 1984, by a cartel hitman. Lara's death sent shock waves through Colombian society and galvanized the Betancur government. The president proclaimed a "war without quarter" against the traffickers and invoked state-of-siege powers that quickly produced an unprecedented wave of arrests, confiscations of property and destruction of laboratories. While welcomed in Washington, this massive response also confirmed U.S. officials' suspicions that Colombian authorities had considerable intelligence on the drug smugglers but simply lacked the will to go after them.

President Betancur abandoned his previous opposition to extradition and signed an extradition order for Carlos Lehder, who had already fled the country. The Colombian public's

[6] "The Colombian Connection," *Time*, Jan. 29, 1979, p. 29.

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revulsion at Lara's assassination provided broad-based support for the drastic actions taken by the president. It also heightened Colombia's awareness of its own growing drug problem, particularly of the widespread addiction to *basuco*, a cheap, powerful form of cocaine, that had developed in the early 1980s among Colombian youth. Many Colombians realized that they could no longer afford to dismiss the cocaine traffic as a "gringo" problem to be solved by the Americans.

Betancur's crackdown surprised the cartel leaders and forced them to go into hiding in Panama, where they paid strongman Manuel Noriega $4–5 million for protection. Jorge Ochoa and Pablo Escobar contacted former President López who was in Panama as an official election observer, denied they were responsible for the Lara assassination and made a "peace" offer, which they asked López to transmit to the Betancur government. Claiming to control 70 to 80 percent of the South American cocaine traffic, they offered to withdraw from the drug business and help fight it in the future, to get out of politics, and to repatriate billions of dollars. In exchange, they sought their "reincorporation" into Colombian society in the near future. They held a second secret meeting in Panama City on May 28 with Colombia's Attorney General Carlos Jiménez Gómez, in which they added the suggestion that the extradition treaty be revised so they could not be prosecuted retroactively.

The U.S. embassy was informed of the offer, and Washington immediately stated its adamant objections to any such deal. When the story broke in the Colombian press in early July, a firestorm of protest obliged President Betancur to deny that there were or would be any negotiations with the drug lords.

Although obviously neither the United States nor the Colombian public was in any mood to accept a deal, in hindsight a strong argument can be made that a golden opportunity to strike a bargain beneficial to Colombia was lost. The cartel bosses specifically offered to hand over their clandestine laboratories and airstrips, to stay out of the trade, and to help substitute other crops for coca and marijuana. They estimated that once their organization had been dismantled, it would take others at least ten years to replace it. The intelligence about the industry's structure and money-laundering operations would have been extremely useful to both Colombian and U.S. law enforcement in opposing a resurgence. The repatriation of some $15 billion would have been enough to offset Colombia's entire foreign debt. It might also have saved the

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country from the orgy of terror, corruption and murder unleashed by the cartel over the next four years—the abyss referred to by former President Pastrana.

Rather than bargain, however, President Betancur opted to escalate the war. Backed by substantially increased U.S. aid, during the next two years he extradited ten Colombians and three foreigners to the United States, stepped up eradication programs and seized more illicit drugs than all of his predecessors combined. But the Colombian trafficking organizations proved more adaptable and resilient than anticipated. The sweeps by the army and confiscations of suspected traffickers' properties did eliminate most of the huge cocaine-processing complexes, but the traffickers adjusted by returning to mobile, small-scale operations. They also increased their use of bribery, intimidation and murder to insulate themselves from prosecution, and liberally rewarded their followers to ensure their loyalty.

In exile in Panama, the cartel overlords strengthened already existing relations with General Noriega. They later established relations with both the Sandinistas and the contras in Nicaragua. New contacts with Hondurans, orchestrated by Juan Ramón Matta Ballesteros (a Honduran with close ties to the Medellín cartel), facilitated the explosive growth of shipments through Honduras into Mexico. The Medellín group built ties with Mexican marijuana and heroin smugglers and with Mexican authorities to facilitate the shipment of Colombian cocaine across the Mexican border into the American southwest. In the Caribbean they strengthened relations with the Bahamas and Jamaica and developed new ties in Cuba, Haiti, Belize and several smaller island countries. The net result was a massive proliferation of new routes and the corruption of governments previously untouched by the cocaine trade; the total tonnage of exported cocaine increased and prices dropped. By 1986 some 40 percent of the cocaine flowing into the United States had been diverted from the traditional Caribbean routes across the U.S.-Mexican border.

Even more devastating for Colombia were the escalating attacks on its judiciary, part of the traffickers' fight against extradition. Between 1981 and 1986 over 50 judges, including a dozen Supreme Court Justices, were murdered, and any judge who handled a drug case was bombarded with death threats if he refused to be bribed. It is widely believed in Colombia that the Medellín cartel paid the M-19 guerrillas $1

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million to occupy the capital's Palace of Justice in November 1985, a debacle that ended in the deaths of all the Supreme Court justices held hostage, some 80 others including all the M-19 guerrillas, and the palace's complete destruction.

Whether the traffickers in fact paid the M-19 for this attack, there is no question that the drug lords entered into temporary alliances with some leftist guerrilla organizations in the remote areas where drug cultivation and refining activities overlapped with guerrilla operations. Such arrangements have been frequently mislabeled as a new "narcoguerrilla" alliance, but it is more accurate to view them as transitory marriages of convenience rather than as a budding fusion of *narcotraficantes* and rebels. The guerrillas were paid in weapons or cash for their services, thereby increasing their capacity to wage war on an already besieged government.

These linkages notwithstanding, it is crucial to recall the Medellín traffickers' formation of the MAS in 1981 to assassinate guerrilla sympathizers. MAS was responsible for many, if not all, of the more than 500 deaths among members of the left-wing Patriotic Union, formed in 1985 with the backing of the FARC and the Colombian Communist Party, as a result of President Betancur's truce negotiations. The goals of the guerrillas and the traffickers are fundamentally incompatible: the guerrillas are revolutionaries who seek to overthrow the Colombian system; the traffickers are robber-baron capitalists who seek to protect their ill-gotten gains and assure themselves immunity from prosecution. Their stormy relations have involved far more bloodshed than cooperation.

By disrupting the traffickers' networks in Colombia, the Colombian authorities demonstrated that the drug lords were vulnerable. At least some guerrilla organizations such as FARC, whose peasant supporters cultivated coca for the cartel and other traffickers, decided to take over growing and refining operations for themselves, thereby cutting out the Medellín middleman. In response, the Medellín cartel has refused to purchase coca paste from the FARC guerrillas, precipitating more clashes between the two groups.

At least as ominous for Colombia is the emerging trend among the drug lords to buy up large tracts of rural land in guerrilla zones. Unlike the previous landowners, the traffickers have been unwilling to pay the guerrillas protection money. Instead, they have used their resources and firepower to create large private armies to protect themselves from the rebels, and

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to massacre peasants suspected of collaborating with guerrillas. The result has been a veritable bloodbath in the countryside in recent years, which authorities have been unwilling or unable to control.

As landowners, the drug lords will inevitably gain a foothold in legitimate associations of farmers and cattlemen that wield significant influence in Colombia's political system. In this fashion they may ultimately attain through the side door the kind of political power they initially sought via party politics and direct campaign contributions.

VII

When President Virgilio Barco Vargas took office two years ago, he inherited from Betancur a country with a contradictory image. Colombia had been lavishly praised for its crackdown on trafficking and was generally recognized as the leading Latin American nation in the area of law enforcement. But these efforts had not stopped the flow of cocaine or even slowed it noticeably. Moreover, Betancur's war against drug traffickers was clearly faltering and the nation's judicial system had literally ceased to function. Although in his inaugural address Barco promised to continue the anti-drug drive begun by his predecessor, during his first three months in office he gave little indication that this would have priority.

In late August 1986, for example, just a few weeks after Barco took office, a lower court judge, apparently bribed or threatened by the traffickers, unexpectedly released cartel member Jorge Luis Ochoa. Ochoa had recently been extradited from Spain to Colombia, and Washington wanted him extradited to the United States. In early December Colombia seemed to be abandoning the fight altogether when an intimidated Supreme Court declared the extradition treaty unconstitutional because it had not been signed by President Turbay himself but rather by his minister of government.

On December 14, 1986, President Barco signed the treaty, bringing it back into effect. Three days later Guillermo Cano Isaza, the crusading anti-drug publisher of Colombia's second-largest newspaper, *El Espectador*, was assassinated in Bogotá by cartel gunmen. Barco reacted swiftly, decreeing a new offensive against the narcotics trade in which the army was ordered to take part. Over the next month army and police units conducted over a thousand raids and arrested almost 800 suspects, including three traffickers on a list of 113 that the United

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States had submitted to Colombia for extradition. But no major cartel figure was caught in this roundup.

In response to Barco's campaign, on January 13, 1987, the Medellín cartel carried out its boldest assassination attempt since the Lara Bonilla affair. A hit squad was sent behind the Iron Curtain to Budapest to murder Betancur's former justice minister, Enrique Parejo González. Parejo had been sent out of the country as ambassador to Hungary to protect him from the cartel, which was after him because of his "traitorous" support for extradition. Although he was shot three times and seriously wounded, Parejo survived. Nevertheless, the attempt had chilling implications: no one was beyond the reach of the Medellín traffickers.

On February 4, 1987, cartel kingpin Carlos Lehder and 15 of his bodyguards were arrested at one of his farms by an elite anti-narcotics police unit. Fearing that he would be able to bribe or shoot his way out of Colombia's jails, the Barco government hurriedly extradited him to the United States. Lehder, whose flamboyance and volatility made him a liability to the cartel, said it had betrayed him to the authorities. A second, not incompatible, theory holds that the arrest occurred because President Barco had just replaced the Medellín police chief and his top aides with uncorrupted personnel. Lehder thus lost his protectors in the police force, which then acted on an anonymous tip as to his whereabouts.

Lehder had gained notoriety in early 1985 with his announcement that he would pay $350,000 to anyone who could kill or capture the DEA chief, and a lower amount for others. In March 1985, in hiding as a result of Betancur's crackdown, he gave an interview (subsequently aired on national television) in which he appealed to discontented military officers and Marxist revolutionaries alike to join him in the "cocaine bonanza . . . the arm of the struggle against America . . . the Achilles' heel of American imperialism." After Lehder's arrest and extradition to Florida, cartel members made threats against Colombian and U.S. officials, including one, not carried out, to kill five Americans for every Colombian extradited to the United States. He was sentenced on July 20, 1988, to the maximum term of life imprisonment without parole.

But Lehder's extradition appears to have stemmed neither the flow of cocaine from Colombia nor its wave of drug-related violence. It may even have increased the mayhem by stimulating rivals like the Cali group to challenge the Medellín cartel.

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Throughout 1987 and in 1988, the Barco government was buffeted by guerrilla and drug mafia violence. By mid-1987 eight of nine guerrilla organizations had broken the truce negotiated by the Betancur Administration and cut off the ongoing peace talks. The government refused the guerrillas' demands for "power sharing" and would only discuss the terms of their disarmament. The activities of death squads increased, and reports of human rights abuses and disappearances by the military rose dramatically.

In June 1987 the Supreme Court, intimidated by the cartel's violent reprisals, once again ruled that the extradition treaty was unconstitutional despite Barco's signature. Barco promised that his government would find a legal way to extradite, but extraditions were suspended indefinitely. In November Jorge Luis Ochoa was captured (apparently by accident) at a routine police checkpoint outside of Cali. After little more than a month in jail, he bribed his way out. Although Barco subsequently prosecuted the judge who released Ochoa, the damage was done. U.S. Attorney General Edwin Meese called the release a "shocking blow" to international law enforcement and protested that the Colombians had assured him they would extradite Ochoa to the United States.

On January 25, 1988, the Colombian attorney general, Carlos Mauro Hoyos Jiménez, was shot to death along with his two bodyguards during an attempted kidnapping on the outskirts of Medellín. In a nationwide address that evening, Barco vowed that he would not "surrender" to blackmail or intimidation by the traffickers. He invoked state-of-siege powers and announced a package of emergency measures, the Statute for the Defense of Democracy. Specifically, he announced that he was increasing the 70,000-man National Police force by 5,000 and would appoint 5,000 new judges and assistants. Barco also pledged to renew extradition efforts and ordered the military to join the police in a new offensive. Within a month the army destroyed two large cocaine-processing complexes and dozens of smaller ones, but it did not recapture Jorge Ochoa.

VIII

The Colombian government has been drafted to man the front lines of the drug war without the proper resources, training or equipment. The results have been fatal for many Colombian officials and debilitating for the country's political system. Yet the U.S. government continues to insist that Co-

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lombia must take on the drug lords, no matter what the costs. According to Francisco Bernal, head of Colombia's Narcotics Bureau in the office of the attorney general: "We're being left to fight this war alone. We're supplying the dead, the country is being destabilized and what help are we getting?"[7] Even President Barco has expressed concern that Colombia is unfairly "sacrificing" more than other nations.[8]

Many Colombians are incensed by what they see as the U.S. government's myopic obsession with extradition. In reaction to Colombia's release of Ochoa and the Supreme Court's ruling on the extradition treaty, Washington ordered sanctions against Colombia, including lengthy customs checks for travelers and products arriving from Colombia. These actions fueled rising nationalism and anti-U.S. resentments, and led many Colombians to conclude that U.S. authorities did not understand the country's precarious situation.

The Reagan Administration has insisted that extraditions are an essential anti-drug weapon, but by early 1988 it was clear that there was little support in Colombia for a renewal of extraditions. In May Justice Minister Enrique Low Mutra announced that the Barco government was studying the possibility of repudiating the 1979 treaty unilaterally.[9] The U.S. sanctions have prompted the Barco government to emphasize the need for a multilateral rather than a purely bilateral approach to the drug-trafficking problem.

Neither the guerrillas nor the *narcotraficantes* appear capable of overthrowing the Colombian government. But many Colombians are clearly weary of the costly and seemingly interminable war on drugs. The waves of violence have shaken confidence in Barco's leadership and his strategy of close cooperation with the United States. Hard-liners are calling for an expanded role for the military in the fight against both the drug lords and the rebels, even at the cost of restrictions on democracy and civil rights. A military coup in Colombia is also unlikely, but the kidnappings and other violence may well drive the civilian leadership to rely increasingly on military force to govern the country. In the process, human rights violations on all sides

[7] Alan Riding, "Colombians Grow Weary of Waging the War on Drugs," *The New York Times*, Feb. 1, 1988, p. 8.

[8] Bradley Graham, "Drug Killings Cow Colombians," *The Washington Post*, Feb. 6, 1987, p. A14.

[9] EFE News Agency, "Colombia Might Repudiate Extradition Treaty with U.S." in *The Miami Herald*, May 17, 1988, p. 11A.

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will rise and the political system is likely to become more authoritarian. In the final analysis it is Colombia's democratic traditions and institutions that are at stake. The next U.S. administration must take care not to force Colombia into the abyss of authoritarianism in the name of national security and the war on drugs.

One of the most glaring deficiencies of the U.S. strategy is the tendency toward nonconsultative, unilateral decision-making in bilateral or multilateral affairs. Typically, Washington has pursued a cooperative strategy with Colombia, but when Colombia's share of America's drug market increases or during electoral campaigns or after dramatic incidents, Washington frequently acts unilaterally without consulting or even warning Bogotá. From a policy perspective, it is astonishing how little has been learned by either party in this "peak and valley" relationship. Neither the U.S. nor the Colombian government has developed a strategy to anticipate, much less resolve, these crises. President Reagan has unquestionably assigned more financial and human resources to anti-drug programs than any of his predecessors. But judging by the current scope of the drug-trafficking problem, these programs have clearly been inadequate.

Despite some encouraging signs that U.S. drug use may be leveling off or even declining, drug trafficking remains the fastest-growing industry in the world. The consuming population is huge. Total acreage under cultivation has continued to expand. New areas and countries are constantly being added to the list of producing or transiting nations. The violence, corruption and destabilization associated with the drug trade have increased to threatening levels despite intensified enforcement efforts. Cooperation with key countries like Colombia appears to be on the decline.

IX

What is to be done? One approach is for Washington to finance a significant buildup of Latin American governments' drug-fighting capabilities. The United States could provide source countries including Colombia with the $2–3 billion annually that would be required to establish effective control over drug-producing areas which are essentially "occupied" by guerrilla forces or multinational criminal organizations. This strategy would entail provision of more firepower, helicopters, communications equipment and intelligence support. Produc-

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ing countries could also be given more advanced technologies for combating the narcotics industries: herbicides for spraying, radar systems to track the movement of drug smugglers' boats and aircraft, modern antiaircraft weapons, electronic devices to bug and jam traffickers' communications, and heat-seeking equipment to detect drug laboratories. Many Latin American countries need more sophisticated security systems to protect officials, judges and witnesses. This strategy of escalated efforts is not simply a matter of providing the means; politically difficult institutional reforms in drug-producing and transiting countries are needed to make their use effective.

A second option would be to "Americanize" anti-drug operations in Latin America. This approach would entail the U.S. government's assuming drug enforcement functions that source countries do not or cannot perform, provided that those countries consent. Examples of Americanization are the extradition and trial of Colombian drug dealers in U.S. courts and the U.S. Army's Operation Blast Furnace against cocaine laboratories in Bolivia in the summer of 1986. The effectiveness of the Americanization model is limited, however; Operation Blast Furnace paralyzed Bolivia's cocaine industry for a few months, but the introduction of U.S. forces undermined the popularity and nationalist credentials of President Víctor Paz Estenssoro's government, was condemned by virtually all factions on Bolivia's political spectrum, and was rejected as an option by most other Latin American countries, including Colombia and Mexico. The problem with extradition is that the drug mafia can immobilize the judicial system, as it has in Colombia, by violence and intimidation. Americanization is therefore a risky, potentially counterproductive approach that should be applied only in special circumstances.

A third U.S. option is to support Latin American governments' efforts to offer viable economic alternatives to the drug trade. Effective drug enforcement involves much more than merely parachuting men and equipment in to raid laboratories and to eradicate marijuana, opium or coca fields. The United States could make a major contribution by helping economically depressed nations provide crop- and income-substitution programs for drug farmers. It could open up new economic opportunities by lowering import barriers for legitimate exports—textiles, sugar, coffee, flowers—and extending the Caribbean Basin Initiative's preferential trade system to all South American governments willing to adopt serious anti-drug cam-

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paigns. It could help alleviate the crushing burden of Latin American debt by taking the lead in devising new formulas for debt relief. Renewed regional economic development is an indispensable component of any successful, long-term effort to reduce drug trafficking.

A fourth, radically different, option would be to abandon the war against drugs and move instead to legalize, or at least decriminalize, drug consumption. Advocates of this option often compare current anti-drug policies in the United States and abroad with previous U.S. efforts to prohibit alcohol consumption; they predict that the suppression of drug use is likely to be no more successful than prohibition was.

Proponents of legalization or decriminalization argue that a distinction should be made between the public health problem of drug abuse and the violence and criminality associated with the drug trade because it is illegal. They do not condone or encourage drug use; they believe that the best way to curtail drug trafficking is to treat drugs as a public health, rather than a criminal, problem. By legalizing the production and sale of drugs, it would be possible to remove the clandestine profits from the drug trade and thus eliminate the economic incentives for criminal gangs to get involved. The state could control quality and lower sale prices, eliminating the need for users to commit crimes—stealing, muggings, murders—to procure drugs. U.S. federal, state and local governments now spend approximately $8 billion annually on law enforcement and additional billions on courts, prisons and prisoner maintenance (one-third of all federal prisoners are in jail for drug-related crimes). Moreover, the state could tax the sale of drugs, thereby earning billions in revenues to finance programs of drug education, prevention and rehabilitation.[10]

There are, of course, many downside aspects to legalization. Many Americans consider the idea of legalizing drug use to be morally repugnant. It is also possible that drug abuse will increase if drugs are legalized, although by how much is not known. Addiction rates, job accidents, worker productivity losses and medical treatment costs could rise as well. Without arguing that it is a panacea, legalization's proponents aptly point out that current policies are not working. Their central point, that the public health aspects of drug abuse should be

[10] Ethan A. Nadelmann, "U.S. Drug Policy: A Bad Export," *Foreign Policy*, Spring 1988, pp. 97–108.

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separated from the criminality that arises from drugs' illegality, deserves debate. But it is abundantly clear that the political winds in the United States do not favor legalization; hence this option does not appear to be a viable one in the near future. And, unless the United States moves toward legalization, no country in Latin America could do so without incurring severe sanctions from Washington.

To even dent the drug traffickers' power, Latin America will need massive additional assistance from the United States; the most promising strategy is a combination of options one and three. Unfortunately, the political climate in Washington presently seems to be shifting against foreign aid, as the U.S. Congress has reduced American economic and military assistance around the world. Colombia has received no economic aid since 1975 and military assistance was ended this year.

There is no question that the United States needs to rein in demand more effectively if any real success is to be achieved in the war against drugs. As long as the profits remain so great, illicit drugs will be smuggled into the United States from the impoverished Third World. Linking demand reduction with stepped-up law enforcement at home and abroad, as currently advocated by the United States, is a strategy fraught with dangers for source countries. The United States would "get tough" not just at home, but with Latin American and Caribbean governments that do not fully meet U.S. expectations. Instead, less rhetoric and more diplomacy would permit greater U.S. cooperation with the very Latin American countries whose active support is most needed. American drug officials should establish more realistic objectives and standards for their own anti-drug programs and other nations'.

Attempts must be made to anticipate new trends or developments, such as crack, a potent form of cocaine unknown ten years ago. The principal challenge for U.S. drug warriors is to develop a viable, long-run strategy for both demand and supply sides and then to implement it consistently. This will necessitate significantly higher levels of U.S. funding at home and abroad and sustained efforts at cooperation with the Latin Americans. The "war on drugs" is nowhere close to achieving the cooperation required, and it is unclear whether the United States and Latin America have the political will and are prepared to devote the resources necessary for the fight. Without such commitments they cannot realistically expect to turn the corner, much less see any light at the end of the tunnel.

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Robert I. Rotberg

HAITI'S PAST MORTGAGES ITS FUTURE

Democracy, fair elections, toleration of dissent, multiparty government, checks and balances, constitutions and the rule of law are all foreign to Haiti, the sick man of the hemisphere and the United States' close neighbor. This summer Lieutenant General Henri Namphy, Haiti's current strongman and the head of a military junta that has ruled the demi-island nation since dictator Jean-Claude (Baby Doc) Duvalier was forced to flee in February 1986, ousted President Leslie F. Manigat and tore up the country's post-Duvalier constitution. "Constitutions are not for Haiti," Namphy said.

II

The Duvalier family, father and son, had run Haiti like a feudal fiefdom for nearly 30 years. Although Baby Doc was less indiscriminately cruel than François (Papa Doc), his father, he maintained a predatory state which terrorized Haitians and returned very little to most of his countrymen. The junta—Namphy, Major General Williams Regala, Brigadier General Prosper Avril and Colonel Jean-Claude Paul—all soldiered for the Duvaliers, and had ties to the corrupt and rapacious elements who used Haiti for private gain. But as officers in the army their role individually and collectively was less central to the dominance of the Duvaliers than the dreaded *tonton macoutes*, a group of henchmen that functioned as a secret police.

Indeed, the Duvaliers largely shunted the soldiers aside, until the last Duvalier was himself forced out by a massive, popular outpouring of revulsion similar to that which rid the Philippines of Ferdinand Marcos during the same month. Baby Doc's ouster, aided by a final, vital push by resident U.S. diplomats, permitted the long ignored and despised army to reclaim the power it had lost in Haiti in 1957, with the end of the dictatorial regime of General Paul E. Magloire and the rise of Papa Doc. Unlike its Philippine counterpart, Haiti's army had not been

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instrumental in Duvalier's departure. The junta declared itself an interim government to supervise a transition to democracy, and received the United States' blessing for this purpose.

Instead, Namphy presided throughout 1986 over a silent and largely enigmatic junta. He moved more slowly than populists and the United States wanted toward the goal of constitution-writing and popular elections. Eventually and reluctantly, the Namphy junta permitted long-term exiles to return and opened the doors to debate. A constitutional commission wrote and the Haitian people ratified a liberal instrument in 1987; it called for open elections supervised by an impartial, nonmilitary commission, and barred close associates of Duvalier from candidacy. It set up a host of traditional democratic safeguards, and restored meaning to Haitian national institutions like the judiciary and the legislature.

The western hemisphere's poorest country, a nation which had never known more than the whisper of democratic government, seemed set for a benign and fair harbor. But Namphy and his colleagues distrusted the probability of popular rule; this became clear in June 1987, when they tried to wrest control of elections away from the independent electoral council. Massive protests forced them to back down, but they dealt harshly with their opponents. Two candidates were killed, and on the morning of November 29, election day, the army participated in the massacre of at least 34 people before it broke up polling and called off the elections.

In reaction to the aborted election, the United States (along with France and Canada) cut off the large amounts of foreign nonhumanitarian assistance that had helped to sustain Haiti since early 1986. But the generals paid little heed. By 1987 the army had come to control one of Haiti's few sources of personal gain: port and customs revenues, and the contraband trade in all kinds of prohibited imports. Commerce under the junta has largely been dominated by unofficially permitted smuggling at the ports. The goods—rice, bread, bicycles, batteries and so on—fill the markets of Port-au-Prince, and officers profit handsomely from this trade.

The junta rescheduled elections for January 1988, altered the rules, welcomed a boycott of the second balloting by all the popular and liberal candidates who had sought to contest the November poll, and carefully supervised the result. Calls in the U.S. Congress for a peacekeeping force to ensure orderly elections came to naught; in the event, many Haitians did not

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vote, having been sufficiently intimidated by the November massacre and also exhorted to abstain by opposition leaders.

Manigat won in January, overwhelming two other candidates believed to be friendly to the military and to conservatism in politics. Widespread voting irregularities were reported, and a supervisory electoral council handpicked by the junta gave Manigat over 50 percent of the vote. Though these circumstances suggested he was to be a figurehead, Manigat represented something of a surprise choice. Briefly a cabinet minister under Papa Doc, he had been sent into exile, where he wrote anti-Duvalier tracts of Marxist bent. When he stood for the election of 1988 he promised a liberal democratic regime, but his main constituency was the junta, or at least elements within that shadowy body. Manigat's election did not persuade the United States to release the $79 million in annual aid suspended in November; the State Department said the elections were not "free, fair or open."

For six months Manigat apparently knew his place. Neither his promised new era of development and democracy, nor his opponents' dire predictions of dictatorial misrule and corruption, were realized. Nothing very much happened. There were few initiatives of consequence, and citizens in the outlying areas of the country like Cap Haitien in the north and Les Cayes in the south could hardly tell that non-dictatorial rule had at last arrived.

Yet Manigat quietly attempted to end the junta's control of the contraband trade. Unable to pay bureaucrats or sustain a state becoming bankrupt, he schemed to gain control of the main source of available revenue. Manigat may also have hoped to intervene against the drug trade.

Manigat sensed a growing split within the junta, and apparently saw an opportunity to assert himself. Suddenly, over a weekend in June, he sided with Colonel Paul, and removed Namphy as head of the army. After all, presidents of Haiti are supposed to be commanders in chief. Within 24 hours, however, Manigat's presidential palace was surrounded and he and his family were on their way to the Dominican Republic and exile in Europe. Thereafter, Namphy abolished the much-vaunted constitution of 1987.

III

What of poor Haiti, a nation of seven million people living on a land area the size of Maryland? Were it not on our

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doorstep, and had we not occupied and run Haiti for 19 years from 1915 to 1934, and had the U.S. marines not trained the Haitian army in those days, perhaps we could ignore the turmoil in Haiti. But we cannot, both in order to ensure peace in the hemisphere and because Haiti has no other friends. Moreover, Haiti lies only 700 miles from Miami, and two million Haitians live in Miami, New York and Boston, and another half-million or so in Montreal and Quebec. The United States can no longer afford to act in paternal or avuncular ways in international affairs, but neither can it walk away from the misery and misgovernment of the hemisphere's oldest black entity.

Namphy was neither the first Haitian autocrat nor will he be the last. Indeed, Namphy is ill and may soon be succeeded by another junta member—possibly Regala, long regarded as the unsavory strongman of the junta. Another member, Paul, has been indicted by a U.S. grand jury in Miami as a drug trafficker. Duvalierists, who uniformly did well out of the old state, are anxious to return. Even if there should be another upwelling of popular protest, the future of Haiti is hardly easy to imagine in bright colors. Unhappily, given Haiti's tragic history and the legacy of three decades of Duvalierism, it is very difficult to persuade jejune observers that Haiti can be transformed from within. It lacks a viable political culture, basic literacy, natural resources and a germ of prosperity. It also has little faith in itself. Given such a fragile foundation for change, can the United States help in a significant way?

Patterns of interaction between rulers and the ruled are hardly immutable; long cherished modes of individual and group behavior can change. Modern, clear-sighted leadership *can* make a difference. So, at the margin, can foreign assistance. But Haiti is an unusual neighbor of the United States. Its history, its economic and political structure, and its social character all declare the Haitian case a severe challenge to policymakers in Washington as well as to the governors and the governed in Port-au-Prince.

Haiti, the western third of the Antillean island of Hispaniola, occupies an area of about 10,700 square miles.[1] But to be small is not necessarily to be compact. The Gulf of Gonâve cuts into the heart of the country, making Haiti resemble a crocodile

[1] Background material is drawn from my book, *Haiti: The Politics of Squalor*, Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1971.

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that is about to swallow the desiccated satellite island of La Gonâve. Port-au-Prince, a mere 30 miles from the rugged, often-closed land frontier with the Dominican Republic, guards the apex of the bay. But the narrow belt of land widens on each side of the capital; Haiti's longest and widest dimensions are 183 and 114 miles. Because the coastline is irregular and the northern and southern peninsulas are so elongated, different sections and peoples of the country have remained unusually separated, internal communications have always been excessively difficult, rural life has proved markedly resistant to change, and the port towns' development has not spread to the surrounding hinterlands.

Haiti has always been a place apart. Historically and geographically isolated despite (and because of) its shared border with the Dominican Republic and its proximity to Cuba and the United States, Haiti resisted (at least until the drug-running era) the full embrace of westernization and modernization. A third of the land is about 1,500 feet above sea level; its mountains impede cross-country communication and commerce, even with the improved road network of the 1970s and 1980s. Among the measures of modern means of communication and physical integration, Haiti has the fewest telephones and the least electric power and poorest overall infrastructure per capita of any country in the hemisphere. Outside Port-au-Prince and its suburbs, transport and communication are difficult, harsh and expensive.

Haiti is a rural fastness, yet even the countryside is no longer as hospitable as it once was to impoverished millions who grow corn, sorghum, rice, yams and pulses and nurture a few pigs on tiny holdings outside the towns. Haiti has been denuded of trees, long ago cut down for firewood and charcoal; its mountaintops are bare and its slopes badly eroded. Only two percent of its total land is still forested. The torrents that pour brown and red out of the interiors into the sea during the rains carry nutrients and precious soil. As a result, agricultural productivity has declined drastically in this century, and especially since 1960.

Haiti remains much more rural than most developing countries of its size and quality. The people of Haiti live in the folds of the country's hills, in small villages, in port cities and squashed into the fetid slums of the capital. Since only 28 percent of all Haitians are urban, a remarkably low percentage for the Third World, the 72 percent of Haitians who scratch a

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subsistence from the low-yielding soils of the denuded valleys and slopes constitute the most densely packed rural population in the Americas.

The average density of Haiti as a whole is 560 persons per square mile, but only 20 percent of the land mass is arable and half of the country's people lives on this 20 percent. On those hectares the average pressure on cultivable land is well over 2,000 people per square mile. That high figure places rural Haitians in unhealthy competition with denizens of the Nile delta and Java for the world's most crowded conditions outside cities. In other words, Haiti boasts less than half a hectare of farmland per person.

Unfortunately, the arable hectares are shrinking because of erosion and overuse. Only 11 percent of all land is now capable of sustained farming. Even the comparatively rich, central Artibonite Valley has grown poorer through overcrowding and land exhaustion. Given the obviously declining carrying capacity of all the land, these are spectacular burdens to be borne by a developing country, much less one of the least efficient and least politically stable.

Haiti's average per capita gross national product is $400. Haiti ranks at the very bottom of the western hemispheric scale and is among the bottom quartile of countries on a world scale, comparing approximately with Ghana and Kenya. It ranks with the poorer (but not the poorest) African nations.

Haiti is poor both because it is overpopulated and because it lacks natural resources. Comparatively modest deposits of bauxite and low-grade copper were once mined, but are no longer viable. Oil drilling has produced little, and no base minerals—not even the gold that attracted Christopher Columbus in 1492—have been discovered in concentrations attractive to investors. Haiti exports coffee, sugar, mangoes, a little sisal and, until recently, produced baseballs, leather goods and other consumer items that rely on hand labor for their manufacture. This assembly industry has been severely affected by political strife; about 20,000 jobs were lost between 1986 and 1988. Urban unemployment is estimated at 50 percent. Tourism, once another major source of foreign exchange earnings, has been greatly curbed by Haiti's reputation as a source of AIDS and by riots and instability. Namphy's June takeover will hardly help restore his country's fortunes.

Standard numerical equivalents cannot begin to describe the extent and impact of Haitian poverty. It is equally apparent in

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the extensive slums of the capital—they rival those of Caracas, Rio de Janeiro, Cape Town and Johannesburg in squalor and misery—and in cramped rural villages and in pole and dried earth hutments reminiscent of tropical Africa. The swollen bellies of children and the tattered raiments of their elders, the kind and quantity of consumer goods in most shops and markets, the long distances women travel in order to obtain water or to sell a handful of mangoes, the absence of shoes and the omnipresence of maimed and mutilated beggars all testify to the corrosive continuation of depressed conditions.

Poverty, nutritional failures and the spread of endemic diseases are all part of a cycle of underdevelopment that limits the effectiveness of modernizing initiatives. Tuberculosis and tetanus are endemic, malaria has not been fully eradicated, and protein deficiency in children and intestinal disorders are widespread. A survey established that the nutritional status of the people of Haiti was the worst in the western hemisphere. Sixty-six percent of all Haitian dwellings lack access to safe drinking water and eighty percent have no indoor sanitation.

These conditions produce an infant mortality rate estimated at a high 117 per 1,000 live births. Between seven and 15 percent of all Haitian children die during the first eight weeks of life alone; about 20 percent of all children die before they are five years old. Life expectancy at birth averages about 55 years.

IV

Politics in Haiti reflects and is constrained and conditioned by these many physical and socioeconomic hardships. The continued domination of an urban elite and the style of dictatorship to which Haitians have become accustomed have also been assisted by the maintenance of a restricted and inappropriate system of education and the perpetuation of antimodern modes of thought and patterns of behavior. Schooling, in theory accessible to all Haitians, has in practice been limited since the early nineteenth century to members of the urban elite and the families of relatively advanced peasants. Haiti's functional illiteracy rate remains about 90 percent, at the level of Ethiopia, Mozambique, Afghanistan and North Yemen.

Teachers, like the newly trained doctors who are obliged to spend their first two years in a village hospital or clinic, disdain their rustic surroundings, are poorly motivated, have little equipment, and probably find it stultifying to try to convey the

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elements of a French classical education to their charges. The lessons are meant to be taught in French, which few rural pupils can read or speak. There has been serious talk of curriculum reform and of a vast campaign to teach illiterate adults to read and write in Creole, an extended version of seventeenth-century Norman French influenced by Bantu grammatical constructions and vocabulary, which is the sole language of about 90 percent of the population.

Together with low levels of education in a rural setting go the parochialism and resistance to change which are often attributed to peasants largely cut off from mass media or easy access to urban life. According to a variety of indices, the pace and pursuits of most rural Haitians seem to have changed little since the early nineteenth century.

Haitian farmers have had every incentive to turn their backs on developments in the capital. Neither the heritage of slavery, the wars of independence, nor the experiences of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries encouraged peasants to seek their security elsewhere than in their isolated mountain and valley retreats. Freedom and independence were more important to ex-slaves than higher levels of prosperity. Cut off as they were—and as most still are—from communications media that might have inculcated a sense of relative deprivation, and uninfluenced by missionaries (of which there were few in the rural areas until the mid-twentieth century), or immigrants from other cultures (of which there were none), or the towns, self-preservation has dictated an overwhelming apathy to the course of Haitian politics. On an experiential basis, disengagement has proved a prudent policy. Peasants still have no reason to suppose that anything but harm comes from involving themselves in national politics; at the local level the question of participation hardly arises since there has never been any effective political life for the citizenry. Under the Duvalier regimes, colonial-style military rule was the pattern in the rural sections and districts.

Nearly all Haitians share the attitudes of rivalry, suspicion and intrigue that are so apparent in national life. Except to the extent that sophistication and education have altered their perspectives, urban-dwelling Haitians also share a distinctive cast of mind which influences their political and economic responses, and appears to be derived from the necessary mental accommodation with slavery: the first Haitians were rootless, lacking any bonds common to them all except revolution. They

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were originally of many tribes and languages of Africa, and thus lacked the cement of a shared culture, religion, language or, later, as peasants and freed men, the group socialization that might have been conveyed by a colonial experience. Instead, the vast majority of Haitians went directly from slavery to independence, without any sort of participatory tutelage as colonial subjects. Separated as they had been from kith and kin and denied the normal rights of assembly and thus the possibilities of cooperation, they retained the combination of submission to authority and the ability—deviously if necessary—to cope under stress, which was a by-product of the slave estate. Even within the nuclear family there was competition and calumny.

In order to reform and uplift Haiti, its future leaders must overcome poverty, demographic drags, infrastructural deficiencies and the social disabilities that have been sketched. Further, neither the leaders nor the Haitian people themselves can deny the national legacy of decay and destruction. Haiti's history militates against democratic development. Haiti's political culture—its political and personal values—hardly enshrines participatory politics.

V

Haiti is a nation that has known despotism and terror more than elections and power-sharing. Conceived in harsh slavery, born of revolution and nurtured in decades of hostility, Haiti knew turbulence and corruption before it experienced order. It has never known effective two-party competition, with honest elections or benevolent government.

The problems of modern Haiti have a long lineage. In the eighteenth century the French-owned plantations of sugar and coffee prospered. By the 1770s Haiti had eclipsed other French colonies of the Caribbean in wealth. Sugar exports were greater than those of any other territory in the world. Haiti's soils were fertile, extensive and well irrigated, its plantations well managed. About 30,000 whites, and 27,000 free mulattos and blacks, enjoyed comfort, culture and privilege. The 500,000 slaves who worked the plantations, however, were ferociously abused.

In 1790 and 1791, rioting slaves became a great mob run amok; they uprooted, fired and destroyed. Before long rural Haiti was dominated by roaming slave bands. Everywhere there was devastation; even Port-au-Prince was razed. By 1798 the

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revolution had succeeded both in establishing the freedom of the slaves and, decisively for the development of modern Haiti, in destroying the country's profitable agricultural base. Technically trained persons fled and about a third of the prerevolutionary slave population died. The surviving ex-slaves took to the mountains, and concentrated on subsistence rather than cash cultivation. Independence was achieved in 1804 after a series of wars with France.

Jean-Jacques Dessalines, who succeeded Toussaint L'Ouverture as free Haiti's first ruler in 1804, accentuated the decay of France's sugar isle by unleashing a wild wave of despotism and terror. Instead of conserving the few oases of learning, middle-level bureaucracy and technocracy available within the country, Dessalines systematically extirpated whites and oppressed mulattos, confiscating their land and, on several occasions, massacring large numbers for sport.

Haiti came to govern itself in the absence of any heritage of representative democracy or any experience of consensus. It was unable to reestablish the intensive agriculture of the country because indigo, cotton and sugar all required large-scale capital investment. Under President Jean-Pierre Boyer (1820–1843), Haiti irrevocably became a land of largely illiterate, black, Creole-speaking smallholders divorced from the mulatto-dominated towns. Most Haitians were poor, but they were free and secure in this stagnant status quo. Class consciousness, sectionalism and individualism were all tendencies carried to political and social extremes by Boyer and his successors. Impersonal abstractions like the notion of nationhood and the common good attracted few loyalties; there were no means of communicating the needs of the state and no funds with which to extend its apparatus to those outside the elite cliques which dominated it. The presidency was equated with a license to plunder, and nearly all the elite's energies were devoted to the acquisition and retention of that license. Throughout the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, only the army maintained a semblance of institutional coherence and continued to play an influential national role.

Because of its poverty, isolation, endemic corruption and administrative inefficiency, Haitian governments after Boyer became more and more unstable and short-lived. From 1843 to 1915 there were 22 presidents, most of whom came to power by force of arms and coups d'état. Fourteen were ousted by revolts after relatively brief incumbencies, three died natu-

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rally in office, one resigned, one was poisoned, one was blown up in his palace and another was pulled apart by an urban mob. Legitimacy, in the American sense, was nonexistent: Haiti was ruled until 1915, but it was never governed.

By the early years of the present century, Haiti was bankrupt, economically and politically. Foreigners, especially the Germans (who controlled wholesale and retail trade), the French (to whom Haiti sold nearly all its coffee), and the Americans (who supplied most imports), dominated what remained of the republic's economy. Customs revenues had been pawned to pay off ruinous loans, and a number of dubious and costly concessions had been granted to unscrupulous foreign promoters. Private funds were not lacking, particularly for backing movements of rebellion, but the government itself lurched precariously from payday to payday and encouraged the army to forage for itself.

Expediency had destroyed any lingering willingness to attend to national needs. At the same time, Haitians were, and have remained, fundamentally conservative. Any social change constituted a major threat to the entrenched livelihood of the urban elite. Thus, they could live with turmoil, corruption, and maladroit, grasping and visionless rulers—providing that these men were not unusually brutal and provoked no radical alterations in the fabric of Haitian society. By 1915 the people of Haiti had experienced only brutish rule, and nothing that looked hopeful for the future. Unfortunately, the American occupation did not provide durable new footing.

The United States intervened in Haiti in July 1915 and ruled there until 1934. The intervention was prompted by turmoil in the country and the United States' fear of the German presence, fueled by the outbreak of World War I. The United States pacified, administered, introduced new methods of solving old problems, provided an array of technological improvements, built decent roads and introduced proper telephone and telegraphic services, refurbished hospitals and schools, tried to upgrade living standards and, like colonial powers in Africa, attempted to impose its own cultural ideas on Haitian society.

Although Woodrow Wilson declared that the intervention in Haiti constituted a humanitarian response to the total collapse of indigenous abilities to maintain law and order, the manner of intervention, and the way in which Americans subsequently dealt with Haitians, suggested an overriding con-

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cern for the protection of U.S. national interests in a disturbed world.

The Americans were inexperienced colonizers, and the Marine Corps, which provided the local leadership and the grand commissar during most of the occupation, proved more amateur than most. Their horizons were narrow, and the maintenance of law and order—at a time when U.S. funds were short—seemed more important than preparing Haiti for economic and political growth. The American occupation was thus without plan, and disappointing to those who had hoped that it would transform a society too long isolated from the currents of world progress. It also perpetuated the atmosphere of arbitrary authoritarianism to which Haitians were long accustomed.

Haitians resented the occupation, not least because of the failure of the Americans to prepare either Haitians or Haiti for its end. No attempt was made to involve Haitians in the country's political process or to plan with Haitians for their eventual resumption of sovereignty. During the occupation elections were held locally, but they were rigged; after 1917, the ballot was denied on a national level. Presidents ruled by fiat on behalf of the occupiers, constitutional amendments were farcically ratified, and the press was censored. The U.S. decision to withdraw in 1934 was spurred by anti-U.S. protests in Haiti, and the U.S. Good Neighbor policy toward Latin America.

The United States had failed to change Haiti. Nineteen years might have proven sufficiently long to have demonstrated the superiority of Anglo-Saxon political approaches. American tutelage might have brought about lasting alterations in Haitian practices. But the Americans had ruled arbitrarily, perhaps more openly and without the venality, but still in the manner of earlier Haitian dictators. We had given Haitians no obvious and easily imitated model of political responsibility. The level of local participation in politics remained low and unrepresentative. As far as most Haitians were concerned, one clique had replaced another: power was power. As tutors, the Americans had reinforced retrogressive stereotypes.

The Americans had not broadened the base of political participation; the same types of cliques operated in Haitian politics as had always operated. President Sténio Vincent, a wealthy mulatto who had assumed office under the Americans, transformed himself into a dictator in 1935. He reintroduced

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censorship, jailed editors, ended the independence of the judiciary, and resumed the Haitian practice of arbitrary arrest and detention without trial.

Vincent was supported by the Haitian army, which backed him when he sought and obtained a third term as president in 1941. The American-introduced Haitian constitution, however, only permitted two terms for a president. U.S. diplomatic pressure and threats of intervention forced Vincent out; Elie Lescot, Haiti's ambassador to the United States, was elected by the legislature to succeed Vincent. After a few years, Lescot, too, attempted to exceed the authority of his office. Students and civil servants took to the streets of Port-au-Prince, and the army moved in to oust the president. In 1946 they installed Dumarsais Estimé, a reformer who encouraged trade unions and rural cooperatives, and even nationalized large U.S. companies. By 1949, however, Estimé had succumbed to the venal sin of Haitian leaders: he considered himself indispensable and above the law. Indeed, Estimé failed the essential test of Haitian political life—the maintenance of legitimacy during periods of stress. Once it was realized that Estimé, like all of his predecessors, was a mere opportunist and no true popularist, the army acted, installing General Paul Magloire, one of its own, trained by the U.S. marines, as his successor.

Magloire ruled during a period of comparatively high world prices for Haitian exports and, as a result, was able to build roads, construct other public works and achieve a degree of modernization in Haiti. But Magloire and his chief of police both believed that the presidency was a license to make money. They lived ostentatiously and projected playboy images, dipping their hands deep into the national till. To protect themselves, they also began depriving citizens of their civil liberties. Even in Haiti there were limits; in this case, the limits were attempting to exceed a constitutional term of office and jailing those who protested and struck.

VI

The fall of President Magloire in late 1956 marked the end of the century-long manipulation of Haitian politics by shifting arrangements of interlocking cliques. For eight months, while Haiti looked for a new political direction, turmoil and chaos racked the republic as it had in those terrible months before the American occupation. It was from this bloody cataclysm—during which five weak and inherently unstable governments

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and 13 bitterly antagonistic contenders vied for the presidency—that Papa Doc Duvalier and his family machine emerged victorious.

Duvalier, a public health physician, had studied at the School of Public Health at the University of Michigan. His manner was reassuring and he appeared (especially to the U.S. embassy) to represent an authentic, popular break with mulatto domination. The official Americans who assisted him financially in the election campaign of 1957 were pleased at his victory. They expected it to usher in a brave and bold new world of democracy.

Duvalier, however, was motivated by a lust for power which would be satisfied only when everything in Haiti budged according to his will, which was not socially oriented. The elimination of his enemies would not and did not result in the spread of social justice, economic development, widespread modernization or even a puritanical national cleansing. Like presidents preceding him, if never before so single-mindedly and ruthlessly, Duvalier was consecrated to the gods of destruction, brutality and sadism. Potential dissidents were removed and opposition of any kind stilled. Duvalier's dictatorship was henceforth marked by unbridled bullying of defenseless Haitians throughout the republic, and by the elevation of torture and brutality to astounding levels.

As Duvalier's *tonton macoutes* made Haitian notions of personal liberty obsolete, so he himself made a mockery of the political process, constitutional constraints on executive power, and the already loose definitions of proper Haitian presidential behavior. Duvalier's object, during his dictatorship, was to entrench himself in power by any and all means, to quell even the most vestigial parliamentary opposition, to put himself above the state and law, and, largely in order to enhance the successful accomplishment of the last objective, to continue to glorify his person. Duvalier sought to humble all men and institutions that might challenge the eminence of his rule and to crush, over and over again, any pockets of independent and constructive thought.

In 1958, for example, Duvalier pushed the legislature aside and began governing by decree. Among his first acts was retroactive legislation that promised death to persons spreading rumors or false news. His *macoutes* made 100 political arrests and shut down 46 newspapers throughout the country. He solicited special "contributions" from wealthy businessmen;

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parliamentary deputies "donated" one month's salary, and the army also paid. Duvalier confiscated all radio transmitters in the country, including those in missionary hands. From 1958 onward, roadblocks were common; daily commuters were searched by *macoutes*, who regularly exacted their special tolls from hapless motorists and bus passengers.

In 1964, completing a process that had been started in 1961, Duvalier declared himself—in response to "popular demand"—president *ad vitam aeternam*. The transformation of the state into a personal fief, the subordination of a natural ethos to an individual will, and the elimination of any Haitian, foreigner or institution capable of detracting from, minimizing or holding out hope against the perpetuation of dictatorship—these were all standard Haitian (and authoritarian) techniques of maintaining one-man rule simply carried to, and, in some categories, well beyond, the previously conceivable boundaries.

Although Duvalier prohibited free movement of Haitians, by the mid-1960s an exodus of trained Haitians was well under way. At least a half-million Haitians left their country for the Dominican Republic, the United States and Canada between 1964 and 1969. In the latter year there were more Haitian physicians, psychiatrists and nurses in Montreal than in Haiti. Duvalier had succeeded in terrorizing his people and in destroying Haiti's economy.

In 1959, at a time of acute stress in his regime, Duvalier had written:

> Our governments never cared about the national inheritance and never attempted to stop social griefs. They talked a lot about liberty, only to fool the free world instead of using it fairly as a domestic policy. The country is split into two groups; the exploiters—restless and foolhardy minority—monopolize the administrative power and paralyze the progress of the masses; the exploited—the great majority—[are] victims of a wrongful and cruel system. There are exploiters in all strata of society. Originated from the mass, they are sometimes more dangerous. All stunning blows to the collectivity's interests come directly from them. To enrich themselves with all possible speed, they will betray anyone for a mess of pottage. Do not trust them.[2]

Without meaning to, Duvalier wrote accurately of his own and his son's governments. There were no intermediary structures

[2] Quoted in Jean-Pierre O. Gingras, *Duvalier, Caribbean Cyclone: The History of Haiti and Its Present Government*, New York: Exposition Press, 1967, pp. 105–106.

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of relevance, no hierarchies of importance, and no competing foci of institutional loyalty. The Duvaliers were the only bosses. No one shared their power or helped them to exercise it in anything other than menial ways.

The Duvaliers created as totalitarian a state as could be achieved with the underdeveloped technology at their disposal. Because of the relative inefficiency of their regimes, and their concentration upon short- rather than long-term gains, they made no attempt to institute a process of thought control or mental indoctrination. However, dissent of all kinds was stifled whenever and under whatever circumstances it arose.

VII

The three decades of Duvalierism, father and son, robbed Haiti of what little democratic and developmental momentum remained after World War II. Reminiscent as their reigns were of the harshest phases of despotism during the nineteenth century, it is hardly a wonder that the structure of the state and the character of politics changed little under General Namphy's junta from 1986 to early 1988. The ouster of Baby Doc had brought renewed personal freedom and inaugurated a welcome diminution of the capital's climate of terror. But the junta's first phase was hardly popular; its rule was arbitrary, if less vicious and less capricious than that of the Duvaliers.

Namphy's successors, whoever they may be, have a hard and, frankly, almost impossible task. Without the backing of a robust national democratic value system and given inherited traditions of cynical misrule, it is unlikely that the transition from authoritarianism to good government can be either easy or quick. Haitians have long endured a zero-sum existence: either one is on top or on the bottom; no group or clique shares with others. Future democrats and dictators may want to change Haiti in a fundamental political sense. But because the human and historical material is so fragile, no remolding of Haiti can be predicted with confidence.

Haiti is poorer and more miserable than it was. As a nation it is close to bankruptcy and ripe for yet another personalist takeover. François Duvalier ran the country down; his son's regime sponsored modest growth, but the tumult during the junta's rule has made the country's prospects precarious once again. Given its legacy of overpopulation, deforestation, infrastructural neglect and general weariness, Haiti hardly presents a likely case of economic takeoff. Its citizens have too little to

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eat and spend; until Haitians see themselves as becoming politically and economically better off, they will distrust and withhold consent from their governments.

Since Namphy and his colleagues hardly have the vision or skill to accomplish this formidable task, and clearly refuse to share power with the majority of Haitians, the people may yet generate the energy to revolt, as they did against Baby Doc. In that uprising, Haitians were more united than at any time since the eighteenth-century revolt which brought them freedom and independence. Although the Haitians' fury forced the remaining Duvalierists and *tonton macoutes* to lie low for a time, and the machinery was set in place for a democratic experiment, the opposition leaders proved no match for those wanting to perpetuate the old ways. There was no single opposition leader behind whom the people could unite, in part due to the fractured nature of the country and its primitive means of communication and transport. Of the 22 candidates who stood for the canceled November 1987 election, four were thought to have substantial popular support. Until there is a renewed symbolic focal point for rallying people to the long fight ahead, the cause of democratic rule will be lost.

Whatever happens, Haiti will need renewed help from the United States, France and its other traditional friends and benefactors. For the moment, however, the United States should seek ways—mostly diplomatic, but with the promise of resumed cash aid—of influencing the junta to return to the democratic path of 1987. Ultimately, we must take our lead from Haitians of democratic instinct. We must look to Haiti itself, which finally ousted the Duvaliers, for critical leadership and positive direction. The case for helping Haiti is overwhelming. Patience will be needed, too. But exactly how and when to help are still open questions.

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Daniel Yergin

ENERGY SECURITY IN THE 1990s

Fifteen years after the October 1973 oil embargo first catapulted energy security to the top of the international agenda, and a decade after the Iranian Revolution worsened the situation, concern is again growing about energy security and the potential for new crises in the 1990s. Are the seeds now being planted for revived problems in the next decade? Or has the response to the harsh experiences of the 1970s so fundamentally altered the landscape that consumers can look forward to a decade in which energy supplies will be neither economically nor politically constraining? If new crises do emerge, are the consuming countries better prepared to weather them than they were in the 1970s?

A variety of indicators warn of new pressures. U.S. oil imports, having hit bottom in 1985 at 27 percent of total consumption, have risen sharply since. They now account for 36 percent of consumption, and seem headed back toward the high levels that were reached in 1979, at the time of the Iranian Revolution. Overall, oil demand in both the United States and the world is rising again. As a telling commentary on the significance of petroleum and the instability of the region possessing 70 percent of total free-world oil reserves, U.S. naval vessels took to patrolling the Gulf in 1987 to protect oil shipments against Iran's "tanker war." Meanwhile, the use of coal and nuclear power—two of the most important alternatives to oil—appears increasingly stymied, and environmental considerations could put increasing pressure on the whole energy supply system.

Yet there are many no less persuasive indicators pointing in the opposite direction. Oil prices, which almost three years ago collapsed from $28 a barrel to between $10 and $11 a barrel, and then recovered to about $18, now seem to have settled at

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around $15 and could just as easily decline again as rise. Consumers are benefiting from the lower prices, as are the balance-of-payments accounts of industrial and non-oil-producing developing countries. World oil production is far more diversified than in 1973. Production outside the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) has actually risen since the price collapse, and production capacity persists at between nine million and ten million barrels per day in excess of market demand. Oil itself has lost a significant share of the total energy market—down from 54 percent of total energy demand in the developed countries in 1973 to about 44 percent today.

These latter indicators make clear that the world has changed substantially in the 15 years since the oil embargo so emphatically brought considerations of energy security to the fore. Conditions in the marketplace are radically different from those of the early 1970s. Markets then were tight; now they are dominated by surplus. Then they were relatively rigid; now they are much more flexible. Energy security measures that were then ignored have now been instituted. Another striking difference is the impact of the information revolution on energy markets. Today much market information is available to players all over the world almost instantaneously. This means that reaction times are much shorter and that various energy markets are linked more closely and interact more immediately with each other.

The objective of energy security is to assure adequate, reliable supplies of energy at reasonable prices and in ways that do not jeopardize major national values and objectives. It is not very hard to conceive of the kind of event that could trigger a crisis. Indeed, the question is not whether there will be events that could threaten energy supply—for surely there will, be they political, military or technological—but rather how resilient energy markets themselves will be and how effective energy security measures will prove. Yet there is much that is uncertain about how markets will develop in the 1990s—ranging from the level of non-OPEC supply, to economic growth in both the developed and the developing world, to technological developments that can affect energy consumption, supply and transportation. The resolution of these uncertainties will determine whether or not the balance between capacity and demand will tighten, especially in the second half of the 1990s. Preliminary data, however, suggest that the price collapse of

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1986 marked an end to the retreat from oil consumption that began in October 1973, a slowing of the progress in conservation that has been made since then and a shift back toward high levels of oil consumption—though certainly not at the pell-mell rate of the 1960s.

Present circumstances require a balanced perspective. There is a much more secure base to the world's energy economy than was the case in 1973, and—under the right conditions—that base could well extend to the end of this century and into the next. Yet the risks are real and, under certain plausible circumstances, could become much more significant in the next decade. The present period of calm provides an opportunity to make a series of commitments that will enhance the long-term position of oil consumers. Experience, caution and simple self-interest all dictate reasonable attention to energy security.

II

The focus of energy security concerns is on the shocks—interruptions, disruptions and manipulations of supply—that can lead to sudden, sharp increases in prices and can impose heavy economic and political costs.

Oil continues to be pivotal in these concerns for two reasons. The first is that petroleum is still, by far, the most important source of energy for the industrial world and the one for which, in transportation, there is no significant ready substitute. The second is the basic asymmetry of trade in oil—the fact that most of the world's proven reserves are located far from the world's major consumers. Oil crosses borders and makes long voyages by sea. Oil, more than any other commodity, is intimately intertwined with nationalism and national power, and is subject to political and military struggles for its control.

The issue of security of supply first emerged on the eve of the First World War, when Britain's first lord of the Admiralty, Winston Churchill, wrestled with the decision of whether to convert the Royal Navy from coal to oil. To burn oil would give the British an advantage in speed and flexibility over the Germans. Yet Churchill was all too aware of the risks Britain would be taking on:

> To build any large additional number of oil-burning ships meant basing our naval supremacy upon oil. But oil was not found in appreciable quantities in our islands. If we required it we must carry it by sea in peace

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or war from distant countries. We had, on the other hand, the finest supply of the best steam coal in the world, safe in our mines under our own land. To commit the Navy irrevocably to oil was indeed "to take arms against a sea of troubles."[1]

That asymmetry remains today a succinct metaphor for the basic problem. To Churchill, the gains outweighed the risks, and he went ahead and ordered the conversion. The issue was made vividly clear in the Second World War, when oil not only determined capabilities, but also defined strategic objectives.

The events of the 1970s have borne out the significance of oil in the overall energy security equation. As a result of the 1973 embargo and other market conditions, oil prices increased from about $2.50 a barrel to over $10. The turmoil that accompanied the Iranian Revolution in 1979 drove oil prices from $13 a barrel to $34. The implications of these price increases were very heavy. They were a strong force in driving inflation to the point where it seemed to be the intractable political problem of modern industrial democracies. The abrupt price increases also had grave recessionary effects, leading to high unemployment and the deepest economic downturn since the Great Depression. The recycling to developing countries of the burgeoning financial surpluses of the oil exporters inaugurated the round of vast international borrowing that resulted in today's continuing debt crisis. Energy problems undermined the confidence and cohesion of the industrial countries, created some of the most serious rifts ever among them, and threatened a loss of national autonomy and independence in foreign policy.

Many of the effects, of course, have since passed. At one time the oil crises seemed destined to realign international politics, but much of that impact has dissipated in today's market, where the threat to withhold oil is likely to injure the exporter much more than the importer.

Still, future threats to oil supplies and thus to energy security could arise from wars and revolutions, or from unexpected technological problems, or from a conjunction of such developments in different parts of the world. But it is not only to the supply of oil that threats could arise. In the early 1980s, the Reagan Administration worried that high dependence on Soviet natural gas would make Western Europe vulnerable to

[1] *The World Crisis*, Vol. I, New York: Scribner's, 1923, pp. 134–136.

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Soviet attempts to gain political advantage through the manipulation of supplies. Currently, some in the electric power industry worry that a future nuclear power plant disaster like that at Chernobyl in 1986, occurring anywhere in the world, could lead to a strong political drive to "turn off" nuclear power. This in turn might disrupt the economies of many nations that now rely on nuclear power, force a quick return to oil, and result in a rapid surge in oil prices. The escalation of environmental worries—concerning, in particular, the "greenhouse" effect and global warming—could lead in the opposite direction, to an accelerated drive away from fossil fuels, creating considerable quandaries for energy policy, great confusion in the energy industries and additional costs for consumers.

Ensuring the availability of oil at reasonable prices remains the primary concern, and it is on that we must focus.

III

We might usefully think in terms of a security margin, an excess of available supply and production capacity over demand that cushions shocks to the system and, not incidentally, makes futile any efforts to manipulate supplies for political advantage. A taut balance between consumers' needs and the availability of supplies is also a precarious balance.

This is evident in comparing the effects of five different Middle East crises on oil supplies. The nationalization of Iranian oil in 1951, the Suez crisis of 1956 and the Six Day War of 1967 all had, in retrospect, relatively minor effects on the oil market—despite initial expectations to the contrary in each case. In all three cases, there was enough unused production capacity elsewhere in the world to make up for supplies that were not available for physical and political reasons.

After the Six Day War the situation was transformed by a great increase in demand for oil—because of its low price and rapid economic growth—and relatively low investment in diversified sources around the world. By the early 1970s there was virtually no spare capacity in the United States or anywhere else in the world. Thus, when a new Middle East war sparked the Arab oil embargo in October 1973 and the first "oil shock," there were hardly any additional alternative supplies around the world on which to call.

Half a decade later, near the end of the 1970s, the oil market was still caught in this transition. The price increases and

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security-oriented government policies that followed the embargo had not yet made their full effects felt. U.S. oil imports were at their highest levels ever; U.S. and world oil demand was starting to rise again. Major new sources—Alaska, Mexico and the North Sea—were only just beginning to have an impact. At that moment, the Iranian Revolution toppled the shah, interrupted exports, disrupted long-standing supply arrangements, created panic in the oil market, drove prices to the $34-a-barrel level—and thus delivered the second oil shock.

Yet this second oil shock gave powerful impetus to the reactions that had already been set in motion by the 1973 embargo. The combined responses generated today's surplus. The higher prices and perceptions of grave insecurity provided a tremendous stimulus for the development of alternative oil and other energy supplies. At the same time, conservation had a profound impact on energy consumption throughout the world. In the late 1970s, my colleagues and I argued that the United States could use 30 to 40 percent less energy per unit of GNP—that is, become that much more energy-efficient—than had been the case in 1973 without much, if any, effect on the standard of living.[2] At the time, this was a novel and very controversial statement, and one that stimulated much contention and criticism. Today, however, the United States uses 27 percent less energy—and 32 percent less oil—per unit of GNP than it did in 1973. Indeed, conservation—improved energy efficiency—has turned out to be the most important incremental energy "source" of all. If the United States had remained at its 1973 consumption level, it would now be using the equivalent of 13 million barrels of oil a day more energy than is actually the case.

The buildup of new supplies and the rise of conservation have created surpluses throughout the energy system. Yet the surplus is most evident in terms of oil. OPEC is producing 17.5–18.5 million barrels a day (though it produced as much as 20 mbd this past summer); it could produce 27–29 mbd.

If there had been, over the last few years, a closer balance between demand and the availability of supply, the world oil market would have reacted much more sharply to the Iran-Iraq War. But, with so large a cushion, the market—again

[2] See Robert Stobaugh and Daniel Yergin, *Energy Future: Report of the Energy Project at the Harvard Business School*, New York: Random House, 1979, chapter 6.

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despite initial expectations—shrugged off the war, even when oil fields, refineries and tankers were attacked.

As a result of its policy of price maintenance and production restraint, OPEC quickly lost market share as buyers sought out the cheapest barrel. OPEC's portion of total free-world supply declined from 64 percent in 1979 to 42 percent in 1985. In 1985 and 1986 the OPEC countries moved to regain lost market share. As a result of their increased production, the oil price collapsed, in the process revoking completely the second oil price shock of 1979–1981. Adjusting for inflation, the oil price today, in dollar terms, is below where it was in the mid-1970s.

Yet, despite the price collapse, a surplus of capacity and supply remains. OPEC still has 9 to 10 million barrels per day of unused, or "shut-in," capacity. This surplus, which is market driven, continues to contribute to the security margin. Moreover, several countries have added substantially in recent years to their proven reserves.

IV

This surplus is, however, only part of the security margin. Emergency stocks of oil constitute a second part, much more narrow, but highly significant, flexible and sharply focused. Ever since the British Navy converted from coal to oil, governments of oil-importing countries have periodically pursued policies of building up strategic reserves—oil in government-owned or -controlled storage that can be used in an emergency. There has always been a debate as to how much is enough. Marcus Samuel, the founder of Shell Oil and a leading proponent of Churchill's decision to convert, argued, "You cannot have too much storage—I do not think you can go too far in that."[3] Budget-conscious treasury departments always disagree. After the 1956 Suez crisis, President Eisenhower floated the notion that the U.S. government should develop its own emergency oil reserves; his suggestion was considered wholly impractical. In the late 1960s, the shah of Iran—keen to increase his country's output and thus revenues—offered to provide the United States a million barrels a day for ten years, at a dollar a barrel, that could be stored in salt domes for emergencies. The United States passed up the offer.

It was only after 1973 that the United States—in coordina-

[3] Robert Henriques, *Marcus Samuel: First Viscount Bearsted*, London: Barrie and Rockliff, 1960, p. 561.

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tion with other Western governments in the International Energy Agency—established a strategic petroleum reserve. Today, it contains about 550 million barrels—which would cover about 92 days of U.S. imports at current levels. Other industrial governments—principally Japan and West Germany—hold or control another 380 million barrels of stock. These emergency reserves constitute an insurance policy whose maintenance costs look modest indeed when compared to the costs of the interruptions of the 1970s.

While government stocks have risen, private stocks have fallen. As a result, total stocks—government and private—are at roughly the same level that they were in 1978. Because of the fall in demand since the late 1970s, the current stock level covers about 95–100 days of total forward consumption in the industrial countries, compared to 70–75 days in 1977–78. This increase is a contribution to security.

There is a further element of security margin—dual-fired capacity. This is the ability of combustion equipment in power plants and factories to switch easily from reliance on oil to gas or coal. This capacity has become much more widespread since 1973. The prime reason has been price; dual-fired capacity gives the industrial consumer access to what is, at any given moment, the cheapest energy source. But such capability also adds to security by enabling the consumer, in the midst of a crisis, to switch away from oil—primarily to gas—on very short notice.

Finally, the oil transportation system has become more flexible over the last few years. Since the mid-1940s, there has been a continuing debate about the safest way to transport oil from the Gulf. With the memory of tanker vulnerability during World War II, the initial emphasis was on pipelines to the Mediterranean, but it soon shifted back to tankers. The Suez crisis and the Six Day War—as well as economic forces—provided the motivation to develop larger tankers and then supertankers that could economically travel from the Gulf around the Cape of Good Hope on their way west.

The Iran-Iraq War reversed the trend and provided powerful impetus to develop pipelines that would eliminate the need to keep open the Strait of Hormuz, at the mouth of the Gulf. In practical terms, this has meant the construction of pipelines to the Red Sea and the Mediterranean. At the outbreak of the Iran-Iraq War, pipeline capacity was two million barrels a day, equivalent to about 20 percent of current Gulf exports. To-

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day's capacity is 4.7 mbd, equivalent to about 50 percent of current exports. These projects do not eliminate risks to transportation, but the diversification certainly greatly reduces those risks.

V

When all is added up, the current margin of energy security is quite considerable. Much of it, however, depends upon the surplus of production capacity over consumption. It is that surplus that we must explore.

The first thing to observe is its distribution. Of the total surplus production capacity, about 75 percent is in the Middle East and 65 percent of the total is concentrated in the Gulf region alone. This means that there are only 2.5–2.7 million barrels per day of surplus capacity outside the Middle East—roughly equivalent to Iran's current production quota. Overall, 70 percent of free-world reserves are in the Middle East. The concentration of the surplus in a tense, violence-prone region means that the security margin needs to be viewed with some caution.

The second question to ask is at what rate will the surplus erode. After all, the issue is not constraints tomorrow but in the 1990s. There is considerable debate within the oil world about that question. The dominant view is that the surplus in capacity will shrink considerably in the first half of the 1990s, setting the stage for higher prices and for increased vulnerability to political shocks. A minority view holds that the surplus capacity could well stretch out to the end of this century, or even beyond.

Which view is correct? Reasonable scenarios can be developed for both positions. The answer will be determined by the evolution of supply and demand, a subject that is dominated by major uncertainties.

Oil prices of between $15 and $18 a barrel should certainly mean higher demand for oil than a price of $28 a barrel. In 1987, the year after the oil price collapse, free-world oil demand grew at 1.5 percent annually, compared to no growth in 1985. This year, demand should also grow about 1.5 percent—or about 700,000 barrels per day. Yet the connection between lower prices and increased consumption is confused by the fact that many consumers around the world are not seeing the full effect of the lower prices. When oil prices fell, some industrial countries took the opportunity to increase taxation on gasoline.

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There are two major uncertainties on the demand side. One is the degree of continuing momentum in the improvement of energy efficiency—conservation. Will lower prices and the current perception of surplus reduce efforts to maintain and increase energy efficiency, or is increased efficiency now built into the system? The obvious answer is some of both. Preliminary data for 1987 and 1988 suggest a slowing of conservation. There is not enough evidence to decide if this constitutes the beginning of a new trend or only reflects some immediate behavioral reactions to the 1986 price collapse. Still, one can look back and see that the conservation response lagged behind the price increases of the 1970s, in part because of the time it takes to turn over capital stock. This leads some observers to expect a similar lagged response in the other direction, as a result of lower prices.

Yet three points can be made in reply. First, prices that are considered low today are still much higher than the prices of the early 1970s. Second, technological change and innovation will continue to improve energy efficiency, both as a direct objective and as a by-product. Third, while energy security and sheer cost were the driving forces pushing conservation in the 1970s and 1980s, a new imperative is now entering the scene—environmental concern. Atmospheric and climate issues—air pollution, global warming and the greenhouse effect—could provide a strong motive to improve energy efficiency, thus reducing the amount of hydrocarbon combustion that is required and so gaining time to understand the environmental phenomena better.[4] Such concerns are becoming increasingly prominent on the political agenda in the United States and other industrial countries and also in international negotiations.

It should be observed that one area in which strong demand is asserting itself is electricity consumption. Growth rates have been high in many parts of the United States, and in some areas peak demand is getting close to available capacity.

The second uncertainty concerns the developing world. According to many of the projections of the late 1970s and early 1980s, oil demand was expected to increase substantially within the Third World. This did not happen, in large part, because of the poor economic performance in many of these coun-

[4] Irving Mintzer, *Our Changing Atmosphere: Energy Policies, Air Pollution, and Global Warming*, Washington: World Resources Institute, 1987; William Moomaw, "Options for Responding to Global Climate Change," World Resources Institute paper, July 1988.

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tries—the result of weak industrial-world markets for commodities, balance-of-payments problems and debt-related austerity. Yet the potential for growth in oil consumption in these countries remains enormous. For instance, while in the United States there is one car for every 1.8 people, in the developing world, there is one car for every 81 people. If the developing world overcomes its current stagnation and resumes growth, the growth rate for oil demand would be pushed higher.

In a strong conservation scenario, daily oil demand could grow by about four million barrels by 1995—equivalent to about 40 percent of the current surplus. In a high consumption-growth scenario, demand could grow by 7.5 mbd by 1995—equivalent to 75 percent of the current surplus. Prices will not be stationary during this period, of course, and any price increases that do occur will temper demand. Moreover, production capacity itself is not a static concept. While the general view is that production capacity will inevitably decline in the first half of the 1990s, there are forces that could, even in a low price environment, maintain or even expand capacity.

VI

This brings us to the other side of the equation—supply. Here we must look at the broad range of energy sources, not just oil. In both absolute and relative terms, the world has moved away from oil to natural gas, coal and nuclear power. This shift reflects both economic forces and highly focused strategies on the part of the industrial countries. Yet what are the prospects for the major alternative sources of supply in a low-price environment?

Natural gas is being found in abundance around the world. Proven reserves have increased by a third since 1978. There are important growth opportunities for gas in North America. In Western Europe, gas consumption has grown, and a more integrated distribution system is emerging across the Continent. Still, many more market opportunities wait to be exploited. One of the consequences of the squabble between the United States and Western Europe over Soviet natural gas has been a commitment to build more flexibility into the natural gas distribution system.

Gas is a very attractive fuel in environmental terms, and it will be a beneficiary of concerns about the atmosphere and climate. Its drawback is that, compared to oil, it is expensive to transport over long distances. The cost of establishing new

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liquefaction projects based on current technologies is quite high. The conditions required for new liquefied natural gas projects to go ahead would be some mixture of the following: a strong, environmentally based drive to use natural gas; advances in liquefied natural gas technology; a realism on the part of sellers as to what markets will bear in terms of price; and a judicious view on the part of exporting governments as to what they can expect as their take in taxes. Looking toward the end of the century, some potential suppliers are seeking to move into new markets—Norway, and possibly Venezuela, into the United States; Nigeria into Western Europe.

Coal is widely abundant. It has greatly increased its share of the market in electricity generation, and is a beneficiary of stalemate in nuclear energy. The main obstacles to further coal use are environmental considerations. Unless there is progress on clean-burning technologies, coal will be the big loser, with increasing restrictions and disincentives placed on its use.

Nuclear power appeared a very attractive energy source to government policymakers in the early 1970s because of its promise of national autonomy and low cost. Around the world, about 430 plants are licensed for operation, with another 120 or so under construction. That, however, will probably mark the limit of nuclear power development, at least in its current technological form. Costs have been anything but low, partly because of recurrent changes in environmental regulations. The last order for a nuclear power plant in the United States that has not been canceled was placed in 1973; plans for the expansion of nuclear power have been continually curtailed.

Currently, nuclear power provides about 18 percent of total electricity in the United States. Somewhere between a half dozen and a dozen plants will eventually be added to the 109 now licensed for operation. But some partially built plants in the United States either are or may be converted to natural gas. The Swedish government is currently under a mandate to phase out its existing plants by the year 2010, and an effective moratorium exists in West Germany. Although the governments of several industrial nations have maintained a commitment to nuclear power, in practical terms only France and Japan are moving ahead with nuclear power, although in both cases at a reduced pace. The Chernobyl disaster only solidified what had already been an increasing stalemate in the expansion of nuclear power. The rise of concern about global warming is stimulating increasing discussion about the development of a

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new generation of smaller, inherently safer nuclear reactors. But this will be a long-term option. As circumstances are today, the additional contribution of nuclear power to the energy mix in the next decade will be much more modest than what was anticipated even a few years ago.

VII

This brings us back to oil. The 1973 embargo and resulting jump in price stimulated worldwide exploration and development of non-OPEC oil, facilitated by technological advances. In 1973, non-OPEC production totaled around 19 million barrels of oil a day. By 1981—with the surge of production from Mexico, Alaska and the North Sea—it had reached around 24 mbd. It continued to grow in the 1980s, reaching 28.5 mbd by 1985.

Perhaps the biggest surprise since the oil price collapse has been the resilience of non-OPEC production, which has continued to increase. This year, despite the price drop, it could be about 29.5 mbd—about one million barrels per day higher than the 1985 level. For the future, the question is what the level of investment in non-OPEC development will be. This, in turn, will be affected by the contemporary price environment and future expectations.

But "non-OPEC" is a singular term for a very mixed world. It includes widely disparate areas, from North America and the North Sea to India, Malaysia and Colombia. And one crucial distinction stands out—between the United States and everywhere else.

In the late 1970s, a production decline was widely expected for the United States. It did not occur. Production continued to increase on the North Slope of Alaska. The high prices also provided a tremendous incentive for oil development in the "lower forty-eight." This explosion of investment and activity propped up production, including some that was highly marginal in economic terms and that depended on high prices. In 1986, the price collapse removed this already crumbling prop, and U.S. crude-oil production has since fallen by almost 10 percent since the beginning of 1986—by about one million barrels a day. The general expectation is that U.S. production will continue to drop, though the prediction for the rate of decline has been tempered—to perhaps 100,000 to 200,000 barrels per day. This fall is concentrated in the mature pro-

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ducing regions—such as Texas, which has seen its output decline by a third since the early 1970s.

The major uncertainties about U.S. production—and the potential offsets to a decline in the "lower forty-eight"—lie offshore and in Alaska. Currently, there is a considerable battle in Washington about opening up the Alaskan Natural Wildlife Refuge to exploration. The controversy has arisen because that part of Alaska is considered to be the last truly promising oil province in the United States—and one of the country's outstanding wilderness areas. If large reserves are found and development is permitted, then—given lead times—additional Alaskan production could offset further declines elsewhere by the mid-1990s.

The significant decline to date in U.S. production makes the overall increase in non-OPEC production all the more remarkable, for it means that production outside OPEC and the United States has actually risen about two million barrels per day since the price collapse. Although the general view is that this merely reflects a lag and that non-OPEC production will soon start to decline, another prospect is no less plausible. Non-OPEC production could increase by 1.2–2.0 million barrels per day by the mid-1990s, even in a low-price environment. The reasons are three-fold. First, exploration and production have become much more efficient, and supply costs are down substantially. Second, governments around the world have shown a willingness to reduce their tax take on companies, improving the commercial economics even in a low-price environment. Indeed, the only major non-OPEC country not to have adjusted the fiscal environment to make it more attractive to producers is the United States. Third, many companies are willing to invest now to be in position for what they regard as the likelihood of higher oil prices in the next decade.

The current disparity between share of production and share of reserves would suggest an eventual shift back to reliance on OPEC and the Middle East. But the result of all this continuing activity around the world could be the persistence well into the 1990s of a diversified, highly competitive oil market. The end to the Iran-Iraq War could mean additional production from both these countries. While a cessation of hostilities between those two countries will, presumably, relieve one of the main stresses within OPEC, it will not reduce the drive by the various oil exporters to protect and increase their market shares. Moreover, both Iran (which has been producing at about a

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third of its pre-1979 levels) and Iraq will have an incentive to increase production to gain revenues.

Yet, as I have tried to make clear, there is a long list of uncertainties that will determine when the security margin erodes and at what rate. If and when it does erode in a significant way, the oil market will again become more susceptible to crises than is the case today. Violence, wars, technological hazards, political eruptions, regime changes, religious or ideological conflicts—all of these can affect access to oil, or ability or willingness to supply oil, translating, in turn, into supply disruptions and price shocks.

There is an important additional point about the oil-exporting countries that has generally been overlooked. Their rapid population growth means that, in a low-price scenario, many of them will experience declining real incomes per capita—at a time when their demographic structures are heavily skewed toward the young. This could threaten the social and political order in oil-exporting countries, in turn influencing their capability and interest in exporting oil.

If a survey were taken today of those in charge of oil policies in the OPEC countries, many would ruefully say that the second round of price increases, during 1979–81, ended up being a tremendous mistake from the viewpoint of their own countries. Those increases damaged the long-term market for their oil, brought new competitors into the market, led to a great deal of very wasteful spending, created inflation and dislocation within their economies and societies, generated expectations that could not possibly be met and finally forced the adoption of severe austerity policies. There are still those in OPEC countries who would seize any opportunity to force up prices quickly and sharply, both for economic gain and to advance their own political and ideological objectives. But these, today, are in the minority in terms of influence, if not in numbers.

However, as time goes on, collective memories will fade; new personalities will come onto the scene who did not experience directly the second oil shock and its consequences, and who will not have an intuitive grasp of the lessons it taught. When the market tightens, or when there is again a major disruption in supply, these successors could well decide that the opportunity is at hand to make up for lost time, especially if they see sharply higher prices as the quick solution to difficult domestic political and social conditions, as the avenue to international power and influence, and as the means of "righting the scales"

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against the industrial world. Thus, another element of increasing risk through the 1990s will be the progressive unlearning of the lessons of the 1970s and 1980s.

VIII

All this provides a context for considering the most visible and vexing part of the energy security debate—U.S. oil imports. Rising U.S. imports in the 1970s were one of the most important factors in the tightening of the world oil market. U.S. imports rose from 3.2 mbd in 1970 to 6.0 mbd in 1973, and then to 8.6 mbd in 1977–1979. As a result of conservation, switching to other fuels, and rising domestic oil production, petroleum imports declined to as low as 4.3 mbd in 1985. Since the 1986 price collapse, they have risen significantly, averaging six million barrels a day in the first half of 1988—the same level as 1973 and, today, equivalent to 36 percent of total consumption. This rapid rise brings back memories of the late 1970s—the eve of the Iranian Revolution and the second oil shock—when oil imports, on a net basis, reached 46 percent of total consumption.

TABLE I

U.S. PETROLEUM CONSUMPTION AND NET IMPORTS

Year	Consumption (in MBD)[a]	Net Imports (in MBD)[a]	Imports as a Percentage of Consumption
1972	16.4	4.5	27%
1973	17.3	6.0	35%
1974	16.7	5.9	35%
1975	16.3	5.8	36%
1976	17.5	7.1	41%
1977	18.4	8.6	46%
1978	18.8	8.0	42%
1979	18.5	8.0	43%
1980	17.1	6.4	37%
1981	16.1	5.4	34%
1982	15.3	4.3	28%
1983	15.2	4.3	28%
1984	15.7	4.7	30%
1985	15.7	4.3	27%
1986	16.3	5.4	33%
1987	16.7	5.9	35%
1988[b]	16.9	6.0	36%

[a] Millions of barrels per day.
[b] First half-year only.
Source: U.S. Department of Energy.

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One thing that looks very sure is that U.S. oil imports will continue to increase because of growing demand and falling production. If current trends last, sometime in the 1990s the United States will cross the "continental divide" and become dependent on imports for more than 50 percent of its total oil consumption—and, indeed, will be heading toward 60 percent. This is quite a change for a country that, as late as 1953, produced more than 50 percent of *all* the oil consumed in the world.

Do growing imports make the United States more vulnerable? That question will be asked with increasing frequency as the import numbers mount. As the Administration's recent energy security study pointed out, the import level of oil is used "as something like a shorthand indicator of oil vulnerability."[5] But, as the report added, the import-proportion indicator can be something of an oversimplification. The United States imports many products—many of them at levels that are a very high proportion of total consumption. This does not necessarily mean that security is threatened.

Oil is only part of the total U.S. energy mix. At current rates of consumption, oil imports account for 16 percent of total U.S. energy demand (and imported natural gas, another one percent), meaning that the United States is over 80-percent self-sufficient in energy. If oil imports rise to 50 or 60 percent of total consumption, the United States will still be close to 75-percent self-sufficient in meeting its total energy needs. This apparent security is, however, mitigated by a very important qualification—there are no quick, ready substitutes for oil in the transportation sector.

Oil imports also have to be put into a larger economic context. We need to consider economic efficiency. One reason that imports are rising is that they are cheaper than the cost of developing new domestic oil production. There are overall economic and competitive benefits to the nation in relying on less expensive foreign oil rather than relatively costly domestic supplies. For forty years a debate has continued as to whether it is wiser to push U.S. production to its utmost or to rely more on imports and husband domestic supplies. Current circumstances have again made this debate more contentious. It is complicated by the fact that oil supplies are not like light from

[5] U.S. Department of Energy, *Energy Security: A Report to the President of the United States*, Washington: U.S. General Printing Office, March 1987, p. 25.

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a bulb that can be turned on and off with a switch. In order to assure domestically produced supplies at some point in the future, sources must be identified and developed at an earlier date.

Rising oil imports are and will continue to be an important and volatile part of the trade deficit. U.S. oil imports in 1987 amounted to $42 billion—equivalent to about 27 percent of the total 1987 trade deficit. At current prices, every million barrels per day of additional imports adds between $6 billion and $7 billion to the trade deficit and would certainly work against the efforts to reduce that deficit.

But the most important question about imports is not whether imports make the United States vulnerable or not, as if the United States could be insulated from the rest of the world, but how they fit into the global context. There is essentially only one world oil market, and disruptions and shocks in supplies from a given region will reverberate throughout the market and affect all consumers, whether they draw heavily from that specific region or not. After all, in 1973, the countries that embargoed the United States were supplying only about five percent of total U.S. demand. Moreover, a rising level of U.S. oil imports will increase the vulnerability of the overall market, to the degree that it helps tighten the market. Rapidly rising U.S. oil imports will not only erode the security margin, but will also destabilize the market.

IX

The underpinnings of energy security are also affected by structural changes in the oil market. The events of the 1970s broke up the integration of the upstream (production) and downstream (refining and marketing) functions in traditional oil companies and led to the development of large spot markets, trading on a massive scale, and the emergence of a futures market. Moreover, the major oil companies have for the most part gone through considerable contraction and restructuring.

But the vacuum created by the retrenchment of the international oil companies is now being filled. A new feature is downstream integration—"reintegration"—by state oil companies.[6] Some of these companies, originally created to embody the nationalistic aspirations of oil-exporting countries, are be-

[6] Joseph Stanislaw and Daniel Yergin, "The Reintegration Impulse: The Oil Industry of the 1990s," Cambridge Energy Research Associates private report, November 1987.

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coming significant international refiners and marketers—in effect, the new integrated oil companies of the 1990s. Already, motorists in the United States and other industrial countries can find themselves filling their tanks at gas stations owned or partly owned by oil-exporting countries—and the proportion of such enterprises is likely to grow. Kuwait itself is virtually an integrated oil company, possessing not only huge oil reserves and a large export-refinery capacity, but also overseas refineries and thousands of gas stations in Western Europe, all operating under the name of "Q8." Saudi Arabia and Texaco have agreed in principle to establish a joint venture to take over Texaco's refining and marketing operations in 23 states in the United States. Venezuela owns refining and marketing joint ventures in the United States, West Germany and Sweden, and will be adding further to its system. The Norwegian state oil company, Statoil, is building up its own system in Scandinavia, and some other exporters are considering downstream investments.

The objective of the exporters is to ensure for themselves access to consumers in competitive markets—"security of demand."[7] They may not be able to protect the price, but they can protect the volumes they sell, or even expand them in markets dominated by surplus. Thus they can ensure that they will at least do relatively better than their competitors. Countries taking the lead in reintegration are those that during the past decade lost market share to newer exporting countries and are now intent on regaining their share.

Some will worry that these investments could be Trojan horses, opening up oil markets in consuming countries to new manipulation and sharp price increases. In order to do that, however, the exporters would have to gain a considerably larger share of markets than appears likely. Others—competitive refiners and marketers, and domestic oil and gas producers—will have the opposite worry: that the exporters will use these facilities to cut prices in an aggressive or even predatory manner, in order to gain markets.

Yet, on the other hand, such deals can enhance energy security if they embody a new pragmatism and create more durable economic bonds between consumers and producers. After all, this movement represents a recognition on the part

[7] See "Energy and the Exercise of Power," by Alberto Quirós Corradi, in *Foreign Affairs*, Summer 1979.

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of the exporters, in the aftermath of the shortages and nationalistic fervor of the 1970s, that customers matter after all, and that customers have choices. These investments embody a long-term commitment to supply markets, and a stake within those markets; it would be shortsighted for an oil exporter to jeopardize its holdings and position by pursuing short-term gains and behaving in an unbusinesslike manner. These new vertical links will create new interests for the exporter, interests that can run counter to those implied by the horizontal links of OPEC.

However, as more such arrangements develop, we can be sure that the commercial logic of some will be tested and buffeted by politics. After all, these new integrated entities are state-owned flagship enterprises. There could be turmoil in some producing countries; others could have political rifts with the consuming countries in which their outlets are located. Also, as these arrangements grow in number, they will be tested in the United States and some other countries on two further grounds: their conformity with antitrust and antimonopoly laws, and their reliability as suppliers and distributors in the consuming markets. In addition, they will give rise to calls for reciprocal access, in some form, to "upstream" oil-production opportunities in the investing oil exporters, which in many cases were closed off by the wave of nationalizations in the 1970s.

X

To talk of uncertainty in assessing energy security is not to avoid the issue, but rather to face the fundamental reality. The identification and understanding of the key uncertainties is essential to good energy policymaking, both in government and in the private sector. Between the early 1970s and the mid-1980s, the dominant consensus about the future of the oil market changed four times.[8] Each successive consensus seemed to promise some certainty about the future; yet each collapsed within three years or so because of shifts in underlying factors or political developments—or because, since most players in an industry act on the basis of a shared expectation, the cumulative effect can be to transform the conditions that gave rise to the expectation in the first place.

[8] Arthur Andersen & Co. and Cambridge Energy Research Associates, *The Future of Oil Prices: The Perils of Prophecy*, Houston: Arthur Andersen & Co., 1984.

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In such circumstances—and considering both the positive changes over the last 15 years and the evident risks—what should be the aims of U.S. energy security policy?

Slow the growth of U.S. oil imports. Rapid growth in U.S. imports would be destabilizing, and efforts should be made to prevent this. The immediately available policy tools that will be debated include some mixture of the following: a gasoline tax, an oil import fee, an improved fiscal environment for domestic oil and gas exploration and production, and incentives to reduce the dependence on oil in the transportation sector. Each has its advantages and disadvantages. An increase in the gasoline tax may be politically more acceptable in the current price environment than it was in the late 1970s. A gasoline tax is already in place and is administratively more simple than an import fee. It does not give rise to the political battle over exceptions, as would be the likely case with a tariff. An increase would also be an important source of revenues for an administration and Congress serious about attacking the budget deficit; each cent of additional gasoline tax translates into an additional one billion dollars in revenue. Gasoline taxation in the United States is far below the level of other nations—29 cents a gallon versus, for instance, $1.61 in Japan, $1.68 in Britain, and $2.44 in France.

Strengthen the domestic oil and gas industry. It is important to maintain a strong domestic oil and gas industry, even though it will certainly be a smaller industry than in the late 1970s and early 1980s. The same applies to the often overlooked oil services sector, so that skills and technology will be maintained and developed further.

TABLE II

COMPARATIVE GASOLINE TAXES

Country	Consumer Cost[a]	Tax Component[b]
United States	$0.98	$0.29
West Germany	$2.28	$1.48
Japan	$3.60	$1.61
Britain	$2.60	$1.68
France	$3.10	$2.44
Italy	$4.12	$3.31

[a] Per gallon, including tax.
[b] Per gallon.
Source: Cambridge Energy Research Associates.

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Increase natural gas use. Gas can substitute for oil in many uses, and such an expansion would contribute to the vitality of the domestic oil and gas industry and the regions dependent on it. Conditions are ripe under the new U.S.-Canadian free trade agreement for a much more integrated North American gas market, in which Canadian supplies would play a growing role in the 1990s. This would be very favorable from the viewpoint of energy security. In the longer term, the large gas supplies on Alaska's North Slope, now bottled up by lack of transportation, could provide a significant security reserve.

Promote energy efficiency. Conservation has gone from being treated with derision, or at best not being taken very seriously, to a status of universal high regard, at least in terms of rhetoric. Yet the preliminary post-1986 energy trends, environmental considerations, possible pressures on electricity supply, the spread of technology into the developing world—these are some of the factors that provide a rationale for putting particular emphasis on renewed progress in energy efficiency.

Support R&D. Vigorous research and development programs should be carried out in energy efficiency technologies and know-how, clean combustion of coal, gas utilization, alternative technologies and new nuclear design. The objective should be to support a diversified portfolio of activities—some with nearer and some with longer-term time horizons—recognizing the uncertainty in predicting technological advance. Growing environmental concerns provide further impetus for such research.

Fortify the Strategic Petroleum Reserve. The SPR should contain supplies at least equivalent to 100 days' worth of imports. Provisions should be made for the possibility of "early release" in a crisis.

Renew U.S. commitment to the International Energy Agency. The United States should revitalize its participation, even during these sultry energy days, in the IEA. Nationalistic policies will aggravate crises and pit the industrial countries against each other. The IEA provides a framework for coordination, information-sharing, and emergency response in a crisis. This is particularly important because the international oil companies have made clear, in the aftermath of the 1970s, that they will not and cannot take political responsibility for coordination and sharing in a crisis. The IEA also provides a forum for longer-term coordination of energy policies and technologies, and of shared research and development efforts, which is

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important in an era of budgetary pressures throughout the industrialized world.

Ensure competitive markets. Free and flexible energy markets should be encouraged. The U.S. oil price controls of the 1970s may have had important political support. But they also served to shield American consumers from the realities of the marketplace, and certainly slowed up conservation and market responses. Consumers were partly protected from the immediate price increases, but at the expense of impaired access to oil products—e.g., rationing by waiting in line. Many who advocated price controls in the 1970s now recognize, in retrospect, the logical inconsistency between supporting energy efficiency and trying to repress price signals.

XI

In the early 1980s, the world's energy markets—and its economic and political order—were suspended between crisis and adjustment. Today, at the close of the 1980s, it is clear that adjustment won out, convincingly and at a much more rapid rate than was generally expected, as the effects of the second oil shock were overlaid on the first. Crisis itself—and the expectation of future difficulties—engendered a double-time response. Consumers are now enjoying the benefits: today, energy supply and price levels do not constrain economic growth.

Energy has a special significance in the economy. It is the basis of industrial society. Oil, in particular, carries special importance and thus special risks because of its central role, its strategic character and its geographic distribution—and the recurrent pattern of crisis in its supply. Current circumstances allow us to view the energy scene dispassionately, and to recognize how much has changed. It will be remarkable if we get to the end of the 1990s without our energy security being tested by political or technical crises. Today, however, we do have a considerable security margin, and that allows us the hard-earned luxury of addressing the question of energy security in the 1990s and how it can be maintained and enhanced—not with panic, but with prudence.

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Carlisle Ford Runge

THE ASSAULT ON AGRICULTURAL PROTECTIONISM

Buffeted by drought and protectionism, agriculture is emerging as a key issue in the politics of international trade. Because international agriculture cannot be divorced from domestic farm programs, foreign trade officials and others in the diplomatic community are being forced to confront issues beyond their normal purview. "I sit there talking about soybeans," lamented Italian Foreign Minister Guilio Andreotti during an interminable debate with his European partners, "and I don't even know what the miserable things look like."

The complex nature of agricultural protectionism has long served as a barrier to popular and political understanding—a state of affairs useful to the special interests that benefit the most from this protection. The inconsistencies, inefficiencies and inequities that riddle farm policies have usually been of interest only to a relatively small group of specialists. As President Kennedy reputedly told his principal agricultural policy adviser: "I don't want to hear about agriculture from anyone but you. . . . Come to think of it, I don't want to hear about it from you either."

As long as the costs of farm programs were low and foreign markets for surpluses were growing, politicians and economists could afford these short attention spans. But in the mid-1980s budget costs for agriculture rose dramatically in both the United States and Europe. Shrinking foreign demand led to falling farm incomes, yet price support programs continued to pay farmers far more than the market for their products. In recent years on each side of the Atlantic these costs soared to over $25 billion annually, but even such massive programs have failed to prevent a record number of farm bankruptcies.

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In a desperate attempt to unload surplus production, export subsidies have been used to dump grain and other agricultural commodities on the world market, lowering prices and threatening a global trade war.

The parties to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade have begun to debate the farm trade issue as part of a broad effort to reform the global trading system. As the GATT discussions of farm trade accelerate, it is clear that agriculture must now take a central place in U.S. foreign trade policy; reform in agricultural policies can be the stimulus for broader trade liberalization and reform. If farm policy is to be liberal, rather than protectionist, it must reflect greater market orientation both at home and abroad, and reduce the distortions that now separate the domestic from the global markets. Renewing growth through trade, important to the industrialized economies, is even more important to developing countries, where agriculture remains the foundation of economic progress.

Success in this effort will require broader understanding of the domestic causes of agricultural trade distortion. It will require the political courage to discard some of the myths that have protected ineffective and obsolete policies. It will require coordinated, multilateral efforts to rationalize domestic agricultural policies through international agreements. Otherwise, agricultural trade disputes may lead to increased global protectionism and stagnating growth.

II

Until the most recent round of GATT talks, launched at Punta del Este, Uruguay, in September 1986, farm programs had been treated as a notable exception under trade rules, largely at the insistence of the United States, the European Community and Japan. So special was the case of agriculture that it largely escaped the discipline of the basic principles upon which GATT was founded in 1947. The Uruguay Round, the eighth multilateral trade negotiation since World War II, is the first to take direct aim at the thorny agricultural trade barriers stemming from domestic farm policies. In so doing, it is confronting the legacy of failure in previous rounds. Despite various attempts to bring agricultural trade under GATT rules, since World War II this trade has become more discriminatory, less transparent, less bound, and less subject to multilateral dispute settlement. Restrictions and special waivers for agricultural trade (notably import fees and quotas granted to the United States) make

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U.S. arguments for liberalization in other areas of GATT more difficult.

But the United States is hardly alone. Other contracting parties to GATT employ a wide array of non-tariff barriers for agriculture that are neither transparent nor widely understood. The European Community's Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) permits EC members to replace national tariffs with common border measures, notably "variable levies" on non-EC imports, to help shore up domestic prices in what was until the 1970s a large net agricultural importing region of the world. With continued economic expansion and increasingly generous farm subsidies, however, Europe has emerged as a major agricultural exporter, and export subsidies ("restitutions") are used to dispose of its mounting surpluses. Japan, concerned for its rice producers, has also maintained a complex set of customs duties, import quotas and other border measures, including direct government payments to producers and a wide array of other domestic subsidies.

While the United States, Japan and the EC argue for agricultural protectionism on behalf of their farmers, they nonetheless continue to seek to enlarge the scope and level of world trade. This contradiction is often skillfully exploited in GATT by developing countries, such as India and Brazil, which want greater access to U.S. markets yet wish to protect certain economic sectors of their own from foreign competition. The consultation and dispute settlement process in GATT is weak; parties in conflict have often reverted to bilateral retaliation because they have failed to gain satisfactory settlement under the system of GATT panels established for that purpose.

In the face of increasing cynicism over the capacity of GATT to resolve these issues successfully, the United States launched in July 1987 a make-or-break proposition for international agricultural policy reform. The proposal startled many weary trade negotiators by calling boldly for GATT's contracting parties to eliminate all trade-distorting forms of domestic support to farmers over a period of ten years.

This proposal, which has gained measured bipartisan support in the United States, indicated U.S. resolve to stop treating agriculture as a special case if other contracting parties would do likewise. While careful provision was made to allow direct payments to farmers as a "safety net," all forms of support that encourage production in excess of market demand would be eliminated. In essence, the proposal would shift the objective

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of agricultural policy from supporting farm *prices* to supporting farm *income*, untying payments from specific crops. Payments to farmers would be unrelated to planting requirements, and hence "decoupled" from production. Farmers could still receive direct income support, but would be free to grow whatever crops were in demand.

While roundly condemned as unrealistic in the EC and Japan, the proposal gave courage to and was endorsed in principle by a variety of exporters and importers for whom the U.S.-European Community subsidy wars of the mid-1980s had brought nothing but low prices and stagnant demand. It strengthened a diverse confederation known as the Cairns Group (led by Canada, Australia and New Zealand), which had been a key force in bringing agriculture into the Uruguay Round. It also stimulated the EC and Japan to develop their own proposals (essentially defending the status quo while admitting the necessity of short-term relief) and helped other countries to develop more comprehensive agricultural policy options. All these proposals are now on the table at GATT in Geneva.

In December 1988 trade ministers will meet in Montreal for a midterm review of progress in the Uruguay Round, setting the tone and direction for the subsequent negotiating process. Pressure is growing to go beyond general proposals at Montreal and commit to actual liberalization measures as a "down payment" on the final agreement hoped for in 1990. Yet conflicting European and U.S. political pressures are also mounting. The French presidential election has led to a new left-center coalition whose attitude toward trade liberalization is uncertain. The U.S. election process leads both Republicans and Democrats to seek to protect themselves from charges of "appeasement" to foreign interests. Despite the need for reform, few American politicians will call for reduced subsidies in an election year, especially under current drought conditions. Foreign governments will also be inclined to wait until after the election before negotiating seriously.

Added to these political obstacles are a number of economic factors. First, U.S. negotiators confront a Europe seemingly able to finance a continuation of the status quo. The European Community's budget compromise on agricultural spending reached in February 1988 offers no real prospects for reduced export subsidies or enhanced budget discipline—a leading West German agricultural economist dismissed the compro-

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mise as "a drop of water on a hot stone." The arrangement nonetheless allows the EC to avoid reforming the CAP for several more years and to demand "credit" in GATT for what are essentially cosmetic, short-term efforts to decrease agricultural production.

Second, the U.S. drought allows a temporary respite from the pressure of chronic surpluses and provides a potential windfall for European producers. Longer-term global supplies are not vulnerable to the U.S. drought, since bumper crops may occur in other parts of the world; it is the soil and water conditions giving rise to the drought that pose more serious threats to long-run productivity.

The next administration will thus inherit a set of political and economic problems with interlocking domestic and foreign elements. The chairman of the Senate Agriculture Committee, Patrick Leahy (D-Vt.), has emphasized that if progress in the Uruguay Round is not forthcoming, the House and Senate are prepared to draft a highly protectionist farm bill in 1990, the effect of which would be to renew the subsidy wars of the 1980s. It is the midterm review in Montreal that will provide Congress its first clear signal whether progress is achievable. The opportunity now exists to evaluate and appraise the remarkable assault on agricultural protectionism that has been proposed in Geneva, to determine why this battle should be fought, and whether it will be won.

III

Why has agriculture been a special case, immune for so long from the liberalization that has been applied to other sectors under GATT? The traditional claim is that food and fiber production is too important to be left to market forces, that without substantial government manipulation the system would fail. There is also a strong emotional bond between farmers and society as a whole. The political influence of farm groups and broader concerns with "food security" are often used to argue that artificial price supports and self-sufficiency are preferable to the caprice of markets and international trade. Yet few argue that current programs need no improvement. When grain production in the United States, Europe and Japan in 1985 built world stocks to almost twice the levels of consumption, government encouragement to grow crops was seen as excessive.

Many compassionate citizens point to the plight of heavily

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indebted small farmers as justification for additional government price supports. The record of over fifty years of such transfers demonstrates, however, that domestic farm programs based on guaranteed prices paid on a per-acre basis are increasingly skewed toward large farmers, who are then in a stronger position to gobble up their neighbors.

When payments are made on the basis of acres in production, as they are in both the United States and under the European CAP, there is a powerful incentive to acquire and plant more acres. The bigger the farm, the bigger the payment. Ironically, the evidence suggests that these payments are extremely regressive, and hardly salvation for the "family farm." Government price supports have speeded the demise of smaller farming operations and thus decreased rural employment.[1]

These programs have also reduced the level of diversification typical of traditional agriculture. American farmers are paid by the government to produce a selected number of "supported" commodities, including rice, cotton, corn, wheat, soybeans, barley, oats, dairy products and tobacco. Roughly 80 percent of these payments are made to fewer than 20 percent of the nation's farmers. These farmers respond rationally to the incentives provided by price guarantees in relatively few commodities: they specialize in the supported crops. Often they produce little else, since specialized agriculture with government price guarantees is nearly always preferable to diversification. In contrast, the uncertainty of the market would demand diversification to assure survival. "Program crops" are produced intensively, utilizing large quantities of pesticides, fertilizer and other inputs. This intensive production is expensive to the farmer and encourages the accumulation of debt to purchase additional land, irrigation and other equipment, as well as fertilizer and chemicals. It is also expensive to society, since it encourages cultivation practices that lead to erosion and chemical pollution of lakes, streams and the underground water of local communities, and to excessive water use contributing to drought.

Many of the program crops are already in excess supply and cannot be profitably sold. Hence the government stands ready to acquire them in lieu of repayment of loans taken out (at

[1] See Willard Cochrane, "Saving the Modest-Sized Farm—Or the Case for Part-Time Farming," *Choices*, Herndon, Va.: American Agricultural Economics Association, 2nd quarter, 1987.

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subsidized interest) in order to plant them in the first place. After surrendering these crops to government storage, farmers receive a "deficiency payment" for their effort. In recent years market prices have been so weak that huge quantities of program commodities have entered government warehouses, and deficiency payments have accounted for a larger and larger share of net farm income. The Department of Agriculture reports that total government payments as a percentage of net farm income from all sources rose from six percent in 1980, to 26 percent in 1984, and to 31.5 percent in 1986.

For many individual farmers the percentage is much higher, making them utterly dependent on a system that continues to reward the production of commodities that nobody wants. Total U.S. agricultural program spending in 1986 exceeded $25 billion, up almost eightfold from the highest level achieved in the 1970s. This year, large payments will likely be made as drought relief, with or without a harvest. It is little wonder that many farmers cynically refer to "farming the government" as more profitable than plowing their fields.

While different in design, the EC's Common Agricultural Policy has the same effect. By paying prices far higher than world market levels and allowing European farmers to sell surpluses to the EC, the CAP has led to the accumulation of staggering quantities of agricultural commodities. A particularly absurd result of these policies is the recent EC purchase of surplus low-grade butter, which is then disposed of by feeding it to calves.

In both the United States and Europe, a major aspect of "farming the government" involves being paid not to farm at all. Programs have evolved that require farmers growing crops that are in surplus to remove from production a proportion of their acreage planted in order to receive a deficiency payment. These "set asides" amount to an attempt to hit the production control brakes while simultaneously stepping on the price support accelerator. Farmers respond rationally, by diverting those acres that are least productive. As a result, the brakes slip. Experience has shown that from two to three acres must be moved out of production in order to reduce output by the yield of an "average" acre. Acres left in production, meanwhile, are farmed more intensively than ever, raising both yields and the level of environmental damage. Proposals to make such programs mandatory, in effect shutting down millions of acres of productive land, have recently been endorsed

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by "supply control" advocates both in the United States and Europe, although the failed record of existing programs raises major questions about the wisdom of artificial supply restraints, especially in the face of this year's short crop.

IV

Spurred on by supports for some commodities that are as much as four times world prices, EC and American farmers have accounted for the lion's share of surplus production, and will continue to do so as long as support prices exceed market prices. At the end of 1987 EC stockpiles held over one million metric tons of surplus butter, 708,000 tons of skimmed milk powder, 725,000 tons of beef and more than ten million tons of cereals.[2] The Commodity Credit Corporation, the U.S. Department of Agriculture's surplus purchaser, held three billion bushels of grain and paid $2.5 billion in annual storage fees alone on another 2.3 billion bushels held on farms.

These data do not reflect the losses of other trading nations due to the price and income effects of current policies on world markets. Taxpayers everywhere pay the high price of agricultural support programs, although relatively cheap food is some compensation. The biggest losers have been poor farmers in developing countries, where earnings have been driven to new lows by the subsidy wars of the developed countries. Poorer countries cannot afford to insulate their farmers from world markets to the extent possible in richer, more industrialized nations. Instead, many insulate urban elites by keeping food prices artifically low. Even if subsidized, developing country farmers bear the brunt of world agricultural price swings.

It is currently estimated that liberalized agricultural trade would yield a ten-percent increase in world farm prices, leading to farm income gains of $26 billion in developing countries. Because of dramatic increases in agricultural protection during the 1980s, the real effects on developing countries of liberalization in the Uruguay Round could be more than double those resulting from a similar liberalization a decade earlier.[3]

Agricultural development in the Third World, the objective of billions of dollars in foreign aid, is thus deeply undercut by

[2] *Financial Times* (London), Nov. 24, 1987, p. 3.

[3] Tom Loo and Edward Tower, *Agricultural Protectionism and the Developing Countries*, Canberra, Australia: Centre for International Economics, 1988; and Rodney Tyers and Kym Anderson, "Liberalizing OECD Agricultural Policies in the Uruguay Round: Effects on Trade and Welfare," *Journal of Agricultural Economics* (Great Britain), May 1988, pp. 197–216.

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export subsidies and the dumping of surpluses. Reflecting domestic policy, foreign agricultural policies have pursued contradictory objectives, promoting development and dependency at the same time. The only unambiguous winners have been grain importers, notably the Soviet Union, who have played the Western allies off against each other to receive absurdly low subsidized prices. So cheap is the grain bought by the Soviets that they purchase more than they need and then "donate" it to poor countries, making the United States seem niggardly in the bargain.

In the face of these failures, the case for greater market orientation is strong. Yet a move toward a more market-oriented agricultural policy does not mean that farm income would have to be abandoned as an objective. Rather than the indirect object of price supports coupled to specific crops, farm income would become the direct object of agricultural policies.

The key is the phased elimination of programs that pay farmers to plant (or not plant) specific crops, and the substitution of direct income supports targeted to relatively low-income farmers. Interestingly, this is one aspect of the drought relief package fashioned in Congress over the summer. Drought relief payments will be a percentage of income forgone due to crop loss, with some restrictions designed to target them to low-income producers. These payments are, in effect, income supports decoupled from production. In this sense, they clearly establish the principle of decoupling as practicable, and should be built upon, rather than considered a one-time election-year handout. In any event, it is increasingly clear that farm income security cannot be accomplished through price supports that create incentives to plant too many acres of too few varieties of crops.

Despite the dubious achievements of present farm programs, domestic political pressures have been insufficient to force needed changes. While the general public remains largely unaware of the failure of farm programs (and often assumes that farm bankruptcies result from too little in the way of price supports), large payments to large producers continue to ensure well-organized lobbying and campaign contribution efforts. The lobbies defending these programs, organized commodity by commodity, are tenaciously attached in Washington to the subcommittees that determine the levels of price support. As commodity-specific lobbies have gained influence, the older, general farm organizations have declined. As long as farm

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policy is formulated on a commodity-by-commodity basis, rather than as across-the-board farm income payments, the subcommittee system will assure congressional pressure to keep these prices high. Price support programs appeal to the local politics of congressional districts dependent on particular crops, rather than on broader policy and trade objectives.

Breaking this hold on the public purse would be an important consequence of direct income supports paid to farm families now being called for in GATT. Such a program would also restore some of the influence of general farm organizations with broad-based interests. Although direct income supports could initially be as expensive as current programs, they would at least be transparent. This would allow taxpayers and farmers to decide more openly what level of aid they favor, and to convey this message to Congress.

While often criticized as no more than "welfare," direct payments are clearly superior to the current system, which is worse than welfare in the sense that the biggest farms get the biggest payments. Some urban members of Congress have gone further, asking whether farmers deserve government payments simply because they are farmers (as opposed to, say, grocers) and arguing that the long-term objective should be to pay farm families, not because they farm, but because they are poor. Even in the short run, the "welfare" tag need not stick to direct payments. There is no reason, for example, that farm income supports should not be tied to increased obligations to improve the rural environment, converting a one-way payment into an exchange of income security for a variety of needed social and environmental benefits. In addition to benefiting the non-farm public, improvements in soil and water conservation, wildlife habitat and rural infrastructure would yield direct economic benefits to farmers, who have suffered the brunt of rural environmental pollution, lost economic opportunities and infrastructure declines brought on by specialized production and eroding rural tax bases. This relationship is particularly significant in Europe, where environmental damages and rural unemployment resulting from farming specialized crops are major political issues.

In sum, price support programs are disguised transfers that protect domestic agricultural constituencies from market forces with little scrutiny from taxpayers, and even less regard for their environmental and global trade effects. Their domestic

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failings aside, it is these global effects that have emerged to take center stage in GATT.

V

American agriculture is, and will remain, heavily dependent on exports. The advantages of U.S. agriculture are enormous, but not so great that they cannot be squandered through misdirected policies. North America is one of the world's great breadbaskets, united by temperate climates, rich soils and advanced farm skills and technology. Vernon Ruttan, a foremost authority, describes American agriculture as "one of the nation's last indisputable world-class industries." While a few might argue that government price supports have made it so, the underlying causes are rapid productivity gains fueled by public- and private-sector research. Over the last 25 years, productivity gains greater than in any other sector of comparable size have made U.S. farm goods highly competitive in foreign markets.

These markets, especially in developing countries, increasingly support prosperity in the Farm Belt.[4] From 1962 to 1971 an average of 49.5 percent of U.S. wheat, 13.0 percent of U.S. corn, and 31.1 percent of U.S. soybeans flowed into the global market. From 1971 to 1983, these proportions increased to 58.4 percent for wheat, 27.0 percent for corn and 39.4 percent for soybeans. The acreage planted in these crops increased 54 percent between 1970 and 1981.

Beginning in 1980, however, foreign demand for grain crops began a steep decline. As foreign demand declined, land, machinery and other fixed investments could not be removed from production as rapidly as they had been brought on line. Instead, they fell in price, setting off a commodity and land market bust that matched the boom of the 1970s. Thus came the "farm crisis" of the 1980s. Without the export market, the sickening skid in prices of farmland over the last few years would have been even worse. Both in the U.S. Farm Belt and in less-developed countries around the world, bank loans made on the basis of commodities price bullishness turned sour. Barbara Insel, writing in these pages in 1985, deplored a "world awash in grain" and raised the disconcerting possibility

[4] See Carlisle Ford Runge, ed., *The Future of the North American Granary: Politics, Economics and Resource Constraints in North American Agriculture,* Ames: Iowa State University Press, 1986.

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that an agricultural production deluge might swamp the United States in its own abundance.[5]

In the face of this overproduction, both the United States and European Community turned to export subsidies as a way of ridding themselves of unwanted surpluses, setting in motion a subsidy war that lowered grain prices worldwide. Urban elites of the developing economies, accustomed to subsidized food, received low prices at the expense of rural producers. The overproduction of the developed world flowed at subsidy onto world markets, keeping prices low and destroying the incentives of poor farmers in the Third World.

While global surpluses resulting from high price supports have been unprecedented in the last several years, acreage retirements and other government policies have attempted to restrict production artificially. Now, in the face of drought, these restrictions make a short crop even more problematic. It is clear that instability in global agricultural markets is only partly the result of natural supply interruptions, and is primarily the consequence of government price-support and supply-control policies and shifts in demand.

The perception of senseless waste surrounding agricultural policy is now widespread, and has led to the major assault on agricultural protectionism in the Uruguay Round. The conclusion has been forced on major agricultural traders that the sector can no longer be granted special dispensation. If the reform effort fails, there are powerful political interests on both sides of the Atlantic prepared to take up positions for a long, costly and ultimately dangerous agricultural subsidy war.

VI

What direction will agricultural reform in GATT take, if it takes any at all? As negotiators prepare for the December meeting in Montreal, the broad outlines of the debate are now emerging. Despite the advantages of liberalization, some countries and interests will continue to seek a system of managed agricultural trade, analogous to domestic attempts to manipulate supply and demand artificially. In contrast, U.S. negotiators have argued that the global agricultural economy is too complex to be managed, and that the rules and disciplines of GATT should be extended to allow greater market orientation in agriculture.

[5] "A World Awash in Grain," *Foreign Affairs*, Spring 1985.

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The U.S. proposal advocates eliminating all tariff and non-tariff barriers over a ten-year period, including trade-distorting health and sanitary measures, all export subsidies and all domestic measures that affect trade. Only food aid and decoupled domestic programs with minimum effects on output would be permitted by the end of this period. This is clearly the loudest call for liberalization, and represents a major change from the way agricultural trade (especially American and European) is currently conducted. The U.S. proposal carries the advantage of consistency and high purpose, but makes clear how illiberal the past and current policies of the United States and many of its trading partners have been. Despite its effectiveness as an opening gambit, its distance from current reality has not been lost on current beneficiaries of farm programs, or on our negotiating partners. It is now time for the United States to move beyond high principles to develop specific policy innovations and options.

The Cairns Group proposal (and a separate but essentially similar proposal by Canada) also reflects a resolve to move radically toward greater market orientation in agriculture. The Cairns Group is notable for including exporters, importers, developed and developing countries: Australia, New Zealand, Canada, Argentina, Uruguay, Brazil, Thailand, Hungary, Chile, Colombia, Indonesia, Malaysia and the Philippines. Like the United States, this group calls for eventual elimination of all domestic subsidies and border measures with trade distorting effects. Unlike the U.S. proposal, however, it has called for a set of early relief measures representing a "down payment" on the eventual package. While its implementation schedule is more explicit than the U.S. proposal's, its objectives are similarly liberal: a new framework of GATT rules that would eliminate all import and export restrictions and all domestic subsidies with an impact on trade. Only measures for infrastructure improvement, disaster relief and decoupled direct income support to farmers and consumers would be allowed.

At the other pole of the debate, the European Community focuses heavily on short-term multilateral actions to correct oversupply in commodities such as sugar, dairy products and cereals, where its own price supports are highest. Reflecting its desire to maintain the CAP in essentially its present form (including its system of export subsidies and price supports), the EC proposal envisages one-year "emergency" commitments to reduce cereals prices, sugar exports and production in other

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surplus sectors, followed by longer-term measures in which protection for some sectors (notably those "miserable" soybeans) might actually be increased.

From the U.S. perspective, the EC proposal offers little in the way of liberalization, and could easily lead to more restrictive trade. American critics noted that the proposal mistakes surpluses as the problem, rather than as a symptom of underlying price support at too high levels. The essential philosophy of the EC proposal is managed trade, in which the divorce of domestic and international prices underlying the CAP is accommodated by the rest of the world. The CAP itself, often pointed to by the EC as its greatest achievement in market integration, comes in for no major reform. While this vision of trade reform has the virtue of realism, in the sense that it departs little from business as usual, it has been roundly condemned by both the United States and the Cairns Group, as well as by developing countries that foresee a "managed" solution as primarily beneficial to the industrialized exporters.

The fourth major proposal tabled in Geneva comes from Japan. While not a participant in the export subsidy wars, Japan occupies a uniquely protectionist niche in the world market for rice and other agricultural commodities. The Japanese have clearly opposed greater market orientation in practice, if not in principle. Part of the Japanese approach has been to emphasize the noneconomic objectives of farm policies, including rural employment, environmental quality and "food security." This last point is of particular importance in the context of Japanese attitudes to dependence on foreign suppliers of food and feed. Japanese officials often cite as evidence of the untrustworthiness of foreign suppliers the experience of 1973, when the Nixon Administration embargoed shipments of U.S. soybeans in the face of a short crop and skyrocketing U.S. prices. It would appear that the Japanese will require a GATT agreement guaranteeing contracted-for shipments in exchange for concessions on American demands, which so far have met considerable resistance.

Clearly, the distance between these positions is great. There will be a strong tendency at Montreal to wait and see what a new American administration will bring. But there are important reasons why the basic U.S. approach to agricultural trade reform, worked out in bipartisan discussion with commodity and congressional interests, should not be greatly altered, regardless of the election outcome. Rather, this approach

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should be made more specific. These reasons have been noted publicly by both Democratic and Republican leaders.

First is the ineffectiveness and cost of current policies, which have accounted for two-thirds of the total expenditures of the European Community operating budget, and over one-sixth of the U.S. budget deficit. While these costs have moderated somewhat, they remain the object of public criticism for the unfairness with which program benefits are distributed, in addition to their adverse employment and environmental impacts.

Second is the central role of the U.S. agricultural proposal to U.S. strategy in the Uruguay Round as a whole, which has 14 other negotiating areas linked, in one way or another, to agriculture. The United States is pushing reforms in GATT affecting areas such as services, intellectual property rights, and the capacity of the GATT system to resolve disputes—worth literally trillions of dollars in U.S. business. Trade-offs between agriculture and these other areas are crucial to the ultimate package that the United States takes away from the bargaining table. The United States has drawn the attention of other GATT parties to the need to remove the waivers and exceptions behind which American agricultural interests have sought protection in the past, assuming these parties are prepared to offer significant concessions of their own. It will not be allowed to back down from this position at the Montreal meeting or afterward without major negotiating losses.

A new American administration will not be able to avoid the foreign and domestic problems of agriculture. The new president will find agriculture a linchpin in a round of multilateral trade talks in progress, the failure of which would have global economic implications. There are, moreover, a wide range of domestic agricultural interests for whom the U.S. proposal offers the hope of a dynamic and diversified agriculture less dependent on government price supports. The U.S. proposal has been endorsed by a wide range of domestic farm groups, on the assumption that other GATT members will reform their agriculture in tandem with the United States.

VII

The assault on agricultural protectionism faces long odds. The interaction of multilateral trade negotiations and domestic policies can lead to mutually reinforcing reforms. But a reverse dynamic—toward less liberal trade and greater protection-

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ism—is also possible if progress appears stalled.[6] Here the distance between the U.S. and European proposals in GATT looms as a major challenge for the new administration, as well as for the December meeting in Montreal.

Yet there remain specific areas in which discussion and progress is ultimately possible, especially if the Montreal session can focus clearly on guiding principles for reform.

First, direct payments to farmers will remain the principal alternative to current policies, although movement in this direction will be difficult. In order to make it operational, decoupled policy alternatives must be clarified so that negotiators and affected farmers understand what such an approach would mean. From the negotiators' perspective, decoupling is a matter of degree, since some programs distort planting decisions more than others. The key negotiating objective from this perspective should be the phased elimination of those measures with the greatest distorting effects on trade, and the substitution of direct income supports in their place.

From the farmers' perspective, decoupling will mean greater reliance on market prices and the search for a profitable mix of crops, independent of government price supports. Direct payments that provide enhanced income security will be accompanied by prices which may in fact be higher and more stable than under current programs. The overall effect will be to enhance diversified cropping mixes, creating demand for research into new crop alternatives and widening the base of agricultural productivity gains. Apart from these domestic program changes, the impact on trade of all agricultural policies must be ordered, allowing acceptable bounds to be established as a basis for the phased elimination of the most distorting measures.

A second guiding principle is that social welfare objectives of agricultural policies should be a part of the discussion in GATT. These may appear tangential, but can be crucial to selling policy reforms to domestic interests. In the United States the agriculture committees of Congress must be able to convince their constituents (both commodity and consumer groups) that the United States has gotten a "fair deal" in GATT.

[6] Robert L. Paarlberg, *Fixing Farm Trade: Policy Options for the United States,* New York: Council on Foreign Relations/Cambridge, Mass.: Ballinger Publishing Company, 1988; and Dale E. Hathaway, *Agriculture and the GATT: Rewriting the Rules,* Washington, D.C.: Institute for International Economics, September 1987.

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If this deal involves direct income supports to farmers, then the approach must find acceptance with farmers and the nonfarm public alike. Linking agricultural reforms to environmental and rural employment objectives can not only enhance their attractiveness, but their impact on rural development and revitalization. Similar programs can assist European and even Japanese politicians to sell direct income supports to farmers. Nor can the issue of food security be sidestepped, especially in Japan. It will be important to guarantee supplies to major importers as part of a final agreement, consistent with the rules of GATT.

Third, the developing countries must be convinced that agricultural trade reforms are in their interest. Despite the advantages of liberalization, many of these Third World producers remain skeptical. Insofar as possible, these governments can be encouraged by the promise of market access. If necessary, special and differential treatment for developing countries is allowed under GATT rules. But there are real risks in this approach. If these countries are exempted from GATT disciplines in agriculture, then why should the United States, the European Community and Japan trouble with multilateral negotiations at all? In this respect, short-term gains for developing countries may wind up as long-term losses, as the major players move outside of GATT to conduct negotiations, closing off market access. In addition, if Third World states are allowed to continue agricultural pricing policies that have been criticized by the International Monetary Fund and World Bank, GATT will have undercut these other multilateral institutions.

On the other hand, a real opportunity exists to bring the developing countries into the same framework of increased market orientation as the developed countries (albeit in different ways). The role of GATT in improving the developing countries' market mechanisms may be even more important to growth in world trade than reforms in the agricultural economies of the developed world. Removing government disincentives to production designed to favor urban elites, especially in Africa, would be worth billions of dollars in foreign development aid.

Given the entrenched interests and the profound difficulties facing agricultural policies, however, the temptation to blame foreign governments for failed domestic policies remains strong. Negotiators in both the United States and the European Community can engage in recriminatory charges and counter-

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charges, followed by renewed subsidy wars, without serious short-term losses in domestic political terms. Similarly, Japanese policymakers can continue erroneously to tout self-sufficiency as the only road to food security, using their previous experiences with embargoes as examples of the perfidy of foreign suppliers. Net importers in the developing countries can rally their constituents by laying the blame (with reason) for low agricultural prices on the industrialized countries, yet failing to acknowledge that a wide variety of distortions in their own economies discriminate against farmers and in favor of urban elites.

The historical record of multilateral diplomacy is a checkered one. Yet it is GATT that provides the only current hope in forcing reforms, if all parties continue to support the process. Whether the assault on agricultural protectionism will succeed in the Uruguay Round will depend less on diplomatic skill than political courage. The myths surrounding current agricultural programs must be cast aside, and replaced by realistic policies that assure income security without locking in signals that distort markets and destroy the incentives of farmers around the world to produce what is in fact scarce. Political courage may be the scarcest commodity of all.

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Dominique Moïsi

FRENCH FOREIGN POLICY: THE CHALLENGE OF ADAPTATION

Seven years ago, the election of a Socialist as president of France caused anxiety among France's allies. The inclusion of Communist ministers into the French government, radical domestic changes and strong pro-Third World commitments initially aroused anxious suspicions, only gradually dissipated by President François Mitterrand's hard-line approach toward the Soviet Union and his firmness during the Euromissile crisis.

In 1988 by contrast, the reelection of Mitterrand and the installation of a Socialist-led governing coalition headed by Prime Minister Michel Rocard has been greeted with relief. To the outside world as well as to a majority of Frenchmen, Mitterrand appears as a more statesmanlike and reassuring leader than his conservative former prime minister, Jacques Chirac. After all, during the week prior to the election on May 8, Chirac's government had managed to reawaken all the old international prejudices about France's national arrogance and selfishness. As seen from Western capitals, Chirac was simultaneously negotiating with terrorists in the Middle East to obtain the release of French hostages, paving the way for a neocolonial war in New Caledonia and betraying his international promises by prematurely allowing Dominique Prieur, one of the secret agents who in 1985 had sabotaged an anti-nuclear protest ship, to return from punitive exile.

But even the feeling of domestic and international relief at Mitterrand's reelection cannot completely assuage the combination of perplexity and uncertainty with which the world regards France's international role. As France enters the second half of what will probably be described by historians as the "Mitterrand era," can she confront the political and economic challenge of joining a united Europe? Is France's desire to be a global mini-superpower compatible with her desire to cooperate in the European Community?

In 1981, foreign policy matters, though far from predomi-

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nant, had been present in the election campaign; President Valéry Giscard d'Estaing had suffered from his unfortunate and untimely meeting with Leonid Brezhnev following the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. In 1988 foreign policy debates were conspicuously absent from the campaign, as if to shield the ambiguous consensus among the political elite and express the general public's lack of interest.

In 1981, there was some disagreement on aims; in 1988 the unvoiced questions centered mainly around issues of means. Does France have the means to achieve her ambitions? It seems that, precisely at the moment when France most needs a strong and unified executive backed by a stable majority in Parliament, and a firm and confident economy with which to confront the growing challenge of international trade competition, she may be the least able to adapt herself successfully to a changing and more arduous world environment.

During the Euromissile crisis, with its superpower confrontation, France's steadfast loyalty to NATO policy played a major role in the West's successful deployment of the missiles. Today a combination of East-West rapprochement on arms control, Middle East terrorist activities, and pacifist and anticolonial opposition to a French presence in the South Pacific have exposed France's inherent vulnerabilities. These changes have underscored the political and diplomatic costs of conducting a highly visible foreign policy at a time of growing discrepancy between means and aims, speeches and reality, the nation's ambition and the nation's wealth.

The key question for France is whether she can realistically pretend to maintain her independent search for "grandeur" and security. As Pierre Hassner put it in a recent essay: "From Napoléon III to Mitterrand via de Gaulle, French policy can be interpreted as an attempt to resurrect past grandeur in the absence of the means that had once made it possible."[1] The time may have come when this contradiction will finally explode, forcing upon the French a redefinition of their goals. This reconsideration may force France's ambition to become truly European.

II

Nowhere more than in East-West security matters will the challenge of reality prove more compelling. Following the

[1] "The View From Paris," in Lincoln Gordon, ed., *Eroding Empire: Western Relations with Eastern Europe*, Washington: The Brookings Institution, 1987.

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resolution of the Euromissile question, France's return to a discreet but clearly special position among her European partners may have seemed initially to correspond to a traditional pattern. France's more reserved stance toward the prospective agreement on intermediate-range nuclear (INF) missiles had therefore a reassuring and familiar quality for those who were used to France's declarations of difference and specificity. Whenever a major East-West crisis breaks, France behaves as a faithful and reliable ally within the alliance. Such was the case, for example, during the various Berlin crises or during the Cuban missile crisis. But whenever these emergencies recede, to be replaced by more "normal" East-West tensions, a dissenting French voice is heard above her allies', a perfect illustration of France's balancing act between her two loyalties, to herself and to the alliance.

From 1981 to the end of 1983, from Mitterrand's election to the high point of the Euromissile crisis, France's hard line toward the Soviet Union constituted a divine surprise for the United States, which found in Socialist France her most steadfast and reliable partner and an island of stability amid mounting pacifist waves, especially those in the Federal Republic of Germany.

France's hard line was the product of peculiar strategic, domestic and even cultural considerations. In the late 1970s and early 1980s the two superpowers were engaged in a major test of political will and diplomacy over Euromissiles. Mitterrand was worried about the evolution of the balance of power in the world and in particular in Europe, at a time when the Soviet Union appeared to some to have a strategic edge and West Germany, in its continuing identity crisis, seemed to be flirting with both nationalism and pacifism. For Mitterrand, the realist, France had to be aware of her new responsibilities.[2]

At that time also, America during the first term of Ronald Reagan's presidency expressed the regained assertiveness and nationalism of a country whose president looked and often acted young despite his age, compared to the gerontocratic Soviet leadership. Furthermore, Socialist France had to prove her reliability as a Western ally, to counteract anxieties about the Communist presence in her government. At a deeper cultural level, largely because the French intelligentsia had to make up for its long infatuation with the "motherland of

[2] Dominique Moïsi, "Mitterrand's Foreign Policy: The Limits of Continuity," *Foreign Affairs*, Winter 1981/82.

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socialism," the French were more negative toward the Soviet Union than were most of their European partners. In this context and for a few exceptional years, French-American relations could only thrive.

France's return to a more distinctive, some would say Gaullist, position on East-West matters—one not to be confused with her mid-1960s equidistance between the superpowers—developed as a result of many self-reinforcing factors. The West's diplomatic victory led to a transition from the Euromissile quarrel to a debate over America's infatuation with the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) and, later, to the arms control dialogue between the superpowers.

No longer worried by the balance of forces in Europe, and reassured by the January 1987 conservative victory in the Federal Republic of Germany, the French saw in the American desire to transcend the nuclear world a threat to their own security and mini-superpower status. SDI reawakened in them the specter of an isolationist "Fortress America" willing to decouple its security from that of Europe. For the French, the idea that space weapons could successfully fight a war above the heads of man reflected the inherent optimism of the American character, which clashes with the more cynical and tragic worldview of the Europeans. Conservative by necessity, in spite of their attachment to arms control, the French could only view with growing discomfort America's revisionist stance, seeing it as based on a disregard for nuclear realities.

After March 1986, when the neo-Gaullists won a parliamentary majority, the "cohabitation" phase between Prime Minister Chirac and President Mitterrand added an element of confusion to France's attitude toward SDI, even though Mitterrand's and Chirac's differences over the scheme were largely exaggerated for domestic political purposes. In their respective comments both men had largely concentrated on different aspects of SDI: the president's reservations stemmed from the strategic implications for France, whereas Chirac's more favorable comments were aimed at securing some of the technological spinoffs from the U.S. project. (In fact, French firms such as Matra had not waited for the official green light to join in the bid for SDI-derived contracts.)

These frictions, and their negative effect on French-American relations, reinforced gradually shifting images of the United States and the Soviet Union in the French psyche. Many Europeans were unsettled by what they saw as the Reagan

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Administration's irresponsibility at the 1986 Reykjavik summit. For the French, as for their European partners, Reykjavik constituted a daring, premature diplomatic venture, confirming the impression that the Administration, acting out of a mixture of amateurism, moralism and quest for immediate domestic political gain, was trying to define a new world beyond nuclear deterrence, and thus destabilizing a global order based on the balance of terror. Beyond the fear that the superpowers would once again try to manage the world jointly, there was an apprehension that the benefits of the Euromissile victory would be lost, resulting in a growing military imbalance in Europe. This fear was especially real for the French, who were concerned that sooner or later, in one way or another, their own nuclear forces would be included in future negotiations.

Reykjavik and its aftershocks revived in France an old, and rather negative, image of the United States. The Iran-contra scandal only confirmed French apprehensions. Not only were the Americans unpredictable and adventurist, their diplomacy was unreliable and probably incompetent. This return to a more traditional French view of the United States, characterized by a measure of condescension and irritation, occurred precisely at a time when the Soviet image was improving.

The Soviet Union, under the new and energetic leadership of Mikhail Gorbachev, was able to project an improved image, even though French reservations concerning the Soviet Union and skepticism about glasnost were still more pronounced than those of any other West European country. The 1970s and early 1980s had been marked by the discovery of the "evil" nature of the Soviet Union; this gave way slowly in 1985–86 to a growing hope that the evil could be reformed. Public opinion surveys suggested that the French were not impervious to the winning ways of Mikhail Gorbachev; in fact, "Gorbomania" had reached France. Was the Soviet Union going to improve significantly its record on human rights, moderate its world ambitions and reform its economy and society? Questions that had been unthinkable in the past were now being raised, though with a large dose of historical skepticism. Nevertheless, without waiting for final answers, Paris felt ready to resume a dialogue with the Soviets and a normalization of relations that were more in tune with a traditional French vision of its role and interests. What if at long last changes were occurring, glasnost meant something and the new treatment of artists and dissidents was more than a propaganda trick? At a time when

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the dark side of American democracy dominated the headlines, it was tempting to welcome Soviet liberal reforms.

III

Yet this return to a more equidistant attitude could not, in political terms, be equated to that of the 1960s or early 1970s. For in the current arms control negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union, France fears that Europe would be left to face, on its own, Soviet conventional superiority, and that French nuclear forces would most likely be included in any future arms negotiation. It is the process of the negotiations, more than their content, that the French fear.

In fact, in the debate on the double-zero option for INF, the very reasons that spared France from the pacifist movement in the early 1980s and made her more steadfast than any other European country in her resistance to Soviet ambitions in the Euromissile crisis account for why she was initially the most reserved country in the climate of a blossoming arms control. In the Euromissile debate, France had the least to fear and the most to gain from a firm stance. Because of France's special status within NATO, Euromissiles were not going to be deployed on French territory. Because of the existing consensus on nuclear deterrence and the quasi monopoly of the French Communist Party on the nation's pacifist movement, popular opposition was the least significant in Europe. Because of her somewhat inflated international ego France was not threatened by any kind of cultural identity crisis, unlike many of her European neighbors. The INF negotiations reversed this proposition and France rightly or wrongly felt she had the least to gain and the most to lose from the agreement and its "dangerous logic."

Yet the public comments of French officials have not reflected the depth of French worries. Even President Mitterrand became increasingly favorable to the INF process. As the presidential elections approached, Mitterrand was espousing arms control and disarmament in Europe, as if returning to his late 1970s Socialist stance. His partisans argued that it was unrealistic for a middle-sized power to express reservations or apprehension regarding the irresistible coming together of the two superpowers on arms control—especially if such expressions would likely be without effect. Out of concern for European unity and given the state of West German public opinion, Mitterrand also deemed it necessary that France's position not

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be divorced from that of the Federal Republic. How, furthermore, could a country that had so actively favored disarmament in the 1970s appear so negative toward the first agreement ever on arms reductions? Such an attitude was, according to some French conservative critics, reinforced by electoral considerations, Mitterrand's need for the support of the left—Socialists and Communists alike—to be elected: he could not afford to alienate himself from an electorate favoring arms control and East-West dialogue.

In the debate on the value and risks of the INF agreement for France and Europe, one dimension has been omnipresent: the European one. The INF negotiation has accelerated an awareness of, and a greater openness to, the issue of a common European defense, but this has not yet translated itself into dramatic breakthroughs. In spite of symbolic gestures such as the recent joint French-German military maneuvers and the creation of a Council of Defense between the two countries, there is a contrast between the urgency and novelty of idea behind these measures and the modest scope of the measures actually undertaken. It would be unfair to single out France's responsibility for this state of affairs. Yet the nature of government by "cohabitation" slowed down the European initiatives of France between 1986 and 1988, whereas the crisis of the French economy and its decreasing competitiveness within Europe limited the nation's international and European clout.

French-German relations in their complexity and intensity are a perfect illustration of this state of affairs. Never has the dialogue been more frequent between the French and the Germans, but this frequency has not fostered qualitatively deeper relations. In fact, as the very bases of European postwar stability—U.S. protection of Europe and reliance on nuclear deterrence—are being questioned, France and West Germany's visions of the world appear increasingly divergent.

De Gaulle's France of the mid-1960s was a revisionist power, intent on modifying the existing European security system. Today France is, at heart, a status-quo power, whereas Germany's deepest hope must be to transcend the division of Europe between East and West. The long-term prospect of a denuclearized world cannot be seen in the same light in Paris and Bonn. As long as Germany's hope remains France's fear, as long as the French want to preserve, above all, a policy of independence, as long as France's defense posture remains purposely ambiguous vis-à-vis a West German state whose

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demands are equally unclear, as long as a mixture of structural differences—France a nuclear power outside of NATO, the Federal Republic, the reverse—and as long as emotions dominate, the French-German nucleus of Europe will be bound to remain central but inadequate.

The joint effort of these two countries stands as a major postwar achievement, living proof that Europeans can transcend their divisive past. But such bilateralism is no longer enough. A multilateral approach is needed to transcend the French-German structural deadlock and accommodate British sensitivity to what London tends to see as an excessive flirtation between Bonn and Paris.

There are two prerequisites for a new multilateral policy in Europe: the goodwill of the United States and a redefinition of NATO that would give the European pillar more weight.

The United States must be convinced of its duty to encourage European security efforts by deeds, not just by words. America should, for example, persuade Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher that there is no contradiction between Britain's duties to the alliance and its responsibilities to Europe. Equally crucial, Washington should make sure that the flow in NATO arms procurement goes both ways across the Atlantic. Europeans and Americans alike must understand that the best way to ensure Europe's future is to strengthen the alliance today—and to have Europeans play a greater role in the work of the alliance.

France must show greater pragmatism and flexibility if this process is to work. France could, for example, return to the NATO planning group—a symbolic gesture that would show a new French concern for the sensitivities of other Europeans, who have never fully accepted France's self-proclaimed "specificity."

IV

France has also found herself the tragic hostage of her involvement and ambitions in the Middle East.

In May 1978, in the aftermath of the French paratrooper rescue of Europeans from the rebel-held town of Kolwezi in Shaba Province, Zaïre, *The Times* of London could write with a mixture of bewilderment and envy that "we used to behave as the French." Eight years later it was with both sorrow for France and fear for their own countries that the rest of the Western world contemplated a France that had become the

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main target of terrorist activities in Europe. A highly visible policy of intervention in the world, once a source of pride and satisfaction, had led to a situation that showed up France's vulnerability in a strictly physical sense.

In the early 1970s France's rapprochement with Iraq was intended to secure oil supplies and profitable markets. It had also the political advantage of fostering a Western presence in a country that had become overly dependent on the Soviet Union. The elegant Kissingerian division of influence between the French in Baghdad and the Americans in Tehran did not survive the fall of the shah in 1978 and the ensuing military ambitions of Iraqi President Saddam Hussein. A policy originally designed to provide energy security led eventually to a situation of physical insecurity, first for French forces in Lebanon, then for French nationals taken hostage there and finally for French citizens on their own soil, as terrorists tried to punish France for her entire Middle East policy, from Lebanon to the Gulf, and impose a new policy on the country.

France became a symbol of hated Western presence in a region of turmoil. France unhappily combined high visibility and high vulnerability. A policy of ambiguous leniency under President Giscard d'Estaing had encouraged the impression that France would prove less resolute than other Western nations in fighting terrorism. Such a policy was followed by a confusing reorganization of the secret services under Mitterrand. The French became highly exposed in the Middle East just when their secret services were the least prepared to handle the challenge. Bound by her hostages in Lebanon and at the mercy of terrorists in Paris, prisoner of her history in a region that was a former sphere of influence, France tried to limit the cost of her ambitions.

There was an attempt to restore a more balanced position between Iran and Iraq. Normalization with Iran, long overdue and attempted during the mid-1980s with dynamism if not clarity by Foreign Minister Roland Dumas, was deemed to be diplomatically essential. Jacques Chirac, once he arrived in the prime minister's Matignon Palace in 1986, was initially convinced that to get the hostages back would constitute a gain in public opinion. But the cost proved to be extremely high. France wanted to normalize her relations with Iran without ending her delivery of weapons to Iraq. The revelations of the Iran-contra scandal, linked to the growing awareness of the French authorities that public opinion favored a policy of

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firmness, led to a de facto abandonment of the attempt at rapprochement with Iran. During the summer of 1987 relations worsened and an escalating series of provocations resulted in a police blockade of the Iranian embassy in Paris, an Iranian siege of the French embassy in Tehran and the breaking of diplomatic ties. Iran's growing isolation and the multiplicity of its diplomatic and military setbacks later created the grounds for a restored normalization process with Tehran, which was sealed in November 1987 with the mutual freeing of diplomats. What was the exact price paid by France for the release of her hostages? Only history will tell.

But France's problems in the Middle East go well beyond her difficulty in adopting a balanced stance in the Iran-Iraq War. They stem from a lack of modesty and firmness and from the fact that the Middle East, unlike Francophone Africa, cannot truly be called a French sphere of influence. The stakes are much higher, and the military means involved incomparable. How could France not seem bogged down in the Middle East when the superpowers themselves are increasingly aware of their limited capabilities?

V

It is in Africa that France has found one of her most visible foreign policy successes—the defeat of Libyan forces in Chad. For the French, intervention against Muammar al-Qaddafi addressed issues beyond Chadian independence. It served to demonstrate French credibility throughout Francophone Africa. Chad was not to become the African counterpart to what Iran had become for the United States in the Gulf region.

The French always refused to follow the American line and wage an anti-Qaddafi crusade. After France sent aircraft, weapons and military advisers in 1983 to assist Chadian President Hissene Habré against a Libyan-supported revolt, the agreement between France and Libya announced in September 1984, and France's acceptance of a de facto partition of Chad was welcomed by a consensus in France. But these steps did not dispel criticism of France's strategy of military containment on the ground, the Manta Operation; the strategy was criticized by those, numerous in the conservative parties, who would have preferred French air offensives against Libyan military columns in August 1983. Mitterrand's meeting with Qaddafi in Crete in November 1984 illustrated the sensitivities of the matter; Mitterrand was criticized for meeting with the wrong

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person at the wrong time, with a man who had not respected their earlier agreement and had failed to withdraw all Libyan troops from Chad. The subsequent military successes of Habré's troops have dissipated the resentment and accusation, proving, perhaps, that the president was either right in his "prudent" strategy, or simply lucky, or maybe wise in his conviction that ultimately Qaddafi "would shoot himself in the foot," given the gap between his political ambitions and military means. Habré's troops, with their combination of French weapons, Japanese jeeps and human bravery, proved more than a match for a Libya, economically weakened, politically isolated and demoralized since the U.S. raid on Tripoli in April 1986.

French interests in Africa, however, go well beyond Chad. They were manifested on the eve of the June 1988 Toronto summit of the leaders of the major Western nations and Japan by a generous approach to the Third World debt problem: a proposal to cancel one-third of the reimbursement owed by the poorest countries, specifically African countries. Outside of Europe, Africa may remain the most effective field for French influence.

VI

In her claim to be a middle-sized world power, France presents two major justifications: an independent nuclear force and a presence throughout the world, from Francophone Africa to the Pacific. The South Pacific combines propitiously these two cards, because since 1966 it has been the testing ground for French nuclear experiments. But charges of neocolonialism in New Caledonia are combined with resentment against France's nuclear tests to create trouble for France in the South Pacific.

New Caledonia is a small South Pacific island and French territory located 14,250 miles from Paris. Its political status has been the source of mounting passions, both in France and in New Caledonia, exacerbated by France's recent presidential elections.

New Caledonia is a case unique unto itself. The 150,000 inhabitants are divided between Europeans and native Melanesians (Kanaks), who compose approximately 40 percent and 45 percent of the population respectively, with the remainder composed of Asian and Polynesian immigrants. Democratic principles and the view of the majority of the population—as expressed in the referendum of September 1987—point to a

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French future for New Caledonia. But the trend of decolonization, a militant Kanak nationalist movement and the huge distance between the island and France suggest some form of independence as the long-term solution. The New Caledonian quagmire is further complicated by a mixture of domestic, strategic and economic factors (New Caledonia is one of the world's largest producers of nickel). The conservative parties in France seized the New Caledonian crisis with delight, only too happy to criticize the contradictions and hesitations of the previous Socialist government, which was haunted by retrospective guilt over the Algerian war and had supported the indigenous population's call for immediate independence.

The weight of the past, hanging over the political debate, encourages an unhealthy dialectic of passion. But the stakes of the future are on everyone's mind. Can France give up New Caledonia without losing her global stature, precisely when history appears to be moving toward the Pacific? What would happen if French Polynesia and French Guiana were to be lost next, jeopardizing French nuclear experiments and the European space program? The Mururoa atoll is seen as an indispensable nuclear testing ground in the South Pacific. With her claim to South Pacific Islands and their territorial waters, France can control access to undersea wealth and a surface that is equivalent to 14 times her own national territory. Worse still, what if New Caledonia were to fall under Soviet influence, becoming a base for regional destabilization? As pacifist and antinuclear political currents have reached the South Pacific, threatening the stability of the ANZUS military alliance, such worries are not altogether frivolous.

Added to French concerns in the South Pacific is the continuing flap over the July 1985 bombing at Auckland, New Zealand, of the *Rainbow Warrior*, a boat belonging to the environmentalist group Greenpeace—a French intelligence flop that reads like a James Bond movie interpreted by Monty Python. The affair showed France's willingness to defend her national interest against a movement that campaigned for a nuclear-free South Pacific. Abroad, French responsibility for the affair was attacked as proof of arrogance and selfish nationalism. But domestic criticism has been quite weak, focusing on the stupidity of the action, not its objectives.

If the Greenpeace affair has exploded well beyond Auckland Harbor, it is largely because global and regional disapproval is rapidly closing in on France's nuclear presence in the South

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Pacific. It will prove increasingly costly for France to continue nuclear testing in Mururoa while keeping New Caledonia under French sovereignty. Prime Minister Rocard's new government has concentrated on the New Caledonia problem with energy and speed reminiscent of Pierre Mendès-France's approach to decolonization in the mid-1950s. Speed is essential to avoid further violence, but it is also in everyone's interest to proceed cautiously. Under the new plan, Paris resumes direct control of the territory for a year as a decade of transition begins. A referendum in 1998 is to decide whether self-determination should proceed. It is too early to know what the reactions of the Kanaks and the European settlers will be to the Rocard plan, but if anything can work it will be this courageous initiative.

VII

French decision-makers will have to confront some unpleasant choices if French foreign policy is to escape "schizophrenia" between discourse and reality, between a true European role and an increasingly unsustainable global one.

The time has come for France to adopt a fresh and critical view of her role in the world. In spite of a changing international environment, France is a prisoner of a successful rhetoric, keen on preserving that miraculous success—an apparent domestic consensus on foreign policy. The country has opted to defend its previous choices, fearing that adaptation would mean division and banalization. France is the inheritor of a glorious historical and cultural past. The French language, though fighting a rearguard battle in the world, is still spoken by more than 130 million people, thereby expanding France's cultural presence among a population over twice the size of France's own. France's "mission to civilize" is far from over, and she is rightly proud of being a land of asylum and the bastion of human rights.

Yet France cannot remain prisoner of her great past and of the myths created by de Gaulle. The man who saved France more than once gave her a dubious gift. For it was not France that was great thanks to de Gaulle. It was de Gaulle who was great, sometimes even in spite of France.

A new international environment is threatening the pillars of French stability and comfort precisely at a time when France is least able, because of her concentration on internal politics, to confront the corrosive impact of these new realities. France

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is also less capable of being taken seriously by her European partners because of her declining economic competitiveness.

France's adaptation to a changing world implies, first of all, concentrating more than ever on Europe. France will have to strengthen her conventional military forces and accept that, even for France, more security means less independence. Whatever the cracks in her grandeur, France is essential in constructing a politically unified Europe. West Germany remains essentially an economic power; Thatcher's Britain is still torn between Atlanticist and European allegiances; Italy is an economic miracle in a political quagmire. Only France can play a leading political and security role.

A new consensus has been formed in France around the values of Europe. This new consensus is nevertheless ambiguous and far from being total. One-third of the Frenchmen, those who voted for the extreme right or the extreme left in the recent elections because they felt excluded from a process of modernity and openness to Europe, have rejected such a path. Europe is the source of their anxiety, but it is also ultimately the only answer to their fears.

How will Mitterrand's France face this European challenge? Is France going to abandon herself to the dubious charms of intense but paralyzing debate, or will she adopt a positive role for Europe and herself and combine under Mitterrand II a mixture of openness and stability? What will prevail—a certainty of ultimate defeat in the anachronistic attempt to preserve a unique world role that transcends the nation's means, or a positive symbiosis within the European framework?

In the eyes of future historians, the Pompidou and Giscard d'Estaing presidencies may appear as brief interludes between the de Gaulle and Mitterrand eras. In his style, in his historical and literary approach to politics, in his duration in power, Mitterrand has proven to be the most Gaullist of de Gaulle's successors. Only a man of his generation, who lived through World War II as a mature adult, can have the necessary full openness to the European ideal, beyond the often technocratic imperatives of younger politicians. It is now Mitterrand's responsibility, by guiding France through the necessary foreign policy shifts, from Europe to New Caledonia, to prove that he embodies de Gaulle's realism.

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Gerhard L. Weinberg

MUNICH AFTER 50 YEARS

Half a century after the Munich conference, that event lives in the public memory as a series of interrelated myths. For most people, Munich represents the abandonment of a small country, Czechoslovakia, to the unjust demands of a bullying and powerful neighbor by those who would have done better to defend it. It is believed that the Allies, by the sacrifice of one country, only whetted the appetite of the bully whom they had to fight anyway, later and under more difficult circumstances. The "lesson" derived from this widely held view is that it makes far more sense to take action to stop aggression at the first opportunity.

This view, not surprisingly, is especially influential with those who personally experienced the events of the late 1930s and who thereafter found themselves and their countries involved in the costliest war in history. Many came to hold a view of the proper conduct of U.S. foreign policy, the so-called domino theory, which asserted that if drastic action were not taken to halt aggression at its earliest occurrence, the countries in the path of an encroaching power would fall like dominoes, with the fall of each only hastening that of the next. Once prominently put forward as a justification for American intervention in Vietnam, this thesis was temporarily discredited by second thoughts about U.S. policy there. More recently, however, it has been revived in connection with Nicaragua. Some believe that a Sandinista regime, once fully consolidated, will surely topple the adjacent "dominoes," this time in Central America.

Neither scholarship nor time is likely to shake the firm hold that the symbols of Munich maintain on those who remember a time when the city's name connoted more than good beer or bloody Olympic games. The umbrella that British Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain carried with him to Munich in the

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fall of 1938 came to represent not common sense in the European autumn but cowardice in the face of danger. The exclusion from the conference of Czechoslovakia, the country whose boundaries and fate were at stake, is considered by those even vaguely familiar with the history as a particularly revolting aspect of the affair. On his return to London, Chamberlain held in his hand an agreement stating that all questions concerning Anglo-German relations would be solved by consultation between the two countries, so they would never again go to war with each other. His famous comment that he, like Prime Minister Benjamin Disraeli sixty years earlier, had brought back from Germany peace with honor and "peace in our time," has provided superb copy for every parody of British policy in the 1930s.

II

Three aspects of the Munich conference that developed more fully afterward, or on which we are now better informed, suggest that this traditional interpretation warrants a closer look.

In the first place, it was after all the same two Allied leaders who went to Munich, Chamberlain of Great Britain and Edouard Daladier of France, who one year later led their countries into war against Adolf Hitler's Germany, something no other leader of a major power did before his own country was attacked. The Italians, who under Benito Mussolini thought of themselves as a great power, joined with Hitler in June 1940 in what Mussolini saw as an opportunity to share the spoils of victory. Joseph Stalin was sending the Nazis essential war supplies until a few hours before the German invasion of June 1941 awoke the Kremlin from its confidence in an alignment with Hitler. Franklin D. Roosevelt, who had repeatedly but vainly warned the Soviet leader of the German threat, had worked hard to rouse the American people to the dangers facing them; but until confronted by a Japanese surprise attack and by German and Italian declarations of war, he had hoped that Americans might be spared the ordeal of war.

Only Britain and France went to war with Germany out of calculations of broader national interest instead of waiting to be attacked; and it is perhaps safe to argue that without the lead from London, the French government would have backed off in 1939 and awaited a German invasion of its own territory. It is rather ungracious, especially for Americans whose country

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would not take action to defend either Czechoslovakia or Poland, and which had provided by law that it would not help anyone who did, to condemn as weaklings the only leaders of major powers who mustered up the courage to confront Hitler on behalf of another country.

A second factor that prompts us to take a new look at the 1938 crisis is the view that Hitler, the man usually thought to have triumphed at Munich, is now known to have held of it. The opening of German archives and the new availability of important private papers provide a picture rather different from the one commonly held.

We now know that Hitler had never been particularly interested in helping the over three million people of German descent living inside Czechoslovakia, but only in the ways they might help him in his project to isolate Czechoslovakia from outside support, create incidents that would provide a pretext for the invasion and destruction of that country, and thereafter provide manpower for additional army divisions. The new divisions, in turn, he considered useful for the great war he planned to wage against the powers of Western Europe as the prerequisite for the quick and far easier seizure of enormous territories in Eastern Europe.

Hitler believed that German rearmament was far enough advanced by late 1937 and early 1938 to make this first little war against Czechoslovakia possible. While spreading propaganda on behalf of the ethnic Germans of Czechoslovakia, Hitler was counting on the threat of Japan's advance in East Asia and Italy's support in Europe, and the reluctance of France and England to fight another great war, to isolate Czechoslovakia from outside support. It is understandable in this context that the successful and peaceful annexation of Austria in March 1938 (which left Czechoslovakia even more vulnerable than before), followed by a dramatic reaffirmation of Germany's alignment with Italy during Hitler's visit to Rome, produced Hitler's decision in the second week of May 1938 to go to war that year. We are not ever likely to know whether his belief that he was suffering from throat cancer contributed to his haste; he was certainly a man with a mission in a hurry who would explain later in 1938 that he preferred to go to war at the age of 49 so that he could see the whole issue through to resolution!

But there proved to be inner flaws in his strategy. The prospective allies he had selected turned out to be reluctant.

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The Japanese at that time wanted an alliance against the Soviet Union, not against the Western powers. Poland and Hungary both hoped to obtain pieces of Czechoslovakia but wanted them without a general European war. The Italians, furthermore, were not as enthusiastic as Hitler thought. Mussolini had given a hostage to fortune by committing large forces to the support of Francisco Franco in the Spanish Civil War, forces certain to be lost in a general war in which they would be cut off from their homeland.

III

The basic miscalculation of the German government was, however, of a different type: it was integrally related to the issue that Hitler deliberately placed at the center of public attention, the Sudeten Germans living in Czechoslovakia. The purpose of this focus was obvious. The constant attention in both publicity and diplomacy to the allegedly mistreated millions of Germans living in Czechoslovakia was designed to make it politically difficult, if not impossible, for Britain and France to come to Czechoslovakia's assistance when it was eventually attacked. How could democracies contest the principle of self-determination that they had themselves proclaimed? Would they act to turn a small war into a huge one on the unproven assumption that a big war inevitably would come anyway?

But there were aspects of this program that might, from Hitler's perspective, cause problems. One was that the continued diplomatic focus on the Sudeten Germans, which was needed to assure the isolation of Czechoslovakia, might eventually make the transition from diplomacy to war more difficult. The other was that, despite the number and significance of the Germans inside the Czechoslovak state, there were obviously far more Czechs and Slovaks. If ever the real as opposed to the pretended aim of German policy became clear, the very same concept of self-determination that worked against support of Czechoslovakia as long as its German-inhabited rim was under discussion would shift in favor of Prague once the undoubtedly non-German core came into question. It was in this regard that the crisis of the end of September 1938 came to be so dramatic and its resolution, in Hitler's eyes, so faulty.

We now know that Hitler had originally planned to stage an incident inside Czechoslovakia to provide Germany with a pretext for invading that country with the objective of destroy-

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ing it all rather than merely annexing the German-inhabited fringe. He was influenced by the experience of 1914, when Austria-Hungary had taken the assassination of the Archduke Francis Ferdinand as an excuse to attack Serbia.

In Hitler's opinion there had been two deficiencies in Austria-Hungary's behavior, and Germany would on this occasion remedy both. The first was the plainly accidental timing of the assassination. If one waited for others to act, the most appropriate moment might easily be missed: Hitler had long held that the Central Powers should have struck well before 1914. The obvious solution to the problem of timing was to arrange for the incident oneself, and at the optimal moment. Hitler originally thought of staging the assassination of the German minister to Czechoslovakia, Ernst Eisenlohr; then he shifted to the idea of having incidents staged by the German military inside Czechoslovakia. Finally he resorted to the creation of special squads of Sudeten German thugs who—since it was not thought safe to entrust them with the secret date for the scheduled invasion—were simply assigned quotas of incidents to stage each week in each sector of the borderlands. This process would continue until the time had come for Berlin to announce that the most recent example of Czechoslovak wickedness (in responding to the latest provocation) obviously merited Germany's taking the drastic action of invading the country.

The second defect of Austria's action in 1914, in Hitler's view, was that Vienna had dithered for weeks during that summer while the shock effect of the original incident wore off. This time, Hitler reasoned, it would be very different indeed.

Since the decision to invade would precede rather than follow the incident selected as a pretext, the German military would move swiftly and in accordance with carefully prepared plans. The German dictator was confident that his army would obey the order to attack, in spite of warnings of dissent from some in the military hierarchy. Early in February 1938 he had replaced the commander in chief of the army, Werner von Fritsch, a great admirer of the National Socialist state but an independent thinker, with Walther von Brauchitsch, a man without backbone or scruples who was also the recipient of special secret payments from Hitler (apparently the beginning of a huge and never fully explored program of bribing most of the highest-ranking German generals and admirals).

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Hitler had also, at the same time, assumed the responsibilities formerly assigned to Minister of War Werner von Blomberg. Furthermore, he had recently replaced the chief of the general staff of the army, Ludwig Beck, a vehement critic of the war plan, with the more complaisant Franz Halder. Although there were skeptics among the military—and there are some analysts of the 1938 crisis who believe that an order to attack would have touched off an attempted coup from within the army—it seems to me that Hitler's confidence in the response of the military to his orders and those of its new commander in chief, von Brauchitsch, was fully warranted.

What, then, went wrong? Why was there no transition from propaganda and diplomacy to war?

The constant emphasis on the Sudeten Germans in Nazi propaganda brought too late a response from the government in Prague, which until August left the initiative to Berlin. And this in spite of a formal and explicit, but confidential, warning to Prague from the French government in July that under practically no circumstances would it come to the defense of its Czechoslovak ally. Keeping this message undisclosed—and it was one of the few secrets that did not leak out in the Paris of the 1930s—was of course essential to the official French pretense that it was the British who were holding them back from full support of Prague, a pretense that turned to panic when the British position hardened and could no longer provide a fig leaf for French unwillingness to act.

The centrality of the nationality issue also created a terrible dilemma for London. Canada, Australia and the Union of South Africa (as it was then known) all made it absolutely clear to the British government that they would not go to war alongside Britain over the Sudeten German question. The British chiefs of staff strongly argued against the risk of military action. If war were to come, it would have to come under circumstances that made the issues clear to the public in Britain and the dominions, and, as the British learned in September 1938, to the French.

It was under these circumstances that on September 13 Neville Chamberlain decided to fly to Germany, originally planning not even to tell Berlin that he was coming until after his plane had taken off. The Germans were startled enough even when notified in advance, and they were trapped by their own propaganda that there were nationality issues to discuss. Moreover, those who genuinely believed in the fairy tale of the

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"stab in the back"—that Germany had not been beaten at the front in World War I, but had instead lost the war because of the collapse of the German home front—could not risk starting a second war unless German public opinion could be convinced that such a war, with all its costs in lives and treasure, was everybody else's fault.

So the British prime minister had to be received at Berchtesgaden. All he could be told, of course, was the official public line that something had to be done for the poor Sudeten Germans. While Chamberlain set about getting the agreement of France and Czechoslovakia to having the German-inhabited portions of Czechoslovakia ceded to Germany, Hitler began plotting other ways to arrange for war in spite of the meddlesome Englishman. When at their second meeting, on September 22 at Bad Godesberg, Chamberlain offered Hitler an Allied capitulation to his ostensible demands—the French, Czechoslovak and British governments had all agreed to the transfer of the Sudeten territory—the German dictator was dumbfounded and raised new and obviously preposterous conditions for a peaceful settlement.

IV

It was at this point that the issue shifted conspicuously from the fate of the Sudeten Germans to that of the Czechs and Slovaks. Here Hitler was indeed trapped by his own strategy. He now had either to risk a war with Britain and France as well as Czechoslovakia or pull back, call off the planned invasion, and settle for what Prague, London and Paris had already agreed to.

It was not only Germany's military and diplomatic leaders who urged caution on the Nazi dictator. Troubled by the prospect of a general war when the German people gave every sign of being unenthusiastic about it, Hitler's closest political associates, Hermann Göring and Joseph Goebbels, argued for a peaceful settlement. The prospective allies of Germany in this crisis were hesitant, now that war was a real and not merely a theoretical possibility. The Poles certainly wanted a piece of Czechoslovakia, but not at the risk of breaking completely with their French ally and Great Britain. The Hungarians were watering at the mouth over the possibility of realizing their extensive territorial demands: all of the Slovak and Carpatho-Ukrainian portions of the Czechoslovak state and a few additional pieces if they could get them. The authorities in Buda-

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pest, however, were very conscious of having only recently begun their own rearmament; they were also fairly certain that Britain and France would go to war over a German invasion of Czechoslovakia and that such a general war would end in a German defeat.

Hitler never forgave the Hungarians, whose resolution, in his eyes, was not commensurate with their appetite, but he was even more astonished by the defection of his most important ally, Italy. Mussolini's urging him to settle for the German-inhabited fringe of Czechoslovakia instead of attacking that country as a whole—when Hitler had expected encouragement to go forward, along with a full promise of support—appears to have played a major part in his decision to recall the orders for war, already issued, and instead agree to a settlement by conference at Munich.

Precisely because he had not tested the predictions of those who had warned against an attack on Czechoslovakia, Hitler was then and ever after angry over having pulled back. He projected his own reticence onto others, denouncing as cowards those whose advice he had followed instead of testing his own concept in action, and despising the British and French leaders before whose last-minute firmness he had himself backed down.

If the Munich agreement, which others then and since have regarded as a great triumph for Germany, appeared to Hitler then and in retrospect as the greatest setback of his career, it was because he had been unwilling or unable, or both, to make the shift from propaganda and diplomacy to war as he had always intended. He had been trapped in a diplomatic maze of his own construction and could not find the exit to the war that he sought. In the last months of his life, in 1945, as he reviewed what had gone wrong and caused the dramatic descent from Germany's earlier heights of victory, he appears to have asserted that his failure to begin the war in 1938 was his greatest error, contributing to the eventual collapse of all his hopes and prospects.

In the intervening years he was most careful not to repeat what he considered were the great errors of 1938. A massive campaign was begun to rally the German people for war. As Hitler put it on November 10, 1938, meeting with the German press, the peace propaganda designed to fool others had carried in it the risk of misleading his own people into thinking that peace, not war, was intended. Thereafter, Hitler would sometimes postpone but would never again call off an attack on

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another country once ordered, and he would never again allow himself to be trapped in diplomatic negotiations.

In 1939 German ambassadors were kept away from London and Warsaw; they were in fact forbidden to return to their posts. The incident the Nazis had planned as the pretext for war against Poland—an assault on a radio station inside Germany—would be organized and managed directly from Berlin. Furthermore, as Hitler explained to his military leaders on August 22, 1939, he had things organized so well that his only worry was that at the last minute some *Schweinehund* would come along with a compromise and again cheat him of war. The allusion to Chamberlain and Munich was unmistakable. And it ought to be noted that this "lesson" of Munich remained with him. When the Soviet Union made desperate efforts in 1941 to avert war with Germany, by volunteering the most extensive concessions, by offering to join the Tripartite Pact and by soliciting diplomatic approaches from Berlin, Hitler once again claimed to be worried about only one thing: a last-minute compromise offer that would make it difficult for him to continue on the road to yet another extension of the war.

As for the remainder of Czechoslovakia, he was even more determined that it be destroyed. The German government devoted itself in the months after Munich to accomplishing that objective, never realizing that, in the face of universal relief over the avoidance of war, the violation of the agreement just signed would make any further step by Germany the occasion for war. In 1939 no one listened to Nazi tales of persecuted Germans in Poland; the Germans themselves had demonstrated to everyone that such propaganda was merely a pretext for actions with entirely different objectives. And when soundings were taken in London before the invasion of Poland, the answer was that Czechoslovakia must have its independence back first before any negotiations; similar soundings after the German conquest of Poland were answered with the demand that both Czechoslovakia and Poland be restored to independence. Since Hitler and his associates had not been interested in the fate of those who had been used as propaganda instruments, they never could understand that others had taken the issue seriously—but only once.

V

A third facet of the Munich agreement as we look back on it from the perspective of fifty years is the light shed on events

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by the opening of wartime archives and the progress of research. The account of German policy presented here is in large part based on materials that became available after World War II. The British archives have also been opened and show a government hoping against hope for a peaceful settlement, but prepared to go to war if there were an invasion of Czechoslovakia in spite of all efforts at accommodating what were perceived as extreme but not entirely unreasonable demands. We now know that Chamberlain was correctly reported as willing to contemplate the territorial cession of the German-inhabited portions of Czechoslovakia in early May 1938, and that the British knew that there was no serious French military plan to assist Czechoslovakia—the only offensive operation planned by the French if war broke out was into Libya from Tunisia. It is now also known that in June 1938 Winston Churchill explained to a Czechoslovak official that it was essential for Czechoslovakia to work out an agreement with Konrad Henlein, the leader of the Sudeten Germans, and that although he, Churchill, was criticizing Chamberlain, he might well have followed the same policy if he had held the responsibilities of power.

It is also clear that there were serious doubts within the British government—which may or may have not been justified—about the ability of Britain and France to defeat Germany, and a determination that if war came and victory were attained, the German-inhabited portions of Czechoslovakia would *not* be returned to Prague's control.

The question of whether or not Britain and France would have been militarily better off had they gone to war in 1938 will remain a subject for debate for historians. Most would agree that the defenses of Czechoslovakia would have proved more formidable in 1938 than those of Poland in 1939, but then the question remains whether, since there was to be no attack by the French in the west in 1938, a somewhat longer Czechoslovak resistance would have made any significant difference. It can be argued that the Germans used the last year of peace more effectively than the British and the French, but it must also be recalled that new British fighter planes and radar defenses would not in any case have been available to meet a German onslaught in 1939 as they were for the Battle of Britain in 1940. And the excellent Czechoslovak tanks Germany acquired must be weighed against Poland's essential

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1939 contribution to breaking the German Enigma-machine code.

There are other factors to be considered, including several most difficult to assess. What, for example, would have been the evolution of U.S. attitudes toward a European war in which Canada remained neutral, as it might have done had war broken out in 1938? Certainly there was in 1938 great doubt about the economic and fiscal ability of Britain to sustain a second great war within a generation, at a time when financial support from the United States was prohibited by Congress. In an age of determined American isolation, no one anticipated the lend-lease program on which Britain would later prove so dependent.

The other side of this coin is the clarity of British policy, whether one agrees with it or not, in the year after Munich. If this Munich pact were broken, it was agreed, then the next German aggression that was resisted by the victim would bring on war. It is from this perspective that the pairing in internal British government discussions of Holland and Belgium with Romania and Poland must be understood: the key issue was *any* further step, not its specific direction or victim. With this determination came a resigned recognition of the likely, perhaps unavoidable, cost of a new war for a weakened empire. In August 1939 Foreign Office official Gladwyn Jebb, years later the British representative at the United Nations, was told by an official of the German embassy in London that in a general war in which, as the Englishman predicted, all in the end fought against Germany and eventually smashed it, there would be only two victors, the Soviet Union and America. The German then asked Jebb, "How would England like to be an American dominion?" Jebb replied that "she would infinitely prefer to be an American dominion than a German *Gau*."[1]

The opening of French archives has suggested to some a rather more charitable view of France's policy. Efforts to rehabilitate the French leadership of the 1930s have focused on the deficiencies of British policy, the terrible weakening of France as a result of World War I and the social and political cleavages of the postwar years. Certainly the view of most scholars on French policy in the immediate post-World War I years has changed substantially: France is now viewed as weak-

[1] Rohan Butler, ed., *Documents on British Foreign Policy*, Third Series, Vol. 7, London: H.M. Stationery Office, 1954, p. 556.

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ened and frightened rather than combative and assertive, while the peace treaty of 1919 is increasingly seen as far more favorable to Germany than either German propaganda or subsequent popular views in the United States and Great Britain have pictured it.

Nevertheless, the archives demonstrate even more hesitation in French policy than was previously believed. In the terrible civil war in Spain (still raging at the time of the crisis over Czechoslovakia) it now is clear that the initiative for the policy of nonintervention came from Paris, not from London as was long believed. More immediately relevant is the revelation, previously cited, that in July 1938 the French government secretly warned Prague that French military assistance could not be expected. The publicly advanced argument that France could not commit itself in the absence of a British promise to help was a sham; but in response to a plea from the Czechoslovak government, this deception was kept secret. When the French government learned that the British were indeed serious about fighting if Germany invaded, the ensuing panic in Paris helped precipitate the decision of Chamberlain to fly to Berchtesgaden.

The new light shed on French policy in 1938 also clarifies the extraordinary evolution of French policy in World War II; first the insistence on trying to conduct the war in Scandinavia or the Caucasus, and, after the collapse of France in 1940, the Vichy French willingness to fight the English, other Frenchmen and the Americans, but under no circumstances the real enemies of France: Germany, Italy and Japan.

The archives of the Soviet Union remain closed to scholars, though lately there are signs that this might change. New light on Soviet policy has been shed, however, not only by Soviet documentary publications but also by material from the files of other powers. A new perspective on Soviet policy comes as a result of our knowledge that throughout the 1930s Stalin, who regarded Britain, not Germany, as the Soviet Union's main enemy, was trying to arrange an agreement with Hitler; the policy reversal that led to the Soviet-German Nonaggression Pact in 1939 was made by Berlin, not Moscow. Furthermore, Jiri Hochman has now demonstrated on the basis of material from the Romanian archives that Moscow deliberately rejected the option of sending land and air forces across Ro-

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mania to assist Czechoslovakia in case of war in the 1938 crisis.[2] These factors help explain why the Soviet Union was the only major power outside the Axis that recognized the legality of the disappearance of Czechoslovakia in 1939 and urged the Western powers to follow this example.

Americans have learned from the experience in Vietnam that a democracy should only enter a major war if its people see and feel the issues as so important to themselves as to warrant a sacrifice of blood and treasure. Few, if any, in this country urged the defense of Czechoslovakia against invasion in 1968 or action against its occupation since then. Perhaps someday this thought will make it easier for people to understand the reluctance of the dominions to rush to the defense of Czechoslovakia thirty years earlier, and why they implored the London government not to do so either. There are many objectionable acts committed in international affairs that are not necessarily perceived as so threatening to the national interest of third parties as to warrant calling on many to risk their lives to stop them. If a nation is to undertake the costs of war, what is needed is a popular recognition of its necessity, not the hurling of slogans.

What about the people most immediately affected? The Germans had entrusted their fate to a leader who had promised to establish a one-party state as had been instituted in the Soviet Union and Italy and to lead them "whither they must shed their blood." He certainly kept *these* promises, and by doing so led them to ruin.

For the people of Czechoslovakia, he brought other great disasters; first the end of their independence, and then their subservience to the Soviet Union. As for the Sudeten Germans, he brought a fate that included the return to Germany they had shouted for, but in a way they had not anticipated. Here is a lesson others might ponder. If you shout for something long and loud enough, you run the risk of getting it. Having tried to settle the problem by moving the boundary, the Allies decided, after Germany had broken that arrangement, to let Czechoslovakia move the people. The Sudeten Germans are no longer ruled from Prague, but that is because they were driven from their homes into post-World War II Germany.

[2] *The Soviet Union and the Failure of Collective Security, 1934–1938*, Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1984, pp. 194–201.

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They have indeed come "Home into the Reich" as their slogan required. Those in other parts of the world who prefer not to live under a government they consider inappropriate for themselves might want to think about the risk of expulsion as a concomitant of the hope for new borders.

In the United States, the "lesson" of Munich may well remain that appeasing aggressors, by making concessions to them or merely verbally condemning their actions, only encourages them and makes them more willing to take greater risks. There is without doubt substance to this view, but only in a context in which the alternatives and prospects and costs are assessed soberly. As leaders contemplate the prospect of war, they would be well advised to make sure that their people, or at least a very large number of them, are prepared to make the relevant commitment and are ready to pay the price of sticking to it.

In 1938, in neither Britain nor France—to say nothing of the United States or the Soviet Union—were the masses clearly willing to run the risk of war unless Germany committed the most obvious and direct outrages. And the British dominions had made clear their determination to stay out. The following year Britain and France and the dominions acted in response to the German attack on Poland. On the first occasion in World War II in which a British army decisively defeated a German army—at El Alamein in 1942—the majority of the divisions in the British Eighth Army had come from the Commonwealth to fight alongside the soldiers of the United Kingdom. At a time when New Zealanders appear to some observers to be inclined to opt out of their alliances, their great share in that significant battle deserves to be recalled as a part of the lesson of Munich for societies in which, by whatever mechanism, the public's preferences control the policies of the state.

Those commitments, policies and alliances that can reasonably be expected to involve a country in a great war must be clearly articulated, understood at least in general by the public and perceived as truly essential to the nation's security. In an age of nuclear weapons that might be a useful "lesson" of the Munich conference.

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RECENT BOOKS ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

Edited by Lucy Edwards Despard

General: Political and Legal

John C. Campbell

THE UNEASY ALLIANCE: RELIGION, REFUGEE WORK, AND U.S. FOREIGN POLICY. By J. Bruce Nichols. New York: Oxford, 1988, 337 pp. $24.95.

Voluntary agencies, especially those with church connections, have been partners with the U.S. government in the massive programs for the relief and resettlement of refugees since World War II. Not always comfortable partners, since the foreign-policy and security interests of the government have sometimes clashed with the humanitarian purposes of the churches. This has been especially so in the last two decades, with the flood of refugees from troubled areas in Asia and Latin America—not unrelated to controversial U.S. foreign policies. *The Uneasy Alliance* presents these issues with admirable clarity and fairness. It also serves as an unrivaled history of American involvement in the world's refugee problems over half a century.

NAIROBI TO VANCOUVER: THE WORLD COUNCIL OF CHURCHES AND THE WORLD, 1975–87. By Ernest W. Lefever. Washington: Ethics and Public Policy Center, 1988, 166 pp. $19.75 (paper, $7.95).

In a sequel to his earlier *Amsterdam to Nairobi* (1979) Lefever continues his polemic against the World Council of Churches for its soft-headed pronouncements reflecting a Marxist, pro-Soviet, Third World approach to international affairs, in contrast to the principles the organization espoused when it was established at Amsterdam in 1948. The Council of Churches is an easy target, and most of Lefever's arrows hit the mark, but his own bias is so plain to see that it robs his arguments of full effect.

SHORES OF REFUGE: A HUNDRED YEARS OF JEWISH EMIGRATION. By Ronald Sanders. New York: Henry Holt, 1988, 673 pp. $27.95.

The subject of Jewish emigration from Central and Eastern Europe, from the 19th-century pogroms through two world wars to the problem of the Soviet refuseniks today, is too large even for a volume of this forbidding size. The first part of the book, the period of "classic emigration," is relatively uncontroversial. The events of the second part, including World War II and the failure of the Western democracies to do more to stop the Holocaust, have given rise to accusations and dispute, and here the author reaches moderate and judicious conclusions, especially where President Roosevelt's role is concerned.

ADVISING THE RULERS. Edited by William Plowden. New York: Basil Blackwell, 1987, 222 pp. $45.00.

Explorations of this interesting matter by individuals with first-hand experience in advising presidents and prime ministers, and by others who

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have made a specialized study of the institutions through which such advice is conceived, sifted and transmitted. Individual case studies tell how the system has worked in Britain, France, West Germany, the United States, Canada and Australia; more general chapters deal across the board with "systems of advice," particularly in the key fields of economics and foreign policy. The authors name names, but the book would pique the reader's interest more if the descriptions of planning boards, advisory staffs, ministries and *éminences grises* were enlivened by examples of vital decisions brilliantly made or badly bungled.

ESSAYS ON A HALF-CENTURY: IDEAS, POLICIES, AND ACTION. By W. W. Rostow. Boulder (Colo.): Westview Press, 1988, 190 pp. $29.95.

Essays, articles and speeches over some forty years, introduced by an autobiographical report done for the 50th reunion of the class of 1936 at Yale. In general the pieces follow themes for which the author is known from his major works and his public career, but some take the reader, with benefit, off that beaten track. The book should be welcomed by fans of Walt Rostow and all who appreciate a sharp and fertile mind.

General: Military, Technological and Scientific

Gregory F. Treverton

FATEFUL VISIONS: AVOIDING NUCLEAR CATASTROPHE. Edited by Joseph S. Nye, Jr., Graham T. Allison, Jr., and Albert Carnesale. Cambridge: Ballinger, 1988, 284 pp. $19.95.

This latest product of Harvard's Avoiding Nuclear War Project takes off from the premise that deterrence is not likely to fail soon but will not last forever. The contributing authors thus examine long-term paths to a more stable world, ranging from the technology of strategic defense or more discriminating weapons to the politics of Soviet decline and improved U.S.-Soviet relations. The analysis is careful, the conclusions thoughtfully modest. Not surprisingly, no path is a panacea: the world could be safer, for example, if the Soviet Union declined gracefully like the British Empire, but could be more dangerous if the decline were akin to that of the Austro-Hungarian Empire. The book's editors put their faith, in the short run, in policies and force postures to "lengthen the fuse" to nuclear weapons and, for the long term, in an evolution of U.S.-Soviet relations.

U.S.-SOVIET SECURITY COOPERATION. Edited by Alexander L. George, Philip J. Farley and Alexander Dallin. New York: Oxford, 1988, 746 pp. $42.00 (paper, $18.95).

These Stanford authors share their Harvard colleagues' premise that if the threat of nuclear Armageddon has been mostly responsible for preventing war between the superpowers, the U.S. and the Soviet Union ought to be able to turn their shared security interest into cooperation, tacit or explicit. This impressive volume mines the postwar history of such efforts in Europe, in arms control and in dealing with regional conflict. While the relationship is and will remain fundamentally conflicted—only in Europe have the two superpowers developed a set of assumptions and agreements that amount to a security regime—still, they share incentives to cooperate: each senses it is vulnerable to modern war and that unilateral measures to

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promote security are not enough. In the future, as in the past, explicit agreements are not always possible or necessary; instead, agreement takes the form of "a mix of unilateral policies and cooperative arrangements."

THE GEOPOLITICS OF SUPER POWER. By Colin S. Gray. Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 1988, 274 pp. $26.00.

Colin Gray's writing is always provocative, and this book is no exception. It is grand strategy in the tradition of Mackinder, seeing the U.S.-Soviet competition as the classic confrontation of a sea power versus a land power. His conclusions—that the United States should give pride of place to naval forces, and that it can no longer make credible any threat to use nuclear weapons first and so must abandon NATO's flexible response—are not unique, and his prose is occasionally purple—the Soviet state can inspire only those who are "heroically ignorant or conveniently stupid." But the insights en route to those conclusions are often telling: he demolishes any idea of rollback in Europe as a game nowhere near worth the candle; the United States "can take the political offensive only for profoundly defensive reasons."

THE DANGEROUS DOCTRINE: NATIONAL SECURITY AND U.S. FOREIGN POLICY. By Saul Landau. Boulder (Colo.): Westview Press, 1988, 201 pp. $24.95 (paper, $9.95). A PACCA Book.

If Gray's is a strategy from the right, Landau's is a critique from the left. His short chapters chronicle the emergence of the United States as a "national security state" in which policymakers, unwilling or unable to offer the public an honest choice between "imperialism and republicanism," used anticommunism to remove themselves "from the civilized precepts and limits imposed by both divine and natural law." The result was covert operations from Iran in 1953 to Oliver North; congressional investigations into these abuses ultimately sustained the credibility of the system, thus inadvertently laying the basis for the next abuse. Landau asserts rather than argues that the Soviet military threat is "fictitious." He would focus instead on the real threats at home—crime, drugs and poverty.

THE ORIGINS OF ALLIANCES. By Stephen M. Walt. Ithaca (N.Y.): Cornell University Press, 1987, 322 pp. $32.50.

This rare combination of theory and practice will appeal most to specialists, but it contains useful insights for the making of policy as well. Looking at alliances in the Middle East between 1955 and 1979, Walt argues that nations are more likely to ally against strong states than to "bandwagon" by joining them. But the process is better conceived as a "balance of threat" than a balance of power. That perspective leads Walt to happy conclusions for American policy: since threats are being balanced, not power, the United States has been able to sustain alliances comprising three times more people and GNP than those of the Soviet Union.

CONVENTIONAL ARMS CONTROL AND THE SECURITY OF EUROPE. Edited by Uwe Nerlich and James A. Thomson. Boulder (Colo.): Westview Press, 1988, 251 pp. $19.85 (paper). A RAND Book.

This volume, written by a set of experienced analysts and officials, is a first-rate primer to *the* next issue in European security. It reminds us that, ultimately, it is the postwar shape of Europe that is at stake. Unfortunately,

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the considerable common ground in the various chapters is less than encouraging about prospects, especially when Soviet leader Gorbachev has already captured the high ground. For the consensus is clearer about what NATO must refuse than about what it can accept: it should refuse anything less than large and very asymmetrical reductions in tanks and other heavy equipment, and nuclear weapons must be kept out of the negotiations. And, at least until now, the French approach to the issue has been "just say *non*."

BEYOND MILITARY REFORM: AMERICAN DEFENSE DILEMMAS. By Jeffrey Record. Washington: Pergamon-Brassey's, 1988, 186 pp.

Cast as a criticism of Congress' military reform movement—for being overly occupied with operational details instead of broader strategy—this book is a vivid, terse statement of arguments Record has made before: that the United States has too many commitments and too few capabilities; that, in particular, it has too many troops in Europe; and that its military, in any case trained to fight the wrong war, is often sent into battle under political considerations that determine its defeat.

THE DEFENSE MANAGEMENT CHALLENGE: WEAPONS ACQUISITION. By J. Ronald Fox. Boston: Harvard Business School Press, 1988, 368 pp. $24.95.

Even before the latest scandals, most observers were tempted to avoid the subject of military procurement as too complicated, despite the fact that it has become a $130 billion-plus business. One who had not is J. Ronald Fox, author a decade and a half ago of *Arming America*. This book is a readable analysis of the process. Its conclusions are thoughtful but focus mostly on the Pentagon, reflecting the premise that, as one Hill staffer put it, "Congress will stop micromanaging when the Defense Department stops mismanaging." Yet, dramatic improvements in Pentagon management will be slow at best; until then the U.S. seems trapped in a vicious circle—Congress will respond to the most recent scandal with new layers of paperwork that ensure that today's $600 toilet seat covers will cost twice that tomorrow.

INNOVATION AND THE ARMS RACE: HOW THE UNITED STATES AND THE SOVIET UNION DEVELOP NEW MILITARY TECHNOLOGIES. By Matthew Evangelista. Ithaca (N.Y.): Cornell University Press, 1988, 300 pp. $32.95.

"Technology fuels the arms race" is one of the unexamined maxims of foreign affairs. This interesting book is an effort at remedy. Drawing on a major case study of tactical nuclear weapons, it seeks to understand the pressures for innovation that derive both from within and outside the two superpowers. It concludes that in the United States "the impetus for innovation in weapons technology comes from the bottom," while in the Soviet Union, given secrecy and rigidity, it is more likely to come from the top; thus, the U.S. introduces, the Soviet Union reproduces, in quantity. The resulting policy prescription—U.S. technological restraint traded for Soviet quantitative limits—is not new, but the analysis makes it more interesting.

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COMPARING FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE: THE U.S., THE U.S.S.R., THE U.K. AND THE THIRD WORLD. Edited by Roy Godson. Washington: Pergamon-Brassey's, 1988, 157 pp. $17.95.

This is a hasty pass over broad terrain—one chapter each on the United States, the Soviet Union, Britain and Oman. But it is a welcome call for more detailed, comparative and historical study of intelligence, along with a reminder that, notwithstanding official secrecy, it can be done.

General: Economic and Social

William Diebold, Jr.

NATIONAL MANAGEMENT OF THE INTERNATIONAL ECONOMY. By M. Panic. New York: St. Martin's, 1988, 382 pp. $55.00.

"Growing global economic interdependence turns national problems into international problems—yet each country is left to deal with them in isolation, as best it can." Around this theme is woven a rich and suggestive discussion of how interdependence develops, why it is more difficult for national economies to adjust to change than in the past, and what kinds of policy measures are and are not effective and acceptable in the contemporary world. Clearly written chapters combine economic theory, empirical data and political and psychological judgments. At the end there is a prescription for arrangements that will create "adequate safeguards against the undesirable consequences of international integration" but permit integration to continue; it is not altogether persuasive. The author, a British economist of Yugoslav origin now at Cambridge, has worked in the government, the Bank of England and private industry.

THE FUTURE OF THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM: THE UNITED STATES AND THE WORLD POLITICAL ECONOMY. By Theodore Geiger. Boston: Unwin Hyman, 1988, 190 pp.

The high degree of international economic integration and "political coordination" achieved in the period between 1945 and 1970 is eroding and "these disintegrative trends are likely to continue for the foreseeable future." Not the least of the reasons is that the United States "will no longer assume a disproportionate share of the costs of integration," politically as well as economically. The best hope is to devise methods of "managing the neomercantilist trend" that has emerged. Some fairly concrete ideas for doing this are worked out in this thoughtful book, but readers may be excused for wondering whether these measures will really check the erosion. There can be little doubt, however, about Mr. Geiger's main thesis. As an American economist who played a part in building the postwar order, he fully appreciates what is being lost but retains his old vigor in marshaling arguments for the future.

RESTRUCTURING THE WORLD ECONOMY. By Joyce Kolko. New York: Pantheon, 1988, 390 pp. $24.95 (paper, $14.95).

Structural change is a disturbing process that destroys as well as creates. Stressing the negative side, Kolko sees greater contradictions than ever in capitalism and a bankruptcy of policy since "governments have now tried all the anticrisis measures and they have failed." She finds the prognosis of "growing immiseration with growing concentration of wealth" and other

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of Marx's formulations more relevant now than they were a few decades ago. Yet she does not expect capitalism to collapse; "the vast majority of the world's people will remain victims . . . until *they* act to take power." The book's conclusions outrun its logic and evidence; some exaggerations amount to distortions; but the book does point to unanswered questions and unsolved problems.

MANAGING THE DOLLAR: FROM THE PLAZA TO THE LOUVRE. By Yoichi Funabashi. Washington: Institute for International Economics, 1988, 297 pp.

In this first-rate book a Japanese journalist with excellent connections shows in some detail what the governments of the leading industrial countries tried to do, and did, to bring some order into their financial and monetary relations from 1985 to 1987. Based largely on interviews, of which the most important are anonymous, he shows the play of forces and divergencies of view not only among countries but within most of the major capitals as well. He ends with a thoughtful analysis of why the best that was achieved was "an ad hoc process of adjustment" instead of the construction of a new basis for dealing with the continuing, and probably growing, difficulties of economic integration.

THE PROMISE OF PRIVATIZATION: A CHALLENGE FOR AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY. Edited by Raymond Vernon. New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1988, 295 pp. $12.95.

The vogue for privatization needs analysis and gets a good bit of it in this interesting volume. Studies of Venezuela, the Philippines, Brazil, Turkey and several African countries tell more about the difficulties than the successes in shifting enterprises from governmental to private ownership in developing countries. The experience of Britain, the only industrial country studied, extends the cautionary tale because of the emphasis on monopolies. Professor Vernon's excellent survey shows that the push to change things is often more pragmatic than ideological and involves a wide range of considerations. The United States, he says, should be cautious about telling other countries how to order their affairs, not least because there is no "solid basis for a broadside attack" on state-owned enterprises.

MANAGING INDUSTRIAL CHANGE IN WESTERN EUROPE. Edited by François Duchêne and Geoffrey Shepherd. London and New York: Frances Pinter, 1987, 247 pp.

Germany, France, Britain and Italy have dealt with industrial change in quite different ways and with greatly varying degrees of success. Why this is so and what the consequences are for European integration and global interdependence are leading issues among the many explored by the six European academics who wrote this book. Individual chapters are quite thoughtful and question conventional wisdom. For instance, the German government is shown to have intervened much more in its economy than its professed principles might suggest, whereas France's rapid growth owes less to its industrial policy than to the liberalization of trade.

THE DISTORTED WORLD OF SOVIET-TYPE ECONOMIES. By Jan Winiecki. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1988, 230 pp. $39.95.

Making good use of the vantage points of Warsaw and Lublin, where he teaches, Professor Winiecki provides vigorous demonstrations of a number

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of sources of difficulty in the economies of Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. He shows, for example, why the system makes changes in the industrial structure very difficult and how the effort to advance by importing Western technology has often led to "paying more and earning less." His often ingenious statistical analyses are interspersed with a few—too few—"systems-specific" jokes.

CONTROLLING EAST-WEST TRADE AND TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER. Edited by Gary K. Bertsch. Durham (N.C.): Duke University Press, 1988, 506 pp. $59.50 (paper, $18.95).

Like other studies of export controls on East-West trade, this volume reflects the need to bring together quite divergent considerations of security, economics, politics and relations between the United States and its allies. It differs from most other works in its exploration of the way the organization of decision-making has influenced the outcome. The conferences that helped shape the papers were sponsored by the Center for East-West Trade Policy at the University of Georgia; there is a foreword by Dean Rusk.

DEBT PROBLEMS OF EASTERN EUROPE. By Iliana Zloch-Christy. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1987, 220 pp. $37.50.

A bit formalistic, this study provides a systematic survey of the growth and character of the Western debts of the socialist countries of Eastern Europe. Useful especially for its facts and figures, it discusses the conditions in which Western credits might again expand.

MANAGING INTERNATIONAL MARKETS: DEVELOPING COUNTRIES AND THE COMMODITY TRADE REGIME. By Jock A. Finlayson and Mark W. Zacher. New York: Columbia University Press, 1988, 348 pp. $40.00.

International commodity agreements: Do they ever work? What effect do they really have on prices, production and trade? Who actually pays their costs? The issues have been discussed throughout the century; nevertheless, there is a place for another comprehensive book to take account of the extensive discussions of the experience since World War II, and this careful study by two Canadians fills the need admirably. It shows quite convincingly why, in spite of all the efforts and a great surge of interest in the subject in developing countries, the old arguments remain valid, few agreements have been adopted or have lasted, and not much change can be expected in the future. The condensed accounts of negotiations regarding major products make the book a useful reference as well.

AGRICULTURAL PRICE POLICY FOR DEVELOPING COUNTRIES. Edited by John W. Mellor and Raisuddin Ahmed. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins, 1988, 327 pp. $35.00.

Should the governments of developing countries hold down food prices or push them up to encourage farmers to increase production and modernize? The choice "is intensely political," and if a government aims at stability it must cope with the fluctuations of demand, supply and prices in the world economy. The expert authors, who are mostly members of the staff of the International Food Policy Research Institute, thrashed out their analysis in a conference with a group of senior government officials from developing countries.

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SANCTITY VS. SOVEREIGNTY: THE UNITED STATES AND THE NATIONALIZATION OF NATURAL RESOURCE INVESTMENTS. By Kenneth A. Rodman. New York: Columbia University Press, 1988, 403 pp. $45.00.

The best part of this book is a 200-page section that very usefully recapitulates the differing reactions of the U.S. government to the nationalization of a number of American companies, mostly in the Middle East and Latin America, between the 1930s and the 1970s.

AMERICA'S NEW ECONOMY: THE BASIC GUIDE. By Robert Hamrin. New York: Franklin Watts, 1988, 484 pp. $27.50.

To claim to present "the major facts needed to understand the American economy of the present and future" is to blow up a balloon that reviewers must try to burst. Although he sometimes does not get far below the surface, Hamrin manages to be quite engaging as he sets out a large number of basic facts about various aspects of the economy. His strong suit, though, is in interpreting, especially when he can also debunk. His point of view is that of a liberal Democrat whose target is frequently Reaganomics and its claims.

The United States

Gaddis Smith

1999: VICTORY WITHOUT WAR. By Richard Nixon. New York: Simon & Schuster, 1988, 336 pp. $19.95.

The former president's latest book focuses on the relations of the United States with the Soviet Union and advances a familiar realpolitik line. "What moves the world for good or ill is power, and no sovereign nation will give up any of its power to the U.N. or any other body—not now and not ever." Power is discussed primarily in military terms. Nixon argues that the Kremlin continues to aim at world dominance through a system of repression and he calls for a forceful American response. He is wary of Gorbachev's foreign policy initiatives and shows no sympathy for those who see America in decline. "We hold the future in our hands" are the book's closing words.

STARTING WITH THE PEOPLE. By Daniel Yankelovich and Sidney Harman. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1988, 279 pp. $18.95.

The authors document from public opinion polls that American foreign policy with its emphasis on containment and deterrence is no longer congruent with the values of the American people. It is essential, they say, for consensus to be restored. They present a strong case for "mutually assured security" in Soviet-American relations; specifically, they suggest a reduction of 95 to 99 percent in nuclear weapons and a buildup of nonprovocative conventional weapons, combined with mutual forbearance in the Third World.

MANAGING THE PRESIDENCY: THE EISENHOWER LEGACY FROM KENNEDY TO REAGAN. By Phillip G. Henderson. Boulder (Colo.): Westview Press, 1988, 205 pp. $29.95.

The author draws on the extensive archives of the Eisenhower Library in this celebration of the meticulous procedures ordered by President

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Eisenhower for planning, deciding on and implementing foreign policy. The focus is on the machinery—well oiled and beautifully coordinated—more than on substance. If subsequent administrations had followed the Eisenhower model, the author suggests, much chaos might well have been avoided.

DIPLOMACY AND THE AMERICAN DEMOCRACY. By David D. Newsom. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1988, 226 pp. $25.00 (paper, $9.95).

A fresh treatise on the nature and peculiarities of American diplomacy, the distilled wisdom of the author's four decades of experience. The book should be required reading for every foreign official about to deal for the first time with the United States and for every American contemplating a diplomatic career.

LETTERS TO THE NEXT PRESIDENT. By Richard G. Lugar. New York: Simon & Schuster, 1988, 283 pp. $19.95.

Senator Lugar (R-Ind.) is a member of the Foreign Relations Committee and served as its chairman in 1985 and 1986. His sensible and clearly written book is simultaneously an indirect criticism of President Reagan and a call for close cooperation between president and Congress in the future conduct of foreign policy. His advice, in a capsule, is: tell the truth, respect the Constitution, work with Congress, and recruit able people as advisers. Substantive chapters on the senator's own role in the restoration of democracy in Guatemala and the Philippines are important additions to the historical record.

COLD WARRIORS: EISENHOWER'S GENERATION AND AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY. By H. W. Brands, Jr. New York: Columbia University Press, 1988, 252 pp. $30.00.

Nine perceptive biographical essays about President Eisenhower himself, his "inner circle" (John Foster Dulles, Allen Dulles and Milton Eisenhower), his "lieutenants" (Walter Bedell Smith and Robert Murphy), and "agitators and agents" (C. D. Jackson, Harold Stassen and Henry Cabot Lodge). The author notes how the practical experience of World War II tempered the fervent anticommunism of the Administration: "they recognized the location of the brink, and for all their tough talk they stayed well away. . . . They might have done better, but they might also have done far worse."

SO CLOSE TO GREATNESS: A BIOGRAPHY OF WILLIAM C. BULLITT. By Will Brownell and Richard N. Billings. New York: Macmillan, 1988, 368 pp. $24.95.

Bill Bullitt (1891–1967) was one of the most colorful and egocentrically brilliant figures ever to appear on the American diplomatic stage. In 1919, on a secret mission for President Wilson, he met Lenin and was enraptured. In the 1930s he was Franklin Roosevelt's ambassador to the Soviet Union and then to France. During World War II, coming full circle in his attitude toward the Soviet Union, he was a premature cold warrior. The authors do an entertaining job of depicting Bullitt's rambunctious character and high social style. Their grasp of the international context, however, is only adequate.

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ALGER HISS: RECOLLECTIONS OF A LIFE. By Alger Hiss. New York: Seaver Books/Holt, 1988, 240 pp., $19.95.

Even-tempered but rather thin memoirs. The material on the author's close relationship, as clerk and friend, to Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes is the best. Since Mr. Hiss has written previously about his legal ordeal and conviction, it is understandable why he has little more to say on that subject. But historians may regret his very cursory treatment of diplomatic events—especially the Yalta and San Francisco conferences—in which he participated.

THE LONG-DISTANCE RUNNER: AN AUTOBIOGRAPHY. By Michael Harrington. New York: Henry Holt, 1988, 260 pp. $19.95.

The story of a wonderful life in the left lane, written by a man of great vision whose interests go far beyond the socialist movement but whose commitment to social justice has been the abiding feature of his career. Whether fighting the clubhouse politicians through the New York Democratic reform movement in the 1950s and 1960s or arguing the Israeli-Arab positions at international conferences, Harrington has been one of the genuine heroes of the American left in our time. He is also a marvelous writer.

ETHEL ROSENBERG: BEYOND THE MYTHS. By Ilene Philipson. New York: Franklin Watts, 1988, 390 pp. $18.95.

This book is superb on the milieu—New York's Lower East Side—and the era—the Depression and World War II—in which the Rosenbergs grew up and became dedicated communists. Ethel emerges as the victim of an appalling family (especially mother), but also as a rather unformed personality given to compulsive role-playing. The material on the trial and execution is mostly familiar, but the author's overall approach to the question of the Rosenbergs' innocence or guilt is rather oblique.

Lucy Despard

The Western Hemisphere

Abraham F. Lowenthal

DIPLOMACY OF FEAR: CANADA AND THE COLD WAR, 1941–1948. By Denis Smith. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1988, 289 pp. $35.00 (paper, $15.95).

This is an outstanding monograph, rich with quotations from Canadian, American and British archives and personal papers. The story of how Canadian diplomats tried to understand the behavior of the Soviet Union and cope with the problems of being pulled inexorably along in the wake of the United States illuminates the history of the cold war and of U.S. foreign policy as well as the history of Canada. The material on the thinking of specific Canadian leaders—Lester Pearson, Dana Wilgress, Escott Reid, the egregious Mackenzie King and others—is particularly good.

Gaddis Smith

INNOCENCE IS NOT ENOUGH: THE LIFE AND DEATH OF HERBERT NORMAN. By Roger Bowen. Armonk (N.Y.): Sharpe, 1988, 409 pp. $27.50.

Herbert Norman (1909–1957), born in Japan of Canadian missionary parents, was a brilliant Japanologist and Canadian diplomat. He committed

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suicide while Canadian ambassador in Cairo, when for the third time he was being accused of communist affiliations by McCarthyites in the United States. This sensitive biography of a somewhat naïve intellectual describes Norman's left-wing ties as a student in the 1930s but presents convincing evidence of his loyalty to Canada as a diplomat. The case remains controversial to this day. There are still those who believe he was a spy.
Gaddis Smith

THE POLITICS OF MILITARY RULE IN BRAZIL, 1964–85. By Thomas E. Skidmore. New York: Oxford, 1988, 420 pp. $29.95.

A worthy successor to the author's earlier *Politics of Brazil, 1930–1964*, this volume will quickly establish itself as the authoritative work in English on Brazil under military rule and on the country's gradual transition toward democracy. Assiduously researched and elegantly written, the book combines lucid analysis of economic and social trends with sound political history and balanced judgments.

MEXICO IN TRANSITION: IMPLICATIONS FOR U.S. POLICY. Edited by Susan Kaufman Purcell. New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1988, 157 pp. $19.95 (paper, $9.95).

Six Mexican authors and five North Americans offer timely and well-informed broad-brush appraisals of Mexico's politics, its economy, the issue of immigration and overall prospects for U.S.-Mexico relations. What stands out most is that Mexico's realities are changing faster than U.S. perceptions and policies.

CRISIS IN CENTRAL AMERICA: REGIONAL DYNAMICS AND U.S. POLICY IN THE 1980s. Edited by Nora Hamilton and others. Boulder (Colo.): Westview Press, 1988, 272 pp. $32.50 (paper, $9.95). A PACCA Book.

In their introduction, the editors of these conference papers see a need for "constructive alternatives" to present policies toward Central America, noting the contributors' consensus that the Reagan Administration "has failed in its efforts to reassert U.S. hegemony" there. But the volume's strength is not policy ideas; the first chapter notes only that congressmen (like many Americans) are "trapped between their opposition to communism and their opposition to U.S. troop commitments." Half of the authors, mostly academics, reside in Central America, and so add a valuable perspective to the U.S. debate. Especially good are two chapters on El Salvador, one by Ricardo Stein of that country. Two chapters each on the economy and the nature of war in Central America (including a detailed description of the Guatemalan counterinsurgency) are also informative, even if one disagrees with some of the opinions.
Linda Robinson

NICARAGUA'S CONTINUING STRUGGLE. By Arturo J. Cruz. New York: Freedom House, 1988, 58 pp. $12.95 (paper, $5.95).

Nicaragua's exiled opposition figure reveals his own continuing ambivalence as he recounts his ultimately unsuccessful attempt to negotiate the conditions under which the major opposition parties might have participated in Nicaragua's 1984 election. Neither the opposition nor the Sandinistas fare particularly well in Cruz's memoir, but the degree of distrust generated by Nicaragua's civil war is amply illustrated.

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VENEZUELA'S MOVIMIENTO AL SOCIALISMO: FROM GUERRILLA DEFEAT TO INNOVATIVE POLITICS. By Steve Ellner. Durham (N.C.): Duke University Press, 1988, 262 pp. $43.50.

A well-researched analysis of Venezuela's small but innovative third party, which has eclipsed both guerrilla groups and the orthodox Communist Party to become the country's leading leftist voice. MAS is unusual on the Latin American left in its rejection of intransigent postures (such as unrelenting distrust of the United States and of the local armed forces), but it has not succeeded in attracting many followers aside from middle-class intellectuals.

FROM CONFRONTATION TO NEGOTIATION: U.S. RELATIONS WITH CUBA. By Philip Brenner. Boulder (Colo.): Westview Press, 1988, 118 pp. $24.95 (paper, $7.95). A PACCA Book.

TERRORISM: THE CUBAN CONNECTION. By Roger W. Fontaine. New York: Crane, Russak, 1988, 206 pp. $29.95 (paper, $14.95).

These books, written from sharply different perspectives, highlight the need for informed and dispassionate analysis of Cuba's international role and its relations with the United States. Brenner, a long-time proponent of a U.S. initiative to normalize relations with Cuba, argues persuasively that U.S. policy toward the Castro regime has failed to achieve its objectives. But his hopeful suggestion for a "sensible policy" is ultimately unconvincing because he fails to address Cuba's motives and policies with the same critical independence he shows in analyzing U.S. approaches. Fontaine, a former National Security Council official in the first Reagan Administration and then a diplomatic correspondent for *The Washington Times*, mars his potentially illuminating, detailed account of Cuba's alleged relations with terrorist movements by engaging in crude psychohistory, broad-brush polemic, and unsubstantiated assertions.

Western Europe

Fritz Stern

EUROPE WITHOUT AMERICA?: THE CRISIS IN ATLANTIC RELATIONS. By John Palmer. New York: Oxford, 1988, 217 pp. $22.50.

Why the coy question mark of the title—when it is also the prescription of this manifesto cum analysis? The author, former European editor of *The Guardian* based in Brussels, writes from the conviction (and perhaps the hope) that "the Atlantic Alliance . . . could now, in the later 1980s, be facing a period of potentially terminal decline." He also foresees "the slow decay of Atlanticism." Under these circumstances, an independent, unified and perhaps neutralized Europe should arise—something that only a new left is likely to achieve. Palmer is aware of the corruption and decline in Eastern Europe, but hopes for reforms and sees East European dissidents as favoring his hope for a new European order. An intelligent exposition of important minority views that would find themselves attracted to Gorbachev's invocation of "this common house, Europe." The book—despite its bias, oversimplification and occasional historical lapses—can be read as a useful challenge to any kind of complacent Atlanticism.

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JAHRBUCH DER EUROPÄISCHEN INTEGRATION 1986/87. Edited by Werner Weidenfeld and Wolfgang Wessels. Bonn: Institute für Europäische Politik/Europa Union Verlag, 1987, 533 pp. DM35.

A comprehensive and, in parts, critical survey of what happened during 1986–87 in the various institutions of the EEC. A Baedeker to Brussels' Europe, prepared by a group of competent experts, most of them German, with a searching analysis by Werner Weidenfeld, one of the editors and a leading German political scientist. He, too, reflects on the growing estrangement between the U.S. and Western Europe and on the suddenly reappearing dream—primarily in Germany where the dream first appeared—of a *Mitteleuropa*, presumably a neutralized zone dominated by Germans; this, too, is part of the lure of Gorbachev's appeal to the European "common house." A superior reference work.

IS SOCIALISM DOOMED?: THE MEANING OF MITTERRAND. By Daniel Singer. New York: Oxford, 1988, 324 pp. $24.95.

A harsh, well-written, if at times racy, criticism of Mitterrand's abandonment of progressive, truly socialist policies and his reaching out for centrist support. Singer attacks the gap between socialist promise and capitalist performance and pleads for the reinvention of a true socialism aiming still at an egalitarian and classless society. Like John Palmer, Singer wonders—hopefully—whether "the countries of Western Europe . . . can forge a radical alternative [to the American model and American pressure] likely to act as a magnet for the other half of Europe, ultimately including the Soviet Union."

GERMANY AND THE GERMANS: AN ANATOMY OF SOCIETY TODAY. By John Ardagh. New York: Harper & Row, 1987, 478 pp. $24.95

A British francophile, author of several books on France, discovers today's two Germanies. A journalistic, anecdotal account, with emphasis on society and culture, not politics. A broad but superficial survey, weak on the past, strong on local color, regional differences, opinion polls and prevailing popular attitudes. A host of topics ranging from Christmas celebrations and industrial innovation in West Germany to the nationalist promotion of sports in East Germany. Ardagh believes that the Federal Republic is less lively but more democratic than Germany in earlier times: conventional wisdom, amiably and attractively illuminated by telling examples and statistics.

"CONTAINMENT" IM WANDEL. By Martin Beglinger. Stuttgart: Steiner, 1988, 341 pp. DM58.

A Zurich doctoral dissertation examines the policies toward the Soviet Union of the Eisenhower Administration, with particular emphasis on how anti-Soviet perceptions and assumptions shaped those policies. The author argues that Eisenhower, though more conciliatory and less ideological than John Foster Dulles, did not explore the possibilities that might have been present after Stalin's death. A useful review of a still controversial era, based mostly on published sources.

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ROOSEVELT AND DE GAULLE: ALLIES IN CONFLICT. By Raoul Aglion. New York: Free Press, 1988, 237 pp. $22.50.

Personal memoirs of a French diplomat who in 1940 instantly rallied to De Gaulle. He was posted in New York and describes the bitter divisions among the French in the U.S., the imperiousness of De Gaulle, and the largely anti-Gaullist mood in the U.S. government, while the American press was largely pro-Gaullist. A fascinating insider's view, but not an historical account and containing a few inaccuracies.

BRITISH INTELLIGENCE IN THE SECOND WORLD WAR: ITS INFLUENCE ON STRATEGY AND OPERATIONS. VOLUME III, PART II. By F. H. Hinsley, E. E. Thomas, C. A. G. Simkins and C. F. G. Ransom. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1988, 1,038 pp. $75.00.

The final volume of this magisterial series sticks to its rule against mentioning personalities and, even more rigidly than before, focuses on the written record of what intelligence learned and judged, with less on the more subjective and difficult matter suggested by the subtitle. Where the authors let themselves go, as in the opening sections on planning and deception before D-Day, the result is solid, and on the V-weapons too, the account is illuminating and precise. On other key points, such as the crucial defeat of the German attack at Mortain, the surprises at Arnhem and the Bulge, and the last phase of the Battle of the Atlantic, the account seems excessively dry and non-interpretive alongside the separate accounts of Ronald Lewin, Ralph Bennett and Patrick Beesly. Still, no serious historian of the war can fail to use this volume fully, and the appendix on the comparative Polish, French and British contributions to the breaking of the Enigma machine code is much fuller and more credit-giving than the earlier effort in the first volume of the series. William P. Bundy

THE RESCUE OF THE DANISH JEWS: MORAL COURAGE UNDER STRESS. Edited by Leo Goldberger. New York: New York University Press, 1988, 217 pp. (New York: Columbia University Press, distributor, $40.00; paper, $20.00).

The rescue in October 1943 of the bulk of Danish Jewry—about 7,000 were spirited to Sweden—is depicted in various accounts, some previously published. An essay by a leading Danish historian and an analysis by the great church historian Jaroslav Pelikan are supplemented by personal, often quite gripping, recollections. A mélange, born originally of a conference, but a heartening subject, even if the heroism of thousands is perhaps too easily transposed to the population at large, while the receptivity of neutral Sweden seems taken for granted.

The Soviet Union and Eastern Europe

John C. Campbell

GORBACHEV'S RUSSIA AND AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY. Edited by Seweryn Bialer and Michael Mandelbaum. Boulder (Colo.): Westview Press (with The East-West Forum), 1988, 491 pp. $32.50 (paper, $15.95).

Valuable, timely essays by 13 well-known American authorities. More than half the book probes the nature and sources within the Soviet Union of the changes Gorbachev is seeking to accomplish. The remaining chapters

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are cautiously optimistic in exploring the international implications. Professor Bialer concludes, for example, that "the time has come at least to suspend the idea that we must conduct a crusade [against] . . . the Soviet Union. The continuation of such an attitude will leave us standing alone among the developed capitalist societies." Gaddis Smith

RETHINKING US-SOVIET RELATIONS. By George Liska. New York: Basil Blackwell, 1987, 231 pp. $22.50.

Both Russia and America, according to George Liska, need to take a long-term strategic view of their foreign policies and relations with each other. Gorbachev appears to be doing so, but he has no American counterpart. Liska's own rethinking leaves the cold war behind and brings him to the idea of a global equilibrium based on common interests in stability, downgrading of ideology and a recognition of respective, but not exclusive, spheres of influence. No simple summary can do justice to this wide-ranging historical and conceptual analysis; it is not a naïve prescription for peace and good will. The book lacks, however, any inquiry in depth into Soviet society and its capacity for change, a matter that bears on what the U.S. can and should do. The language is complex and the argument at times abstruse, making this no easy reading assignment and possibly limiting the book's impact.

SOVIET SOCIALISM: SOCIAL AND POLITICAL ESSAYS. By L. G. Churchward. New York: Routledge & Kegan Paul/Methuen, 1988, 216 pp. $45.00.

A veteran observer's reflections on chosen topics such as changing Soviet social structures, Stalinism and de-Stalinization, the intelligentsia, and whether the U.S.S.R. can be called a democracy. Along with his own opinions he comments on the interpretations of many others; thus, the book constitutes a kind of running critical bibliography of the state of scholarship on those topics. Written in 1983–84, the essays do not take account of new developments in the Gorbachev era, but these developments tend to buttress many of the author's conclusions.

COGS IN THE WHEEL: THE FORMATION OF SOVIET MAN. By Mikhail Heller. New York: Knopf, 1988, 282 pp. $22.95.

Seventy years of Soviet history seen through the effort to create *homo sovieticus*, the new Soviet man. In pursuing this theme, Heller, an emigré from the U.S.S.R. now living in Paris, draws a devastating picture of the Soviet political system, which he sees as basically unchanged through the years despite the transitions in the top leadership; Gorbachev's campaign for reform has its parallels in the slogans of all his predecessors, including Stalin. New Soviet man, if he exists, is still unable to adapt to the demands of the scientific-technological revolution of today; hence Gorbachev's insoluble dilemma.

SOVIET SOCIETY AND CULTURE: ESSAYS IN HONOR OF VERA S. DUNHAM. Edited by Terry L. Thompson and Richard Sheldon. Boulder (Colo.): Westview Press, 1988, 290 pp. $26.50.

Authors and editors have succeeded in fashioning a collection of brief, pithy and not wholly unrelated essays that touch on salient aspects of Soviet society from Stalin's time to the present. They make a real effort to put

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their specialized presentations in the context of broad social and cultural trends. Alexander Dallin, Seweryn Bialer, James Millar and Peter Juviler are among the contributors.

THE ECONOMIC CHALLENGE OF PERESTROIKA. By Abel Aganbegyan. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1988, 248 pp. $18.95.

Writing for the outside world, Gorbachev's principal economic adviser presents perestroika in much the same way that the general secretary and others have explained it to the Soviet people. His book may be taken as an authentic statement of how Soviet leaders view the U.S.S.R.'s problems and their solution through changes they describe as fundamental, radical and even revolutionary, intended to move the U.S.S.R. from a command economy "towards a democratic, independent, self-managing economy" and the fuller satisfaction of the needs of the Soviet people. The tone naturally is upbeat, although Aganbegyan certainly is aware of the formidable obstacles to reform, to which Alec Nove refers in his introduction to the book.

SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY. Edited by Robbin F. Laird. New York: Academy of Political Science, 1987, 276 pp. $12.95 (paper).

More about Gorbachev and what he has done and might do. These 20-odd essays are admittedly no more than initial assessments, after the first two years, of the prospects for continuity and for change in Soviet foreign policy, and time may prove some of them wrong. All in all, however, they do show how the new leadership's foreign policies are linked to the primary task of reform at home, and what the main lines of policy appear to be in East-West relations, Third World conflicts and other areas. The authors are a reasonably happy combination of seasoned veterans and promising newcomers.

THE BEAR, THE CUBS AND THE EAGLE: SOVIET BLOC INTERVENTIONISM IN THE THIRD WORLD AND THE U.S. RESPONSE. By Bertil Dunér. Brookfield (Vt.): Gower, 1987, 204 pp. $44.50. Published in association with the Swedish Institute of International Affairs.

THE THIRD WORLD AND THE SOVIET UNION. Edited by Zaki Laïdi. London: Zed Books, 1988, 125 pp. (Atlantic Highlands, N.J.: Humanities Press, distributor, $45.00; paper, $15.00).

The Dunér book poses some key questions concerning Soviet policy and military interventions in the 1970s and early 1980s, the role of Soviet allies (especially Cuba), and the countermoves, or absence thereof, by the United States. The author marshals what evidence he can find—nothing very new or startling—to see what conclusions the facts support and to test the conclusions of others. In many instances the facts are insufficient, and he calls for further study and research. A contrasting viewpoint, found in the Laïdi volume, is that of the Third World countries themselves, either individually or as regional groups. The authors, many of whom are connected with the Centre d'Etudes et de Recherches Internationales in Paris, add new dimensions to the already considerable body of literature on Soviet-Third World relations produced by Soviet and Western writers. The essays follow no set plan, however, and the geographic coverage is spotty.

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UNCOVERING SOVIET DISASTERS: EXPLORING THE LIMITS OF GLASNOST. By James F. Oberg. New York: Random House, 1988, 317 pp. $19.95.

It has been Soviet practice to deny or minimize man-made disasters such as airplane crashes, spacecraft failures, chemical explosions or nuclear accidents. James Oberg, an engineer in the U.S. aerospace program, does an exemplary job of investigating dozens of such events, using a variety of sources and methods to get as close as he can to establishing what the facts were and how the Soviet authorities chose to handle them. He is both thorough and objective. While condemning the policy of secrecy, he sees signs of its easing, and those signs have multiplied since the book went to press.

SOCIALIST AGRICULTURE IN TRANSITION: ORGANIZATIONAL RESPONSE TO FAILING PERFORMANCE. Edited by Josef C. Brada and Karl-Eugen Wadekin. Boulder (Colo.): Westview Press, 1988, 445 pp. $58.00.

Based on papers and discussions at a conference held in 1984, this solid volume contains contributions from 30 experts, all from the West save two each from Poland and Hungary. The underlying data are now out of date but the analysis, both of specific problems and of the overall shortcomings characteristic of all the communist countries, is as pertinent today as when written. The reasons for poor performance emerge clearly. The possibilities for improvement, within the system, are not clear at all.

INNOVATION ODER STAGNATION. By Harry Maier. Cologne: Deutscher Instituts-Verlag, 1987, 248 pp. DM28.

This volume reaches the same conclusions on the Gorbachev economic reforms as do many of the current works in English on the subject, but the author had a special vantage point in that until 1986 he was a leading economic official of the German Democratic Republic, working with colleagues in the Soviet Union who are now among Gorbachev's advisers. His book also covers the problems of innovation and reform in the East European states, but he does not go into national specifics, except in the case of East Germany.

THE OTHER EUROPE: EASTERN EUROPE TO 1945. By E. Garrison Walters. Syracuse (N.Y.): Syracuse University Press, 1988, 443 pp. $29.95 (paper, $16.95).

Writing the history of Eastern Europe in one volume, once an author has cleared the first hurdle of defining the area, is still no easy task, as it means covering the internal and external affairs of eight or ten countries in addition to the broad political and economic trends affecting them all. In this book, intended for general rather than specialist consumption, Walters shows admirable selectivity in providing relevant information without overkill. On the interwar period his book does not displace the earlier works of Hugh Seton-Watson and Joseph Rothschild but it is a worthy companion to them.

SOVIET AND AMERICAN SIGNALLING IN THE POLISH CRISIS. By Thomas M. Cynkin. New York: St. Martin's, 1988, 270 pp. $37.50.

Cynkin, an operations officer in the State Department, has written a full case study in crisis management, showing how both the U.S.S.R. and the

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United States pursued their respective aims in Poland in 1980–81 by sending both public and confidential "signals" to each other and to various factions in Poland. He shows how Moscow, by concentrating on manipulation of the internal situation in Poland, was consistently successful while Washington, which feared a Soviet invasion, used its carrots and sticks without much effect; but the Soviets, of course, had all the geostrategic and political factors in their favor. The method is a little too mechanical: every article in *Pravda* is taken as an important signal. But on the whole this is a job well done, with important lessons for the future.

The Middle East

John C. Campbell

THE BIRTH OF THE PALESTINIAN REFUGEE PROBLEM, 1947–1949. By Benny Morris. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1988, 380 pp. $39.50.

The simple and totally conflicting explanations that Israeli and Arab official statements have given for the mass exodus of Arabs from their homes in Palestine at the time of the first Arab-Israeli war are proved wrong by this careful study, although there are elements of truth in both. Using a great number and variety of Israeli and other sources, Morris examines what happened day by day, sector by sector, village by village. His conclusions, complex answers to complex questions, are so well documented by contemporary material that it is unlikely they would be substantially changed by seeing the unpublished Arab documents unavailable to him. Suffice it to say that the war itself, the attitudes and fears on both sides and the circumstances of the time made the flight of the Arabs almost inevitable.

THE ORIGINS OF PALESTINIAN NATIONALISM. By Muhammad Y. Muslih. New York: Columbia University Press, 1988, 277 pp. $30.00.

A first-rate monograph bringing new light, mainly from untapped Arab sources, to an old subject. Covering the period up to 1920, it traces the role of leading Palestinian "notables" and political activists in the interacting and overlapping currents of Ottomanism and Arabism, Arab nationalism in its Syrian and broader pan-Arab phases, and nationalism limited to the historical territory of Palestine. The author does not ignore anti-Zionism as a stimulus but tries to put it into a broad perspective.

TEDDY KOLLEK: MAYOR OF JERUSALEM. By Naomi Shepherd. New York: Harper & Row, 1988, 175 pp. $16.95.

Not a standard biography but a study of Kollek's accomplishments, and his continuing problems, as mayor of a city reunited geographically in 1967 but still of undetermined legal status, divided by political, religious and ethnic feuds, and never far from the brink of violence. Probably there is no better way of telling Jerusalem's story over these two decades than by keeping the focus on the man at the center of it. And in doing so the author achieves a biographer's purpose in conveying the essence of her subject, in this case a man of inexhaustible energy, tolerance (most of the time) and unique talents, somehow doing an impossible job.

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FOR THE LAND AND THE LORD: JEWISH FUNDAMENTALISM IN ISRAEL. By Ian S. Lustick. New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1988, 244 pp. $19.95 (paper, $11.95).

Lustick's analysis of Jewish fundamentalism, spearheaded in action by Gush Emunim and the militant settlers in the occupied territories, shows how much Israel's political scene has changed since 1967. He explains how this movement, with deep roots in Jewish history and messianic insistence on redemption of all of "Eretz Israel," has created what may be insuperable obstacles to a negotiated settlement with the Arabs and a stable democratic future for Israel. The prospect has serious implications for American policy, although American policy may not be able to do much about it.

BESIEGED BEDFELLOWS: ISRAEL AND THE LAND OF APARTHEID. By Benjamin M. Joseph. Westport (Conn.): Greenwood Press, 1988, 184 pp. $35.00.

Israel and South Africa have a working alliance relationship based on mutual interest and an underlying sense of solidarity, openly admitted and steadily expanded since John Vorster's dramatic visit to Israel in 1976. Joseph says he writes to present the facts (such facts as he could find in open and public sources), not to commend or condemn, but condemnation of Israel's policy seems to follow inevitably from the facts presented.

A NEW IRAQ?: THE GULF WAR AND IMPLICATIONS FOR U.S. POLICY. By Frederick W. Axelgard. New York: Praeger (with the Center for Strategic and International Studies), 1988, 144 pp. $29.95 (paper, $9.95).

Axelgard's answer to the question posed by his title is yes, there is a new Iraq, more stable in its leadership, stronger and more united, wiser and better balanced in foreign policy, than before the Gulf war. The book is in the nature of an intelligence report with data confirming those trends. If the author is overcritical of Washington's alleged failure to adjust to the new situation, as he is overenthusiastic in his estimate of the new Iraq, no matter. It is important that he has stated his case and spurred thinking about it.

ASAD: THE SPHINX OF DAMASCUS. By Moshe Ma'oz. New York: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1988, 221 pp. $19.95.

Moshe Ma'oz has written as good a biography of the Syrian leader as is available anywhere, but Hafez al-Assad remains a sphinx. Having no opportunity, as an Israeli, to interview his subject or consult sources in Syria, the author has had to rely heavily on newspapers and secondary material, which he uses to good advantage, and he may well be close to the mark in his account of how Assad achieved and has held power and greatly increased Syria's weight in regional and world politics. A very useful book even though many questions, some posed by the author himself, remain but partially answered.

THE POLITICAL LANGUAGE OF ISLAM. By Bernard Lewis. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1988, 168 pp. $14.95.

Bernard Lewis calls on his intimate knowledge of Middle Eastern languages, Islamic culture, and past and present politics to explain the patterns of expression, thought and conduct in Islamic societies, so often misunder-

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stood by Westerners. It is a learned book and also one with practical significance in light of the persisting strength of Islamic traditions and the role of Islamic political, even revolutionary, movements amid the changing conditions of the contemporary world.

THE NEXT ARAB DECADE: ALTERNATIVE FUTURES. Edited by Hisham Sharabi. Boulder (Colo.): Westview Press (with the Center for Contemporary Arab Studies, Georgetown University), 1988, 347 pp. $39.95.

A bevy of Middle East experts, some eagerly, some reluctantly, undertake to predict what will happen in the Arab world in the next ten years. The prophecies and alternative scenarios are intriguing but possibly less significant than what the authors say about the past and present. The views of the authors, most of them Arab or Arab-American, are by no means uniform, but they share a mood of pessimism about the region's future.

THE MIDDLE EAST IN GLOBAL STRATEGY. Edited by Aurel Braun. Boulder (Colo.): Westview Press, 1987, 274 pp. $34.00.

The authors (Canadian, American and Israeli) of this set of studies on the interests and policies of outside powers and regional actors in the Middle East take on a dual task: to discover what the respective national strategies are and then to judge their adequacy. In explanation they succeed fairly well. In judgment some are argumentative as well as analytical, and rather severe in finding that none of the governments in question (except Israel) has been blessed with much vision in defining, balancing and pursuing its own national interest.

THE GREAT POWERS IN THE MIDDLE EAST, 1919–1939. Edited by Uriel Dann. New York: Holmes & Meier, 1988, 434 pp. $59.50.

The international relations of the interwar period can now be seen more clearly, thanks to the perspective of time and the opening of archives. That is ample reason for a book of this nature, in which historians review some of the questions of that time on the basis of new research. With 28 authors there is no balanced coverage or unifying theme, and the absence of Arab, Turkish or Iranian historians (the book grew out of a conference held in Tel Aviv) should be noted. Even so, the quality of the individual pieces make this a valuable book.

Asia and the Pacific

Donald S. Zagoria

CHINA'S GLOBAL PRESENCE. Edited by David M. Lampton and Catherine H. Keyser. Washington: American Enterprise Institute (with the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies), 1988, 256 pp. $26.50 (paper, $12.75).

Eight specialists assess China's political and economic reforms, prospects for increased Sino-American trade, China's high-tech future, Taiwan's political and economic ambitions, China's role in superpower competition and the PRC's impact on regional stability. An arresting analysis by Albert Keidel argues that there are very few conditions under which the Chinese reforms could fail. By the year 2000 he says China's economy will have easily surpassed official targets to quadruple the output of industry and

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agriculture. He is particularly bullish on the dynamic coastal provinces that hold nearly half of China's population.

CHINA AND NORTHEAST ASIA. By Harry Harding. Washington: University Press of America/New York: The Asia Society, 1988, 81 pp.

In this short volume, one of America's eminent China specialists provides a concise analysis of Chinese foreign policy since the death of Mao Zedong in 1976. He stresses how the Chinese leaders have increasingly acknowledged the durability and legitimacy of the international order, have greatly reduced their support for revolutionary movements in the Third World, and now take an active and constructive role in virtually every major international organization. Harding concludes that the United States and China will share common interests on some matters while differing on others, but that the commonalities should outweigh the differences.

DISCOS AND DEMOCRACY: CHINA IN THE THROES OF REFORM. By Orville Schell. New York: Pantheon, 1988, 384 pp. $19.95.

A vivid, if somewhat sensationalized, account of the transformation of Chinese society since Mao's death. It describes student demonstrations and the purging of dissident intellectuals from the party, and it offers tantalizing glimpses into the new worlds of Chinese bodybuilding, advertising, disco and cosmetic surgery.

THE INDOCHINA TANGLE: CHINA'S VIETNAM POLICY, 1975–1979. By Robert S. Ross. New York: Columbia University Press, 1988, 361 pp. $40.00.

This is a detailed discussion of how China and Vietnam became deadly enemies in the four years following the fall of Saigon in 1975. The author sees many factors behind the dispute, including the border, the offshore islands, territorial waters, the overseas Chinese and Cambodia. But he stresses the growing Vietnamese-Soviet relationship that developed at a time when Chinese leaders were apprehensive about Soviet "encirclement" of China.

PEACE, POLITICS AND ECONOMICS IN ASIA. Edited by Robert A. Scalapino and Masataka Kosaka. Washington: Pergamon-Brassey's, 1988, 209 pp. $30.00.

A well-respected group of academics from the United States, Japan, Korea and Southeast Asia present an overview of the economic, political and strategic issues now confronting East Asia.

IN SEARCH OF AN EAST ASIAN DEVELOPMENT MODEL. Edited by Peter L. Berger and Michael Hsiao. New Brunswick (N.J.): Transaction Books, 1988, 357 pp. $29.95 (paper, $16.95).

This is a much better than average collection of essays on a subject that has been well worked over in recent years: whether East Asia's economic success stories can serve as a development model for other parts of the world. There is a particularly strong introductory essay by Peter Berger and an excellent essay by Gustav Papanek on the economic strategies that have proved so successful for the region.

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THE UNITED STATES' EMERGENCE AS A SOUTHEAST ASIAN POWER, 1940–1950. By Gary Hess. New York: Columbia University Press, 1987, 448 pp.

This is contemporary history at its best. With few axes to grind, it tells the story of the development of U.S. policy in Southeast Asia during the critical period beginning with the Japanese-American rivalry over the region in 1940–41 and concluding with the outbreak of the Korean War in 1950. It shows how American interest in Southeast Asia sharpened in 1948–49 as the Chinese Communists moved toward victory in the civil war with the Kuomintang and how plans to rebuild the Japanese economy also increased the importance of the region. Both the achievements and the shortcomings of American policy are dealt with.

AFGHANISTAN: THE GREAT GAME REVISITED. Edited by Rosanne Klass. New York: Freedom House, 1988, 519 pp. $29.95 (paper, $19.95).

Freedom House has put together a collection of well-informed essays on the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. Alexandre Bennigsen's analysis of the war's impact on Russian-Muslim relations in Soviet Central Asia is particularly striking.

Africa

Jennifer Seymour Whitaker

DIPLOMATIC SOLDIERING. By Joe Garba. Ibadan, Nigeria: Spectrum Books (in association with Safari Books, Channel Islands, U.K.), 1987, 238 pp.

In this memoir of his stint as Nigerian minister of external affairs (from 1976 to 1978), General Garba recounts with marvelous candor his personal dealings with African, American, European and Soviet leaders while advancing Nigeria's influence generally, and, in particular, its growing role in southern Africa as an honorary member of the Frontline States. The general's story of negotiations and machinations on Angola, Zimbabwe, the U.N., ECOWAS and other matters should provide students with valuable source material and at the same time entertain readers with its down-to-earth and sometimes hilarious demythologizing of people and events.

THE PRECARIOUS BALANCE: STATE AND SOCIETY IN AFRICA. Edited by Donald Rothchild and Naomi Chazan. Boulder (Colo.): Westview Press, 1988, 357 pp. $32.50.

A number of noted experts examine an increasingly fashionable question: what has become of the African state? The book takes a long and searching look at the relationships or parallels between states and informal economies. It does not, however, really deal directly with state and "society" in the sense of state interaction with communities. Most interesting are future-oriented essays on state organization, endurance of sovereignty, and international linkages by Kwame A. Niwsin, John Ravenhill and Timothy M. Shaw.

ZAMBIA: BETWEEN TWO WORLDS. By Marcia M. Burdette. Boulder (Colo.): Westview Press, 1988, 210 pp. $29.95.

In this appealing and accessible case study, the author offers a fully rounded picture of Zambia's course since independence, chronicling the

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periods of boom and decline after the fall in the price of copper around the mid-1970s. She advocates an internally oriented economic strategy to retain industries and livelihoods, but is not very optimistic about the ability of the current leadership to achieve it.

SOUTH AFRICA: REVOLUTION OR RECONCILIATION? By Walter H. Kansteiner. Washington: Institute on Religion & Democracy, 1988, 174 pp. $8.00 (paper).

The director of economic studies at the Institute on Religion & Democracy appears here to be reinventing constructive engagement, or its precursor, the Kissinger policy of "communication" with South Africa. His advocacy of support for liberal democracy (and his efforts to cast the "radical, Marxist" ANC as just another player) would have more impact if he did not ignore a number of political realities in the scene he describes—particularly the isolation of the tribally oriented Inkatha and its leader Gatsha Buthelezi from mainstream black politics today.

POVERTY, POLICY, AND FOOD SECURITY IN SOUTHERN AFRICA. Edited by Coralie Bryant. Boulder (Colo.): Lynne Rienner, 1988, 291 pp. $30.00.

Looking at the ability of southern Africa to feed itself, the essays in this book lay out the complex political and economic connections the countries of the region have with their giant neighbor and sometime adversary, as well as among themselves. The authors (particularly Stephen R. Lewis, Jr.) make the point that South Africa's coercive power may be constrained by its need for productive economic links with the others. The editor and various authors argue for a comprehensive Western plan for economic aid—both bilateral and regional—to South Africa's neighbors.

EUROPE, AMERICA AND SOUTH AFRICA. Edited by Gregory F. Treverton. New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1988, 138 pp. $8.95 (paper).

Britain's Francis Pym, the Netherland's Max van der Stoel, France's Claude Cheysson and America's Herman Nickel and Donald McHenry wrestle with the dilemmas that South Africa poses for Western policy. These thoughtful essays suggest that European elites are as divided as their American counterparts over what to do and that these intraregional policy divisions are more consequential than any generalized transatlantic split. At base are constraints of economic interest and deep-seated beliefs about the relative efficacy of isolation and dialogue as means of persuasion. Whatever their preferences, all agree that the present level of Western sanctions is not likely to be reduced. William Foltz

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SOURCE MATERIAL

Edited by Janis A. Kreslins

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Truth, fiction, and solid waste

While truth may or may not be stranger than fiction, it is often much harder to come by. That's especially the case when the truth is complicated, and the fiction is offered up by a recognized expert with a well-deserved reputation in a field unrelated to the matter directly at issue.

Take, as a case in point, a recent newspaper column by Sylvia Porter, who pioneered in the field of printing sound advice on financial matters. Her column, in fact, began with some financial truths: Every American produces about a ton of garbage a year, and American communities spend more than $5 billion annually to haul it away. Furthermore, she noted, the costs are escalating as landfills close, and government officials on every level are desperate for solutions.

Having made a factual start, Miss Porter then lists seven commandments for waste-conscious consumers. She urges them, among other things, to ask for brown paper bags in the supermarket instead of plastic sacks, and to patronize those fast-food restaurants that use paper packaging and shun those offering foam plastic containers. She also discourses on biodegradability, composting, landfill space, and the undesirability of mass-burn incinerators in one's backyard. The trouble is, her treatment of these subjects intermingles fiction with fact.

Miss Porter writes that paper take-out containers can be composted and returned to the soil in less than a year—that biodegradable packaging, in other words, decomposes and doesn't take up precious landfill space. But she confuses composting—which mostly involves leaves and other lawn and garden wastes piled above ground—with landfilling.

Nearly 70 percent of the materials in landfills, including paper, are considered biodegradable. But if these materials really disappeared in less than a year, landfills wouldn't be overflowing. Actual excavation of landfills, conducted by university scientists, has uncovered refuse dating from 1970, but looking much the same as it did when first buried. This mummified trash included wood, paper, and food refuse, as well as plastics.

Modern sanitary landfills, by their very design, compact and cover the materials they contain, and have special systems to collect and control potentially toxic runoff and gases. These systems are required by government regulation. Landfills are kept as dry as possible, to prevent groundwater contamination and other health hazards. Scientists have pointed out that the elements necessary for biodegradation—moisture, oxygen, the right kinds of microorganisms—are all in short supply in a landfill. It therefore takes from 15 to 50 years before a meaningful level of biodegradation takes place—far too long to alleviate today's landfill shortage.

Waste disposal is, in truth, a volume problem, not a materials problem. Plastic grocery bags, fast-food foam containers, and similar products account for less than one half of one percent of the solid waste stream. Substitute paper for these items, and solid waste will still be generated, sometimes in greater volume. Those paper bags Miss Porter urges us to use, for example, typically are six times bulkier than plastic and take up six times the space in landfills.

Other points could be raised. But it is not our intention to enter into a protracted argument with Miss Porter. We're merely stating that in the debate over the country's solid waste problem, truth has many facets, and the list of villains includes anybody who has ever discarded an empty milk carton, an old bedspring, or the remains of a chicken dinner.

In other words, we're all part of the problem, and all of us ought to be working together at finding solutions. Fiction masquerading as truth should play no part in the process.

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